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
R. CUDWORTH D.D.
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TREATISE

CONCERNING

ETERNAL and IMMUTABLE

MORALITY.

By *RALPH CUDWORTH*, D.D.
Formerly Master of *Christ's College* in *Cambridge*.

With A PREFACE by the Right Reverend Father in GOD,
EDWARD Lord Bishop of *DURHAM*.

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THE

PREFACE.

THE Author of the following Treatiſe was the very learned Dr. *Ralph Cudworth*, whoſe Name is ſo well known to them that are acquainted with the beſt Authors, as to render it needleſs to ſay more in behalf of this Piece, than that it was compoſed by the ſame Perſon, that writ the *True Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe*. This Author, being early prepared with a nice Skill in moſt of the learned Languages, and having joined to a clear and ſolid judgment an indefatigable application to Study, began ſoon to form vaſt deſigns for

the ſervice of Religion: and in ſubſerviency thereto to reduce his large treaſure of learning to proper heads or ſubjects, which he purpoſed one time or other to improve into compleat diſcourſes.

He lived in an Age, when the diſputes concerning *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*, mingling with the Political ſchemes of the Leaders of oppoſite Parties, help'd to cauſe ſtrong convulſions in the State, and to ſpread no leſs fatal an influence upon the principles and manners of the generality of People. For Debauchery, Scepticiſm and Infidelity, as * *he complains*, flouriſhed in his time, and grew up, *in his opinion*, from the Doctrine of the *Fatal Neceſſity* of all Actions and Events, as from its proper root †.

* Ep. Dedicatory before his *Intellectual Syſtem.*
† Preface to the *Intellect. Syſtem.*

Such

Such a Belief, upon whatſoever grounds or principles maintained, as *he conceived*, did ſerve the deſign of Atheiſm and undermine Chriſtianity and all Religion; as taking away all guilt and blame, puniſhments and rewards: and plainly rendered a day of judgment ridiculous. And *he thought* it evident, that *ſome* in *thoſe days* purſued *thoſe notions*, in order to that end.

THESE Sentiments diſpoſed him to bend much of his Study this way, and to read over all the antient Philoſophers and Moraliſts, which he did with great accuracy. He then ſet himſelf to gather and anſwer all the antient and modern arguments, for the neceſſity of all Actions, which had been maintained by ſeveral Perſons, upon very different grounds. And many of his collections of this kind ſtill re-

main, as ſo many monuments of his copious Reading, judgment and induſtry.

He accordingly diſtinguiſhed three ſorts of Fatality, that he might treat of each apart. Firſt *Natural* or *Material*, which excluding God out of the ſcheme, and ſuppoſing ſenſeleſs matter neceſſarily moved, to be the firſt principle and cauſe of all things, is truly and properly the *Atheiſtical* Fate. This he found defended by *Epicurus* of old, and to refute him and the other Aſſertors of the Atomick material neceſſity, he publiſhed his learned and unanſwerable book, which he entituled the *Intellectual Syſtem of the Univerſe.*

Secondly, *Theologick* or *Divine* Fate, which indeed allows in words the exiſtence of that perfect Intellectual Being, diſtinct from matter, whom

whom we call God: yet affirming that God irreſpectively decrees and determines all things, evil as well as good, doth in effect make all actions alike neceſſary to us. In conſequence whereof, God's will is not regulated by his eſſential and immutable Goodneſs and Juſtice: God is a meer arbitrary will omnipotent: and in reſpect to us, moral good and evil are poſitive things, and not ſo in their own nature, that is, things are good or bad becauſe they are commanded or forbidden, and that which is now good might have been bad, and bad good, if the pure will of God at firſt had not determin'd them to be what they are at preſent.

3. The *Stoical Fate*, which conſtrains alſo the natural and moral actions of the Univerſe, and makes neceſſity to be ſo intrinſecal to the

nature of every thing, as that no being or action could poſſibly be otherwiſe than it is. For all things, according to this notion, depend in a chain of cauſes All in themſelves neceſſary, from the firſt principle of Being, who preordered every event before it fell out, ſo as to leave no room to liberty or Contingency any where in the World.

THESE two laſt hypotheſes of Fataliſm were but lightly touch'd in his *Intellectual Syſtem*, becauſe he intended to give them a more particular and more ample conſideration: however, ill health, a ſhort life, or other reaſons we know not, hindered him from finiſhing what the world earneſtly expected, and no one that ſurvived him was able to ſupply.

IT is probable, that foreſeeing the length of the work, and ſome of the hindrances, that afterwards fell

out

out to retard and defeat it, he thought it beſt to contract his Undertaking, and to treat in ſmaller volumes of thoſe points that he judged to be moſt material and principal in this controverſy.

In this view he drew up the Book, with which the world is now preſented, wherein he proves the falſeneſs of the conſequences with reſpect to *natural juſtice* and *morality in God*, which are deducible from the principles of thoſe that maintain the ſecond ſort of Fate, denominated by him *Theologick*. And thus it may be reckon'd to be a ſequel in part, of his firſt book againſt *material Fate*. Had it come abroad as early as it was written, it had ſerved for a proper Antidote to the poiſon in ſome of Mr. *Hobbes*'s and other's writings, who revived in that Age the exploded opinions of *Protagoras* and

other

other antient *Greeks*, and took away the *eſſential* and *eternal diſcrimination* of *moral good and evil*, *of juſt and unjuſt*, and made them *all arbitrary productions of divine or human will.*

AGAINST the antient and modern Patrons of this doctrine no one hath writ better than Dr. *Cudworth:* His book is indeed a Demonſtration of the truth of the contrary opinion; and is drawn up with that beauty, clearneſs and ſtrength, as muſt delight as well as convince the Reader, if I may judge of the Affection of others, from the effect it had on me. It will certainly give a juſt idea of the writer's good ſenſe, as well as vaſt learning.

WE are not certain that this Treatiſe is quite ſo perfect as the Author deſign'd it: but it appears from the MS. that he tranſcribed the

the beſt part of it with his own hand, as if it was ſpeedily to have been ſent to the preſs.

HIS Death following not long after, *This*, with ſeveral other Manuſcripts, were lock'd up from the Sight of the world for many years, and at laſt came into the Hands of his Grandſon *Francis Cudworth Maſham* Eſq; one of the Maſters in *Chancery*, whoſe Temper is too beneficent and communicative to deprive the Publick any longer of a Work that promiſes much benefit to it.

IT is well known, that the looſe principles, with regard to morality, that are oppoſed in this book, are defended by too many in our time. It is hoped alſo that the new controverſies ſpringing up, that have ſome relation to this ſubject, may be cleared and ſhortned by the reaſons herein propoſed. However that be,

a book

a book of ſound ſenſe and true learning is, at all times in faſhion: and if any the leaſt *Good* ſhall follow, as there may much *Good* from the publication of it; or if even the memory of ſo great a man in all parts of learning divine and human, who was an honour to *Emanuel College*, where he was educated, and to *Chriſt's College*, where he afterwards preſided, and indeed to the whole *Univerſity of Cambridge*, which he adorned, ſhall by theſe means be revived and perpetuated, it cannot be ſaid to be publiſh'd unſeaſonably.

E. DURESME.

THE

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A TREATISE CONCERNING ETERNAL and IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

1. AS the Vulgar generally look no higher for the Original of *Moral Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt*, than the Codes and Pandects, the Tables and Laws of their Country and Religion; ſo there have not wanted pretended Philoſophers in all Ages who have aſſerted nothing to be *Good* and

Evil, Juſt and *Unjuſt*, [a] *Naturally and Immutably*; but that all theſe things were *Poſitive, Arbitrary and Factitious only.* [b] Such *Plato* mentions in his Tenth Book *de Legibus*, who maintain'd, [c] *That nothing at all was Naturally Juſt, but Men changing their Opinions concerning them perpetually, ſometimes made one thing Juſt, ſometimes another; but whatſoever is decreed and conſtituted, that for the time is Valid, being made ſo by Arts and Laws, but not by any Nature of its own.* And again in his *Theætetus*, [d] *As to things Juſt and Unjuſt, Holy and Unholy, not only the* Protagoreans (of whom we ſhall treat afterward) *but many other Philoſophers alſo confidently affirm, that none of theſe things have in Nature any Eſſence of their own, but whatſoever is decreed by the Authority of the City; that is truly ſuch when it is ſo decreed,*

[a] Φύσει καὶ ἀκινήτως.

[b] Θετικὰ, νόμιμα, ψηφισματάδη.

[c] Τὰ δίκαια εἶναι τὸ παράπαν φύσει, ἀλλ' ἀμφισβητοῦντας ἀμφιτελεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ μεταβαλλομένους ἀεὶ ταῦτα· ἃ δ' ἂν μιτάθωνται ἕκαστοι, τότε κύρια ἕκαστα εἶναι γιγνόμενα τέχνῃ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινι φύσει.

[d] Ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις, καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον. Καὶ ὅσοι γε μὴ πανταπασι τὸ Πρωταγόρου λόγου λίγουσιν ἀδὲ πῶς τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι.

and

and for so long Time, viz. *Just* or *Unjust*, *Holy* or *Unholy*. And *Aristotle* more than once takes notice of this Opinion in his Ethicks. [e] *Things Honest and Just, which Politicks are conversant about, have so great a Variety and Uncertainty in them, that they seem to be only by Law, and not by Nature.* And afterwards, *Lib.* v. *c.* 10. after he had divided [τὸ δίκαιον πολιτικὸν] That which is Politically Just into [φυσικὸν] i. e. *Natural* [f], *which has every where the same Force*, and [Νομικὸν] [g] i. e. *Legal, which before there be a Law made, is Indifferent, but when once the Law is made, is determined to be Just or Unjust:* Which *Legal, Just and Unjust*, (as he afterward expresses it) are [h] *like to Wine and Wheat Measures*, as *Pints* and *Bushels*, which are not every where of an equal Bigness, being commonly Lesser with those that sell, and Greater with those that buy: Then he adds, [i] *Some there are that think that*

[e] Arist. Eth. Nicom. lib. 1. cap. 1. Τὰ δὲ καλὰ & τὰ δίκαια περὶ ὧν ἡ Πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν & πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή.

[f] Τὸ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον δύναμιν.

[g] Ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν διαφέρει ὕτως ἢ ἄλλως· ὅταν δὲ θῶνται, διαφέρει.

[h] Ὅμοια τοῖς μέτροις οἰνηροῖς & σιτηροῖς.

[i] Δοκεῖ δὲ ἐνίοις πάντα εἶναι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον & πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε & ἐν Πέρσαις καίει. Τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ὁρῶσι.

there is no other Juſt or Unjuſt, but what is made by Law and Men, becauſe that which is Natural is Immutable, and hath every where the ſame Force, as Fire burns alike here and in Perſia; *but they ſee that* Jura & Juſta, *Rights and Juſt things are every where different.*

2. THE Philoſophers particularly noted for this Opinion in *Plato*, are *Protagoras* in his *Theætetus*, *Polus* and *Callicles* in his *Gorgias*, *Thraſymachus*, and *Glauco* in his Politicks; but *Diogenes Laertius* tells us of ſome others, as of *Archelaus*, *Socrates*'s Maſter, that held [k] *That Juſt and Diſhoneſt are not ſo by Nature but by Law*; and (as I conceive) *Democritus*; for after he had ſet down his Opinion concerning Happineſs, or the Chief End, he adds this as part of the *Democritical* Philoſophy [ποιητὰ νομιμὰ εἶναι] which I underſtand thus, That things accounted *Juſt* or *Unjuſt*, are all *Factitious* or Artificial things, not Natural; nothing being Real or Natural but *Atoms* and *Vacuum*, as the following Words are [l]. The ſame is noted by *Diogenes* alſo concerning *Ariſtippus*,

[k] Τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι & τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ νόμῳ.
[l] φύσει δὲ ἄτομα & κενόν.

Plato's Contemporary, that he asserted, [m] *That nothing was Good or Evil otherwise than by Law or Custom.* And *Plutarch*, in the Life of *Alexander*, tells us of *Anaxarchus*, that was *Aristotle*'s Equal, that when *Alexander* repenting, sadly lamented the Death of *Clitus*, whom he had rashly slain, he read this Lecture of Philosophy to him to Comfort him, [n] "*That whatsoever is done by* "*the Supreme Power, is ipso facto Just.*" And *Pyrrho*, the Etiensick Philosopher, and Father of the *Scepticks*, that was *Anaxarchus*'s Scholar, seems to have been Dogmatical in nothing else but this, [o] *That there is nothing Good or Shameful, Just or Unjust, and so likewise as to All things, that there is nothing so in Truth, but that Men do All things according to Law and Custom.*

3. AFTER these succeeded *Epicurus*, the Reviver of the *Democritical* Philosophy, the Frame of whose Principles must needs lead him to deny *Justice* and *Injustice* to be Natural things; and therefore he determines that they arise wholly from mutual Pacts, and

[m] Μηδὲν εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ ϛ ἔθει.

[n] Πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος, δίκαιον εἶναι.

[o] Οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν, οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον, ϛ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ ϛ ἔθει πάντα τὰς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν.

Covenants of Men made for their own Convenience and Utility, and Laws resulting from thence. [p] *Those Living Creatures that could not make Mutual Covenants together not to hurt, nor to be hurt by one another, could not for this Cause have any such thing as Just or Unjust amongst them. And there is the same Reason for those Nations that either will not, or cannot make such Mutual Compacts not to hurt one another. For there is no such thing as Justice by itself, but only in the Mutual Congresses of Men, wheresoever they have entred together into Covenant not to hurt one another.* The late Compiler of the *Epicurean* System expresses this Philosopher's Meaning after this manner: [q] *There are some that think that those things that are Just, are Just according to their proper, unvaried Nature,*

[p] Ὅσα τῶν ζώων μὴ ἠδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἐστὶ οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον. ὡσάυτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἠδύνατο ἢ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι· οὐκ ἦν τὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλὰ ἐν ταῖς μετὰ ἀλλήλων συντροφαῖς, καθ' ὁπηλίκας δήποτε αἰεὶ τόπας συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.

[q] Sunt quidam qui Existimant ea quæ justa sunt, esse secundum Propriam Invariatamque naturam Justa, & Leges non ista Justa Facere, sed duntaxat Præscribere juxta eam quam habent Naturam; verum res non ita se habet. [*Gassendus Syntagm.*

and

and that the Laws do not make them Juſt, but only preſcribe according to that Nature which they have. But the thing is not ſo.

AFTER *Epicurus*, *Carneades*, the Author of the New Academy, as *Lactantius* teſtifieth, was alſo a zealous Aſſertor of the ſame Doctrine.

4. AND ſince in this latter Age the Phyſiological Hypotheſes of *Democritus* and *Epicurus* have been revived, and ſucceſsfully applied to the ſolving of ſome of the *Phænomena* of the Viſible World, there have not wanted thoſe that have endeavoured to vent alſo thoſe other Paradoxes of the ſame Philoſophers, *viz. That there is no Incorporeal Subſtance, Nor any Natural Difference of Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt*; and to recommend the ſame under a ſhew of Wiſdom, as the deep and profound Myſteries of the *Atomical* or *Corpuſcular* Philoſophy. As if ſenſeleſs *Matter* and *Atoms* were the Original of all things, according to that Song of Old *Silenus* in the Poet. [r].

[r] Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta
Semina terrarumque animæque mariſque fuiſſent,
Et liquidi ſimul ignis; ut his exordia primis
Omnia, & ipſe tener mundi concreverit orbis.
[*Virg. Eclog* VI.

He ſung the ſecret Seeds of Nature's Frame;
How Seas, and Earth, and Air, and active Flame,
Fell through the mighty Void, and in their fall
Were blindly gather'd in this goodly Ball.

OF this ſort is that late Writer of Ethicks and Politicks, who aſſerts, [f] *That there are no authentick Doctrines concerning Juſt and Unjuſt, Good and Evil, except the Laws which are eſtabliſhed in every City: And that it concerns none to enquire whether an Action ſhall be reputed Juſt or Unjuſt, Good or Evil, except ſuch only whom the Community have appointed to be the Interpreters of their Laws.*

AND again, [t] *Even a Chriſtian Government hath Power to determine what is Righteous, and what is the Tranſgreſſion of it.*

[f] Doctrinas de juſto & injuſto, bono & malo, præter leges in unaquaque civitate conſtitutas, authenticas eſſe nullas; et utrum aliqua actio juſta vel injuſta, bona vel mala futura ſit, a nemine inquirendum eſſe præterquam ab iis ad quos legum ſuarum interpretationem Civitas demandaverit.

[t] Ad civitatem pertinet etiam Chriſtianam, quid ſit juſtitia, quid injuſtitia, ſive peccatum contra juſtitiam, determinare. [*p.* 343. Hobbes de Cive.]

AND

AND he gives us the ſame over again in *Engliſh* [u]: *In the State of Nature nothing can be Unjuſt; the Notions of Right and Wrong, Juſtice and Injuſtice have there no Place; where there is no Common Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Tranſgreſſion.* [x] *No Law can be unjuſt.* Nay, *Temperance* is no more [y] *Naturally* according to this Civil (or rather Uncivil) Philoſopher, than Juſtice. [z] *Senſuality in that Senſe in which it is condemned, hath no Place till there be Laws.*

5. BUT whatſoever was the true meaning of theſe Philoſophers, that affirm Juſtice and Injuſtice to be only by Law and not by Nature (of which I ſhall diſcourſe afterwards,) certain it is, that divers Modern Theologers do not only ſeriouſly, but zealouſly contend in like Manner, *That there is nothing Abſolutely, Intrinſecally and Naturally Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt, antecedently to any poſitive Command or Prohibition of God; but that the Arbitrary Will and Pleaſure of God,* (that is, an Omnipotent Being devoid of all Eſſential and Natural Juſtice) *by its Commands and Prohibitions, is the firſt and only Rule and Meaſure thereof.* Whence it fol-

[u] *Leviathan*, p. 63. [x] p. 182. [y] Φύσει. [z] p. 25.

lows

lows unavoidably, that nothing can be imagined so grosly wicked, or so fouly unjust or dishoneſt, but if it were supposed to be commanded by this Omnipotent Deity, must needs upon that Hypotheſis forthwith become Holy, Just and Righteous. For though the Ancient Fathers of the Christian Church were very abhorrent from this Doctrine, (as *shall be shewed* hereafter) yet it crept up afterward in the Scholastick Age, *Ockham* being among the first that maintained [a] *That there is no Act Evil but as it is prohibited by God, and which cannot be made good if it be commanded by God. And so on the other hand as to Good.* And herein *Petrus Alliacus* and *Andreas de Novo Castro,* with others, quickly followed him.

But this Doctrine hath been since chiefly promoted and advanced by such as think nothing so essential to the Deity, as *Uncontroulable Power* and *Arbitrary Will,* and therefore that God could not be God if there should be any Thing Evil in its own Nature which he could not do; and who impute such dark Counsels and dismal Actions unto God, as cannot be justified otherwise than by say-

[a] Nullum actum Malum esse nisi quatenus a Deo prohibitum, et qui non possit fieri bonus si a Deo præcipiatur; et e Converso.

ing,

ing, that whatsoever God can be supposed to do or will, will be *for that Reason* Good or Just, because he wills it.

Now the necessary and unavoidable Consequences of this Opinion are such as these, [b] *That to love God is by Nature an indifferent thing, and is morally Good only, because it is commanded by God; That to prohibit the Love of God, or command the Hatred of God, is not inconsistent with the Nature of God, but only with his Free Will; That it is not Inconsistent with the Natural Equity of God to command Blasphemy, Perjury, Lying,* &c. *That God may command what is contrary, as to all the Precepts of the Decalogue, so especially to the First, Second, Third; That Holiness is not a Conformity with the Nature of God;*

[b] Amare Deum φύσει esse ἀδιάφορον, et Moraliter Bonum solummodo quia a Deo jubetur: Prohibere Dei amorem vel præcipere Dei odium, non pugnare cum Dei naturâ, sed tantum cum voluntate liberâ. Non repugnare Juri Divino Naturali præcipere peccata. Deum posse imperare Blasphemiam, Perjurium, Mendacium, &c. Deum posse præcipere contrarium ut omnibus Præceptis Decalogi, ita potissimum Primo, Secundo, Tertio. Sanctitatem non esse Conformitatem cum Natura Dei; Deum posse Hominem Obligare ad Impossibile; Deum nullam habere Naturalem Inclinationem in bonum Creaturarum, Deum jure posse Creaturam insontem æternis cruciatibus damnare.

That

That God may oblige Man to what is impossible; *That God hath no Natural Inclination to the Good of the Creatures*; *That God can justly doom an innocent Creature to Eternal Torment*. All which Propositions, with others of like Kind are Word for Word asserted by some late Authors. Though I think not fit to mention the Names of any of them in this Place, excepting only one, *Joannes Szydlovius*, who in a [c] Book published at *Franeker*, hath professedly avowed and maintained the grossest of them. And yet neither he, nor the rest are to be thought any more Blame-worthy herein, than many others, that holding the same Premises have either dissembled, or disowned those Conclusions which unavoidably follow there-from: But rather to be commended for their Openness, Simplicity and Ingenuity, in representing their Opinion nakedly to the World, such as indeed it is, without any Veil or Mask.

WHEREFORE since there are so many, both Philosophers and Theologers, that seemingly and verbally acknowledge such things as *Moral Good and Evil*, *Just and Unjust*, that contend notwithstanding that these are

[c] Vindiciæ quæstionum aliquot difficilium.

not

not [d] by *Nature*, but [e] *Institution*, and that there is nothing *Naturally* or *Immutably Just* or *Unjust*; I shall from hence fetch the Rise of this Ethical Discourse or Inquiry [f] *concerning things Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Laudable and Shameful:* (For so I find these Words frequently used as synonymous in *Plato*, and other Ancient Authors,) demonstrating in the first Place, that if there be any thing at all *Good* or *Evil*, *Just* or *Unjust*, there must of Necessity be [g] *something Naturally and Immutably Good and Just*. And from thence I shall proceed afterward to shew what this [h] *Natural, Immutable, and Eternal Justice is*, with the Branches and Species of it.

CHAP. II.

1. WHEREFORE in the first Place, it is a Thing which we shall very easily demonstrate, *That Moral Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honest and Dishonest,*

[d] Φύσει. [e] Θέσει. [f] Περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν. [g] Δίκαιον φυσικὸν καὶ ἀκίνητον. [h] Δίκαιον φυσικὸν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀίδιον.

(if

(if they be not meer Names without any Signification, or Names for nothing elſe, but *Willed* and *Commanded*, but have a Reality in Reſpect of the Perſons obliged to do and avoid them) *cannot poſſibly be Arbitrary things, made by Will without Nature*; becauſe it is Univerſally true, That things are what they are, not by *Will* but by *Nature*. As for Example, Things are White by Whiteneſs, and Black by Blackneſs, Triangular by Triangularity, and Round by Rotundity, Like by Likeneſs, and Equal by Equality, that is, by ſuch certain Natures of their own. Neither can Omnipotence itſelf (to ſpeak with Reverence) by meer Will make a Thing White or Black without Whiteneſs or Blackneſs; that is, without ſuch certain Natures, whether we conſider them as Qualities in the Objects without us according to the *Peripatetical* Philoſophy, or as certain Diſpoſitions of Parts in reſpect of Magnitude, Figure, Site and Motion, which beget thoſe Senſations or Phantaſms of White and Black in us. Or, to inſtance in Geometrical Figures, Omnipotence itſelf cannot by meer Will make a Body *Triangular*, without having the Nature and Properties of a *Triangle* in it; That is, without having three Angles equal

equal to two Right ones, nor Circular without the Nature of a *Circle*; that is, without having a Circumference Equidistant every where from the Center or Middle Point. Or lastly, to instance in things Relative only; Omnipotent Will cannot make Things Like or Equal one to another, without the Natures of Likeness and Equality. The Reason whereof is plain, because all these Things imply a manifest Contradiction; That things should be what they are not. And this is a Truth fundamentally Necessary to all Knowledge, that Contradictories cannot be true: For otherwise, nothing would be certainly true or false. Now things may as well be made White or Black by meer Will, without Whiteness or Blackness, Equal and Unequal, without Equality and Inequality, as Morally Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honest and Dishonest, *Debita* and *Illicita*, by meer Will, without any Nature of Goodness, Justice, Honesty. For though the Will of God be the Supreme Efficient Cause of all things, and can produce into Being or Existence, or reduce into Nothing what it pleaseth, yet it is not the Formal Cause of any Thing besides itself, as the Schoolmen

have determined, in these Words, [i] *That God himself cannot supply the Place of a formal Cause:* And therefore it cannot supply the Formal Cause, or Nature of *Justice* or *Injustice*, *Honesty* or *Dishonesty*. Now all that we have hitherto said amounts to no more than this, that it is impossible any Thing should Be by *Will only*, that is, without a *Nature* or *Entity*, or that the Nature and Essence of any thing should be Arbitrary.

2. And since a Thing cannot be made any thing by meer Will without a Being or Nature, every Thing must be necessarily and immutably determined by its own Nature, and the Nature of things be that which it is, and nothing else. For though the Will and Power of God have an Absolute, Infinite and Unlimited Command upon the Existences of all Created things to make them to be, or not to be at Pleasure; yet when things exist, they are what they are, This or That, Absolutely or Relatively, not by Will or Arbitrary Command, but by the Necessity of their own Nature. There is no such thing as an Arbitrarious Essence, Mode or Relation, that may be made indifferently any Thing at Plea-

[i] Deum ipsum non posse supplere locum Causæ formalis.

sure,

ſure: for an Arbitrarious Eſſence is a Being without a Nature, a Contradiction, and therefore a Non-Entity. Wherefore the Natures of Juſtice and Injuſtice cannot be Arbitrarious Things, that may be Applicable by Will indifferently to any Actions or Diſpoſitions whatſoever. For the Modes of all Subſiſtent Beings, and the Relations of things to one another, are immutably and neceſſarily what they are, and not Arbitrary, being not by Will but by Nature.

3. Now the neceſſary Conſequence of that which we have hitherto ſaid is this, That it is ſo far from being true, that all *Moral Good* and *Evil*, *Juſt* and *Unjuſt* are meer Arbitrary and Factitious things, that are created wholly by Will; that (if we would ſpeak properly) we muſt needs ſay that nothing is *Morally Good* or *Evil*, *Juſt* or *Unjuſt* by meer Will without Nature, becauſe every thing is what it is by Nature, and not by Will. For though it will be objected here, that when God, or Civil Powers Command a Thing to be done, that was not before [k] *obligatory or unlawful*, the thing Willed or Commanded doth forthwith become [l] *Obligatory*, that

[k] Debitum *or* illicitum,

[l] Δέον *or* debitum.

which ought to be done by Creatures and Subjects respectively; in which the Nature of Moral Good or Evil is commonly Conceived to consist. And therefore if all Good and Evil, Just and Unjust be not the Creatures of meer Will (as many assert) yet at least *Positive things* must needs owe all their Morality, their Good and Evil to meer Will without Nature: Yet notwithstanding, if we well Consider it, we shall find that even in *Positive* Commands themselves, meer Will doth not make the thing commanded Just or [m] Obligatory, or beget and create any Obligation to Obedience; but that it is Natural Justice or Equity, which gives to one the Right or Authority of Commanding, and begets in another Duty and Obligation to Obedience. Therefore it is observable, that Laws and Commands do not run thus, to Will that this or that thing shall become [n] *Just* or *Unjust*, *Obligatory* or *Unlawful*; or that Men shall be obliged or bound to obey; but only to require that something be done or not done, or otherwise to menace Punishment to the Transgressors thereof. For it was never heard of, that any one founded all his Au-

[m] Debitum. [n] Justum *or* Injustum, Debitum *or* Illicitum.

thority

thority of Commanding others, and others Obligation or Duty to Obey his Commands, in a Law of his own making, that men ſhould be Required, Obliged, or Bound to Obey him. Wherefore ſince the thing willed in all Laws is not that men ſhould be Bound or Obliged to Obey; this thing cannot be the product of the meer Will of the Commander, but it muſt proceed from ſomething elſe; namely, the Right or Authority of the Commander, which is founded in natural Juſtice and Equity, and an antecedent Obligation to Obedience in the Subjects; which things are not Made by Laws, but pre-ſuppoſed before all Laws to make them valid: And if it ſhould be imagined, that any one ſhould make a poſitive Law to require that others ſhould be Obliged, or Bound to Obey him, every one would think ſuch a Law ridiculous and abſurd; for if they were Obliged before, then this Law would be in vain, and to no Purpoſe; and if they were not before Obliged, then they could not be Obliged by any Poſitive Law, becauſe they were not previouſly Bound to Obey ſuch a Perſon's Commands: So that Obligation to Obey all Poſitive Laws is Older than all Laws, and Previous or Antecedent

to them. Neither is it a thing that is arbitrarily Made by Will, or can be the Object of Command, but that which either *Is* or *Is* not by Nature. And if this were not *Morally Good and Juſt* in its own Nature before any Poſitive Command of God, *That God ſhould be Obeyed by his Creatures*, the bare Will of God himſelf could not beget an Obligation upon any to Do what he Willed and Commanded, becauſe the Natures of things do not depend upon Will, being not [o] *things that are arbitrarily Made, but things that Are.* To conclude therefore, even in *Poſitive* Laws and Commands it is not meer Will that Obligeth, but the Natures of Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt, really exiſting in the World.

4. WHEREFORE that common Diſtinction betwixt things, *things naturally and poſitively Good and Evil*, or (as others expreſs it) betwixt Things that are therefore commanded becauſe they are Good and Juſt, and Things that are therefore Good and Juſt, becauſe they are Commanded, ſtands in need of a right Explication, that we be not led into a miſtake thereby, as if the Obligation to do thoſe *Thetical* and *Poſitive* things did ariſe

[o] Γιγνόμενα but ὄντα. [p] Φύσει & θέσει.

wholly

wholly from Will without Nature: Whereas it is not the meer Will and Pleasure of him that commandeth, that obligeth to do Positive things commanded, but the Intellectual Nature of him that is commanded. Wherefore the Difference of these things lies wholly in this, That there are some things which the Intellectual Nature obligeth to [q] *of it self*, and directly, absolutely and perpetually, and these things are called [r] naturally Good and Evil; other things there are which the same Intellectual Nature Obligeth to by Accident only, and hypothetically, upon Condition of some voluntary Action either of our own or some other Persons, by means whereof those things which were in their own Nature indifferent, falling under something that is absolutely Good or Evil, and thereby acquiring a new Relation to the Intellectual Nature, do for the time become [s] such Things as Ought to be Done or Omitted, being Made such not by Will but by Nature. As for Example, *To keep Faith and perform Covenants*, is that which natural Justice obligeth to absolutely; therefore [t] *upon the Supposition* that any one maketh

[q] Per se. [r] Φύσει. [s] Debita *or* Illicita. [t] Ex hypothesi.

a Promiſe, which is a voluntary Act of his own, to do ſomething which he was not before Obliged to by natural Juſtice, upon the intervention of this voluntary Act of his own, that indifferent thing promiſed falling now under ſomething abſolutely Good, and becoming the Matter of Promiſe and Covenant, ſtandeth for the preſent in a new Relation to the Rational Nature of the Promiſer, and becometh for the time a thing which Ought to be done by him, or which he is obliged to do. Not as if the meer Will or Words and Breath of him that covenanteth had any power to change the Moral Natures of things, or any Ethical Vertue of Obliging; but becauſe Natural Juſtice and Equity obligeth to keep Faith and perform Covenants. In like manner Natural Juſtice, that is, the Rational or Intellectual Nature, obligeth not only to Obey God, but alſo Civil Powers, that have lawful Authority of Commanding, and to obſerve Political order amongſt men; and therefore if God or Civil Powers command any thing to be done that is not unlawful in it ſelf; upon the intervention of this voluntary Act of theirs, thoſe things that were before Indifferent, become by accident

for the time *Obligatory* [u], such things as Ought to be done by us, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of that which Natural Justice absolutely obligeth to.

And these are the things that are commonly called [y] *Positively* Good and Evil, Just or Unjust, such as though they are adiaphorous or Indifferent in themselves, yet Natural Justice obligeth to accidentally [z], *on Supposition* of the voluntary Action of some other Person rightly qualified in Commanding, whereby they fall into something Absolutely Good. Which things are not made Good or [a] *Due* by the meer Will or Pleasure of the Commander, but by that Natural Justice which gives him Right and Authority of Commanding, and Obligeth others to Obey him; without which Natural Justice, neither Covenants nor Commands could possibly oblige any one. For the Will of another doth no more oblige in Commands, than our own Will in Promises and Covenants. To conclude therefore, Things called *Naturally* Good and [b] *Due* are such things as the Intellectual Nature Obliges to immediately, absolutely and perpetually, and upon no Condition of any voluntary Action that may be

[u] Debita. [y] Θέσει. [z] Ex hypothesi.
[a] Debita. [b] Debita.

Done or Omitted intervening; but thoſe things that are called *Poſitively* Good and [c] *Due*, are ſuch as Natural Juſtice or the Intellectual Nature Obligeth to accidentally and hypothetically, upon Condition of ſome voluntary Act of another Perſon inveſted with lawful Authority in Commanding.

And that it is not the meer Will of the Commander, that makes theſe *Poſitive things* to Oblige or become [d] *Due*, but the Nature of things; appears evidently from hence, becauſe it is not the volition of every one that Obligeth, but of a Perſon rightly qualified and inveſted with lawful Authority; and becauſe the liberty of commanding is circumſcribed within certain Bounds and Limits, ſo that if any Commander go beyond the Sphere and Bounds that Nature ſets him, which are indifferent things, his Commands will not at all oblige.

5. But if we would ſpeak yet more accurately and preciſely, we might rather ſay, That no *Poſitive* Commands whatſoever do make any thing morally Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt, which Nature had not made ſuch before. For Indifferent things Commanded, Conſidered Materially in themſelves, remain

[c] Debita. [d] Debita.

ſtill

ſtill what they were before in their own Nature, that is, Indifferent, becauſe ([e] as *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks) *Will cannot change Nature.* And thoſe things that are [f] *by Nature Indifferent*, muſt needs be as immutably ſo, as thoſe things that are [g] *by Nature Juſt or Unjuſt, honeſt or ſhameful.* But all the Moral Goodneſs, Juſtice and Virtue that is exerciſed in Obeying *Poſitive* Commands, and doing ſuch things as are [h] *poſitive* only, and to be done for no other Cauſe but becauſe they are Commanded, or in reſpect to Political Order, conſiſteth not in the Materiality of the Actions themſelves, but in that Formality of yielding Obedience to the Commands of Lawful Authority in them. Juſt as when a man Covenanteth or Promiſeth to do an Indifferent thing which by Natural Juſtice he was not bound to do, the Virtue of doing it conſiſteth not in the Materiality of the Action promiſed, but in the Formality of Keeping Faith and Performing Covenants. Wherefore in *Poſitive* Commands, the Will of the Commander doth not create any New Moral Entity, but only diverſly Modifies and Determines that general Duty or

[e] Τὸ φύσει ἀκίνητον. [f] Φύσει ἀδιάφορα.
[g] Φύσει δίκαια or ἄδικα, καλὰ or αἰσχρὰ. [h] Θέσει.

Obliga-

Obligation of Natural Juſtice to Obey Lawful Authority and Keep Oaths and Covenants, as our own Will in Promiſing doth but produce ſeveral Modifications of keeping Faith. And therefore there are no New [i] *things Juſt or due* made by either of them, beſides what was alway [k] *by nature* Such, to Keep our own Promiſes, and Obey the Lawful Commands of others.

6. We ſee then that it is ſo far from being true, that all Moral Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt (if they be any thing) are made by meer Will and Arbitrary Commands (as many conceive) that it is not poſſible that any Command of God or Man ſhould Oblige otherwiſe than by Virtue of that which is [l] *Naturally Juſt*. And tho' Particular Promiſes and Commands be made by Will, yet it is not Will but Nature that obligeth to the doing of things Promiſed and Commanded, or makes *them* [m] *ſuch things as ought to be done*. For meer Will cannot change the Moral Nature of Actions, nor the Nature of Intellectual Beings. And therefore if there were no Natural Juſtice, that is, if the Rational or Intellectual Nature in its ſelf were indetermined and Unobliged

[i] Δίκαια. juſta *or* debita. [k] Φύσει. . .
[l] Φύσει δίκαιον. [m] Debita.

to

to any thing, and so destitute of all Morality, it were not possible that any thing should be made Morally Good or Evil [n], *obligatory or unlawful*, or that any Moral Obligation should be begotten by any Will or Command whatsoever.

CHAP. III.

1. BUT some there are that will still Contend, that though it should be granted that *Moral Good and Evil, Just and Unjust* do not depend upon any Created Will, yet notwithstanding they must needs depend upon the Arbitrary Will of God, because the Natures and Essences of all things, and consequently all Verities and Falsities, depend upon the same. For if the Natures and Essences of things should not depend upon the Will of God, it would follow from hence, that something that was not God was independent upon God.

2. AND this is plainly asserted by that ingenious Philosopher *Renatus Des Cartes*, who

[n] Debitum *or* illicitum.

in

in his Anſwer to the Sixth Objector againſt his Metaphyſical Meditations, writes thus: ° *It is a Contradiction to ſay, that the Will of God was not from Eternity Indifferent to all things which are or ever ſhall be done; becauſe no Good or Evil, nothing to be Believed or Done or Omitted, can be fixed upon, the Idea whereof was in the Divine Intellect before that his Will Determined it ſelf to Effect that ſuch a thing ſhould be. Neither do I ſpeak this concerning Priority of Time, but even there was nothing Prior in Order or by Na-*

° Repugnat Dei voluntatem non fuiſſe ab æterno indifferentem ad omnia quæ facta ſunt aut unquam fient, quia nullum Bonum vel Malum, nullum Credendum vel Faciendum vel Omittendum fingi poteſt, cujus Idea in Intellectu Divino prius fuerit, quam ejus Voluntas ſe determinarit ad Efficiendum ut id tale eſſet. Neque id loquor de Prioritate temporis, ſed ne quidem prius fuit Ordine, vel Natura, vel Ratione Ratiocinata ut vocant, ita ſcilicet ut iſta Boni Idea impulerit Deum ad unum potius quam aliud Eligendum. Nempe exempli cauſa, non ideo voluit creare Mundum in tempore, quia vidit ſic melius fore quam ſi creaſſet ab æterno, nec voluit Tres Angulos Trianguli æquales eſſe duobus Rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non poſſe, &c. Sed contra, quia voluit mundum creare in tempore, ideo ſic melius eſt quam ſi creatus fuiſſet ab æterno; & quia voluit Tres Angulos Trianguli neceſſario æquales eſſe duobus rectis, idcirco jam hoc verum eſt, & fieri aliter non poteſt; atque ita de reliquis. Et ita ſumma Indifferentia in Deo ſummum eſt ejus Omnipotentiæ Argumentum.

ture,

ture, or Reaſon as they call it, ſo as that that Idea of Good inclined God to chuſe one thing rather than another. As for Example ſake, he would therefore create the World in Time, becauſe that he ſaw that it would be better ſo than if he had created it from Eternity; neither willed he that the three Angles of a Triangle ſhould be Equal to two Right Angles, becauſe he knew that it could not be otherwiſe. But on the contrary, becauſe he would create the World in Time, therefore it is better than if he had created it from Eternity; and becauſe he would that the three Angles of a Triangle ſhould neceſſarily be equal to two Right Angles, therefore this is true and can be no otherwiſe; and ſo of other things. And thus the Greateſt Indifference in God is the Greateſt Argument of his Omnipotence.

AND again afterward, *p.* 162. [p] *To him that Conſiders the Immenſity of God it is Manifeſt, That there can be nothing at all which doth not depend upon him, not only nothing Subſiſting, but alſo no Order, no Law, no Reaſon of Truth and Goodneſs.*

[p] Attendenti ad Dei Immenſitatem manifeſtum eſt, Nihil omnino eſſe poſſe quod ab ipſo non pendeat, non modo nihil Subſiſtens, ſed etiam nullum ordinem, nullam Legem, Nullamve Rationem Veri & Boni.

AND when he was again urged by the Sixth Objector, [q] *Could not God cauſe that the Nature of a Triangle ſhould not be ſuch? and how, I pray thee, could he from Eternity cauſe that it ſhould not be true, That twice four are eight?* He confeſſeth ingenuouſly that thoſe things *were not intelligible* to us; but yet notwithſtanding they muſt be ſo, becauſe [r] *Nothing in any Sort of Being can be, which dōth not depend upon God.* Which Doctrine of *Carteſius* is greedily ſwallowed down by ſome Servile Followers of his that have lately written [s] *of the Old Philoſophy.*

3. Perhaps ſome may make a Queſtion for all this, whether *Carteſius* were any more in earneſt in this, than when he elſewhere goes about to defend the Doctrine of *Tranſubſtantiation* by the Principles of his new Philoſophy, becauſe in his Meditations *upon the old Philoſophy* (where it is probable he would ſet down the genuine Senſe of his own Mind more undiſguiſedly, before he was aſſaulted

[q] Nunquid Deus potuerit efficere ut Natura Trianguli non fuerit? & qua ratione amabo potuiſſet ab æterno facere ut non fuiſſet verum bis quatuor eſſe octo?

[r] Nihil in ullo genere Entis eſſe poteſt, quod a Deo non pendeat.

[s] De Prima Philoſophia.

by

by these Objectors, and thereby forced to turn himself into several Shapes) he affirmeth that the Essences of things were eternal and immutable; but being afterward urged by *Gassendus* with this Inconvenience, that then something would be eternal and immutable besides God, and so independent upon God, he doth in a manner unsay it again, and betakes himself to this pitiful Evasion, [u] *As the Poets feign that the Fates were indeed fixed by* Jupiter, *but that when they were fixed, he had obliged himself to the preserving of them; so I do not think that the Essences of things, and those mathematical Truths which can be known of them, are independent on God; but I think nevertheless that because God so willed, and so ordered, therefore they are immutable and eternal*; which is plainly to make them in their own *Nature* mutable. But whether *Cartesius* were in jest or earnest in this Business, it matters not, for his bare Authority ought to be no more valued by us than the

[u] Quemadmodum Poetæ fingunt a Jove quidem fata fuisse condita, sed postquam condita fuere, ipsum se iis servandis obstrinxisse; ita ego non puto essentias rerum, mathematicasque ullas veritates quæ de ipsis cognosci possunt, esse independentes a Deo; sed puto nihilominus, quia Deus sic voluit, quia sic disposuit, ipsas esse immutabiles & æternas;

Autho-

Authority of *Ariſtotle* and other antient Philoſophers was by him, whom he ſo freely diſſents from.

4. For though the *Names* of things may be changed by any one at pleaſure, as that a *Square* may be called a *Circle*, or a *Cube* a *Sphere*; yet that the *Nature* of a *Square* ſhould not be neceſſarily what it is, but be arbitrarily convertible into the Nature of a *Circle*, and ſo the Eſſence of a *Circle* into the Eſſence of a *Sphere*, or that the ſelf-ſame Body, which is perfectly *cubical*, without any phyſical Alteration made in it, ſhould by this metaphyſical Way of Transformation of Eſſences, by meer Will and Command be made *ſpherical* or *cylindrical*; this doth moſt plainly imply a Contradiction, and the Compoſſibility of Contradictions deſtroys all Knowledge and the definite Natures [x] or *Notions* of things. Nay, that which implies a Contradiction is a Non-Entity, and therefore cannot be the Object of Divine Power. And the Reaſon is the ſame for all other things, as *juſt* and *unjuſt*; for every thing is what it is immutably by the Neceſſity of its own Nature; neither is it any Derogation at all from

[x] Rationes.

the

the Power of God to ſay, that he cannot make a thing to be that which it is not. Then there might be no ſuch thing as Knowledge in God himſelf. God might will that there ſhould be no ſuch thing as Knowledge.

5. And as to the Being or not Being of Particular Eſſences, as that God might, if he pleaſed, have Willed that there ſhould be no ſuch thing as a *Triangle* or *Circle*, and therefore nothing Demonſtrable or Knowable of Either of them; which is likewiſe aſſerted by *Carteſius*, and thoſe that make the Eſſences of things dependent upon an Arbitrary Will in God: This is all one as if one ſhould ſay, that God could have Willed, if he had pleaſed, that neither his own Power nor Knowledge ſhould be Infinite.

6. Now it is certain, that if the Natures and Eſſences of all things, as to their being ſuch or ſuch, do depend upon a Will of God that is eſſentially Arbitrary, there can be no ſuch thing as *Science* or *Demonſtration*, nor the Truth of any Mathematical or Metaphyſical Propoſition be known any otherwiſe, than by ſome *Revelation* of the Will of God concerning it, and by a certain Enthuſiaſtick or Fanatick Faith and Perſwaſion thereupon, that

God would have ſuch a thing to be true or falſe at ſuch a time, or for ſo long. And ſo nothing would be true or falſe [a] *Naturally* but *Poſitively* only, all Truth and Science being meer Arbitrarious things. Truth and Falſhood would be only Names. Neither would there be any more Certainty in the Knowledge of God himſelf, ſince it muſt wholly depend upon the Mutability of a Will in him Eſſentially Indifferent and Undetermin'd; and if we would ſpeak properly according to this Hypotheſis, God himſelf would not Know or be Wiſe by Knowledge or by Wiſdom, but by Will.

7. WHEREFORE as for that Argument, *That unleſs the Eſſences of things and all Verities and Falſities depend upon the arbitrary Will of God, there would be ſomething that was not God, independent upon God*; if it be well conſider'd, it will prove a meer [b] Bugbear, and nothing ſo terrible and formidable as *Carteſius* ſeemed to think it. For there is no other genuine Conſequence deducible from this Aſſertion, *That the Eſſences and Verities of things are independent upon the Will of God*, but that there is an eternal and immutable

[a] Φύσει but Θέσει. [b] Mormo.

Wiſdom

Wiſdom in the Mind of God, and thence participated by Created Beings independent upon the Will of God. Now the *Wiſdom* of God is as much God as the *Will* of God; and whether of theſe two things in God, that is, *Will* or *Wiſdom*, ſhould depend upon the other, will be beſt determined from the ſeveral Natures of them. For *Wiſdom* in it ſelf hath the Nature of a *Rule* and *Meaſure*, it being a moſt Determinate and Inflexible thing; but *Will* being not only a Blind and Dark thing, as conſider'd in it ſelf, but alſo Indefinite and Indeterminate, hath therefore the Nature of a thing *Regulable* and *Meaſurable*. Wherefore it is the Perfection of *Will*, as ſuch, to be guided and determined by *Wiſdom* and *Truth*; but to make *Wiſdom*, *Knowledge* and *Truth*, to be Arbitrarily determined by *Will*, and to be regulated by ſuch a [c] *Plumbean* and *Flexible Rule* as that is, is quite to deſtroy the Nature of it; for *Science* or *Knowledge* is [d] *the Comprehenſion* of *that which* neceſſarily *is*, and there can be nothing more Contradictious than Truth and Falſhood Arbitrary. Now all the Knowledge and Wiſdom that is in Creatures, whether Angels or Men, is nothing elſe but a

[c] Κανὼν μολύβδινον. [d] Κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος.

Participation of that one Eternal, Immutable and Increated Wiſdom of God, or ſeveral Signatures of that one Archetypal Seal, or like ſo many multiplied Reflections of one and the ſame Face, made in ſeveral Glaſſes, whereof ſome are clearer, ſome obſcurer, ſome ſtanding nearer, ſome further off.

8. Moreover, it was the Opinion of the Wiſeſt of the Philoſophers, (as we ſhall ſhew afterward) That there is alſo in the Scale of Being a Nature of *Goodneſs* Superior to *Wiſdom*, which therefore meaſures and determines the *Wiſdom* of God, as his *Wiſdom* meaſures and determines his Will, and which the antient Cabaliſts were wont to call [e] כתר, a *Crown*, as being the Top or *Crown* of the Deity, of which more afterward. Wherefore altho' ſome Noveliſts make a contracted Idea of God, conſiſting of Nothing elſe but *Will* and *Power*; yet his Nature is better expreſſed by ſome in this Myſtical or Enigmatical Repreſentation of an *infinite Circle, whoſe inmoſt Center is Simple Goodneſs, the* [f] *Rays and expanded* [g] *Plat thereof, all Comprehending and Immutable Wiſdom, the Exterior Periphery or Interminate Circumference, Om-*

[e] כתר. [f] Radii. [g] Area.

nipotent

nipotent Will or Activity, by which every thing Without God is brought forth into Exiſtence. Wherefore the *Will* and *Power* of God have no [g] *Command Inwardly* either upon the *Wiſdom* and *Knowledge* of God, or upon the ethical and Moral Diſpoſition of his Nature, which is his *Eſſential Goodneſs*; but the Sphere of its Activity is [h] *without God*, where it hath an Abſolute Command upon the Exiſtences of things; and is always Free, tho' not always Indifferent, ſince it is its greateſt Perfection to be determined by *Infinite Wiſdom* and *Infinite Goodneſs*. But this is to anticipate what according to the Laws of Method ſhould follow afterward in another Place.

[f] Imperium ad intra. [g] Extra Deum.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

I. NOW the Demonſtrative Strength of our Cauſe lying plainly in this, That it is not poſſible that any thing ſhould Be without a Nature, and the Natures or Eſſences of all things being Immutable, therefore upon Suppoſition that there is any thing Really Juſt or Unjuſt, [a] *Due or unlawful*, there muſt of neceſſity be ſomething *ſo* both Naturally and Immutably, which no Law, Decree, Will, nor Cuſtom can alter. There have not wanted ſome among the Old Philoſophers, that rather than they would acknowledge any thing *Immutably Juſt* or *Unjuſt*, would not ſtick to ſhake the very Foundations of all things, and to deny that there was any Immutable Nature or Eſſence of any thing, and by Conſequence any abſolute

[a] *Debitum* or *Licitum*.

Certainty

Certainty of Truth or Knowledge; maintaining this ſtrange Paradox, that Both all *Being* and *Knowledge* was Phantaſtical and Relative only, and therefore that Nothing was *Good* or *Evil*, *Juſt* or *Unjuſt*, *True* or *Falſe*, *White* or *Black*, abſolutely and Immutably, but *Relatively* to every Private Perſon's Humour or Opinion.

2. THE Principal Aſſertor of this Extravagant Opinion was *Protagoras* the Abderite, who, as *Plato* inſtructs us in his *Theætetus*, held, [b] *That nothing was any thing in itſelf Abſolutely, but was always made ſo to ſomething elſe, and Eſſence or Being was to be removed from every thing.* In which Poſition of his there ſeems to be theſe two things aſſerted: *Firſt*, That all things were in Perpetual Motion, and nothing had any [c] *being, but a poſſibility to be*, which the ſaid *Protagoras* thus expreſſed, [d] *All things are made by Motion and Mixture of things together, and therefore are not rightly ſaid to Be; for nothing Is, but every thing is always Made.*

[b] οὐδὲν εἶναι ἓν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ, ἀλλὰ τινὶ ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι· τὸ δ' εἶναι παντὶ ἀφαιρετέον.

[c] Eſſe, *but* Fieri.

[d] Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται, ἃ δὴ φαμὲν εἶναι οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες.

Secondly, That nothing is Made Absolutely, but only Relatively to something else. [c] If any one say that any thing either is or is made, he must say that it is so to something, or in Respect of some Body, for we cannot affirm that any thing either is or is made Absolutely in itself, but Relatively to something else.

Now from hence proceeded those known Aphorisms of his, recorded both in *Plato* and *Aristotle*, [f] *That those things which appear to every one, are to him to whom they appear.* And [g] again, *That every Fancy or Opinion of every Body was true.* And again, [h] *That Man is the Measure of all things whether existing or not existing.* Which Sentence seemed so pretty and argute to him, that he placed it in the very Front of his Book, as *Plato* tells us; and indeed it comprizeth in it all the Singularity of his Philosophy, the true meaning thereof being this; Not only that Man taken generally is the Measure of all

[c] Εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ τινὸς, ἢ πρός τι, ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὑτῷ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον, ὅτι αὐτῷ λεκτέον ὅτ' ἄλλῳ λέγοιτο ἀποδεκτέον.

[f] Τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται.

[g] Πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής.

[h] Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

things,

things, (which in ſome Senſe might be affirmed, that our own Humane Faculties are the Meaſure of all things unto us) but alſo that [i] *Every Individual Man is the Meaſure of all Being and Truth* reſpectively to himſelf; for ſo the following Words in *Plato* explain it: [k] *Your meaning* (ſaith *Socrates*) *is this, That as every thing appears to me, ſuch it is to me; and as it appears to you, ſuch it is to you, both of us being alike men.* Wherefore it is elſewhere expreſſed after this manner, [l] *That every man is the Meaſure of What* is and is not, that is, to himſelf, and [m] *That every one is the Meaſure of his own Wiſdom to himſelf. Sextus Empiricus* gives a ſhort account of this *Protagorean* Philoſophy in a few Words thus, [n] *He aſſerts that, which ſeems to every one, to be, and ſo makes all things Relative.* Now this was an Higher ſtrain of Madneſs than the *Pyrrhonian* Scepticiſm, which was not ſo extravagant as to affirm, that all things were Phantaſtical and Relative

[i] Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος.

[k] Οὐκοῦν ὅτως, πως λέγεις ὡς ὅια μὲν ἕκασα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐςιν ἐμοί· ὅια δὲ σοι, τοιαῦτα ἂν σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε κἀγώ.

[l] Μέτρον ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή.

[m] Μέτρον εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕκασον αὐτοῦ σοφίας.

[n] Τίθησι τὰ φαινόμενα ἑκάσῳ, καὶ ὅτως εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τι.

only; but that we could not affirm what things abſolutely were in their own Nature, but only what they ſeemed to us.

3. But that all this was chiefly intended as a Battery or Aſſault againſt Morality, and Principally levelled by *Protagoras* againſt the Abſolute and Immutable Natures of Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt, appeareth alſo from ſundry Paſſages of that learned Dialogue called *Theætetus*. [o] *Tell me therefore, doſt thou in good Earneſt think that nothing* Is *Good or Honeſt, but is always made ſo?* And afterwards *Protagoras* affirms; [p] *That whatſoever things ſeem to be Good and Juſt to every City or Commonwealth, the ſame are ſo to that City or Commonwealth ſo long as they ſeem ſo.* Again, *p.* 172. [q] *Whatſoever things any City thinking doth decree to be Honeſt or Diſhoneſt, Juſt or Unjuſt, Holy or Unholy, thoſe things are really or truly ſuch to that City; and in ſuch things as theſe no one Private Perſon or City is*

[o] Ed Serrani, p. 157 λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν εἰ σοὶ ἀρέσκει τὸ μήτε εἶναι, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν.

[p] P. 167. διό γ' ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ.

[q] Καλὰ μὲν δὴ ἀισχρὰ, δίκαια δὲ ἄδικα, καὶ ὅσια καὶ μὴ, οἷα ἂν ἐκάστη πόλις διανοηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ δὲ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον ἔστε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτης, ἔστε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι.

wiſer

wiſer than another, becauſe [r] *none of theſe things have any Nature or Eſſence of their own, being meerly Phantaſtical and Relative. Laſtly*, To name no more Places, *p.* 177. [s] *The thing that we were about to ſhew was this, that they which made the Natures and Eſſences of all things, Flowing and Mutable, and which held that what ſeemed to every body, was that to whom it ſo ſeemed, as they do maintain this concerning all other things, ſo concerning nothing more than Juſt and Unjuſt, as being unqueſtionably true of theſe, that whatſoever any City thinks to be Good and Juſt, and decrees them ſuch, theſe things are ſo to that City, ſo long as they are ſo decreed.*

CHAP. II.

1. WHEREFORE, ſince in order to the taking away of the Immutable Natures of *Good* and *Evil*, *Juſt* and *Unjuſt*,

[r] ἐκ ἔϛι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτῆ ἔχον.

[s] ἐκεῖν ἐνταῦθά πω ἦμεν τῷ λόγῳ ςν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τὰς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀιὲι δοκεῖν ἑκάϛῳ, τῦτο καὶ εἶναι τύτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν δὴ διϊχυρίζεϛαι, καὶ ἐκ ἥκιϛα περὶ τὰ δίκαια ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, τᾶῦτα καὶ ἔϛι δίκαια τιθεμένη ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται.

and the Moral Differences of Humane Actions, there was so strange an Attempt made by these Philosophers to overthrow the Absolute Essences and Truths of all things; let us in the next place consider what Pretences, or Grounds they could possibly have for maintaining of so wild a Paradox as this is.

First, THEREFORE, it is Evident from *Plato*'s Writings, that *Protagoras* laid his Foundation in the Heraclitical Philosophy, at that time in great vogue and request in the World, which did, [a] as that Philosopher writes, *bring in a Floating and Moveable Essence*, and maintained [b] *That nothing stood, but all things moved and flowed.* An Opinion which most of the Ancients were inclining to, as appears from the Poets, who made [c] *all things to be the Off-spring of Flux and Motion:* In so much that *Homer* himself (as *Plato* observes) deriving the Pedigree of the Gods, made the *Ocean* their Father, and *Tethys* their Mother [d].

AND there were not any Philosophers of Note, besides *Parmenides* and *Melissus*, that

[a] Φερομένην εἶναι ἐστάγειν.

[b] οὐδὲν ἑστάναι, πάντα δὲ κινεῖσθαι.

[c] Πάντα ἔκγονα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως.

[d] Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

opposed

oppoſed it, who alſo ran into another Extreme: And therefore the former of theſe *Plato* facetiouſly calls [e] *the Flowing Philoſophers*, the latter [f] the *Standers*. Now the true meaning of this Heraclitical Philoſophy was plainly this; That there is no other Being in the World beſides Individual Body or Matter, and no ſuch thing as [g] *ſtanding Intelligible Forms*, that is, no Intellectual Being; which Matter or Corporeal Being as it is liable to Motion and Mutation becauſe of its Diviſibility, every Part of it being ſeparable from another; ſo by the Mutation that we find in all Corporeal Things, we may reaſonably conclude, that it is throughout perpetually moved and agitated by Streams and ſubtle Matter paſſing the Pores of all Bodies; whence it was that they affirmed [h] *that all Things flowed like a Stream*; and that there was no Stability either of Eſſence or Knowledge any where to be found. For that *Cratylus* and *Heraclitus* endeavoured to deſtroy the Certainty of all Science from this Principle, is evident in that they main-

[e] Τὰς ῥέοντας.
[f] Στασιώτας.
[g] Ἰδέη.
[h] Οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα.

tained

tained that Contradictories might be true concerning the same thing, and at the same time. And indeed if there were no other Being in the World but Individual Matter, and all Knowledge proceeded from the Impresses of that Matter, That being always agitated, it is not conceivable how there could be any Stability of Knowledge any more than of Essence found in this Rapid Whirlpool of Corporeal Things; nay, nor how there should be any such thing as Knowledge at all. Wherefore according to this *Heraclitical* Philosophy, *Protagoras* in the first Place concluded [i] *That Knowledge is nothing else but Sense*; For as *Plato* writes, [k] *These two Assertions come all to one, That all things flow like a Stream, and that Knowledge and Sense are one and the self-same thing.*

2. BUT *Protagoras* went further, and made a Superstructure upon this *Heraclitical* Philosophy out of the Old Atomical or *Phenician* Philosophy, which clearly asserted, That all those sensible Qualities, as they are called, of *Heat* and *Cold*, *Light* and *Colours*,

[i] Ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις.

[k] Εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπίπτωκε οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, καὶ αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι.

Sounds,

Sounds, *Odours* and *Sapours*, formally considered, are not things really and absolutely existing without us, but only Passions, Sensations and Phantasms in us, occasioned by certain local Motions made upon the Organs of Sense from the Objects without us, and so indeed but Relative and Phantastical Things. And thus *Protagoras* made up his Business compleat from this Mixture of the *Heraclitical* and *Atomical* Philosophy together; for taking it for granted according to *Heraclitus*'s Doctrine, That Knowledge is nothing else but Sense, and according to the *Phenician* or *Atomical* Philosophy, That the Sensible Qualities are not Things really and absolutely Existing without us, but Appearances or Sensations in us, he concluded [1] *all Sensible and Intelligible things* not to be absolute Essences, but things meerly Relative, Phantastical and Imaginary.

[1] Πάντα τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

1. NOW that this *Atomical*, *Corpuſcular* or *Mechanical* Philoſophy, that ſolves all the *Phænomena* of the Corporeal World by thoſe Intelligible Principles of *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Site* and *Motion*, and thereby makes Senſible things intelligible, baniſhing away thoſe Unintelligible Corporeal Forms and Senſible Qualities, was known to *Protagoras*, who lived not only before *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, but alſo before *Democritus himſelf*, as *Plutarch* teſtifies, (tho' he abuſed it, in grounding ſo ſtrange a Paradox upon it) I ſhall make it undeniably evident from ſeveral Teſtimonies out of *Plato*'s *Theætetus*; for beſides that Paſſage afore-mention'd, [a] *p.* 152. *That all things are made by local Motion and Mixture with one another*, and what follows after, [b] *That Motion is that which makes every thing to ſeem to be, or to be*

[a] Ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα.

[b] Τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει.

gene-

generated, p. 153. he plainly describes the Nature of Colours according to this very Hypothesis, [c] The Sense whereof is this, *Let us begin first with the Eyes or Sight: That which is called a White Colour, is not any Real Quality existing either without the Eyes or in the Eyes; for then it would not consist only in Motion and Generation: But taking it for granted that no Sensible thing is such absolutely in it self, we must say that a White and Black Colour, and every other Colour is generated by certain Motions made and impressed upon the Eye, and every Colour is neither that which makes the Impression, nor that which receiveth it*; (that is, neither any thing in the Eye nor in the Object absolutely) *but a certain Middle thing between them both,* which can be nothing else but a Passion or Sensation in us. Elsewhere in that Dialogue he proves this Assertion, That Colours and the like Sensible things are no Real and Absolúte Qualities

[c] ΣΩ. ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν ὧ ἄριστε ἑτωσὶ κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον. ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων, μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι· μηδὲ τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς. ἤδη γὰρ ἂν μένοι, καὶ ἐκ ἂν ἐν τῇ γενέσει γίγνοιτο. Θέαιτ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς; Σω. Ἑπόμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ ἓν ὂν τιθέντες, καὶ ἡμῖν ἕτω μέλαντε καὶ λευκὸν ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανῆναι γεγεννημένον. ἢ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμὲν χρῶμα, ἔστε τὸ προσβάλλον, ἔστε τὸ προσβαλλόμενόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἑκάστῳ ἰδιον γεγονός. p. 158.

either in the Sentient or in the Object, becauſe the ſame Object ſeems to have different qualities to Different Perſons, as [d] *The ſame Wind blowing ſeems Cold to one and Warm to another; and the ſame Wine which to one in Health ſeems Sweet, will to the ſame Perſon appear bitter and diſtaſteful if he be ſick.* Whence he concluded that *Heat* and *Cold*, *Sweet* and *Bitter*, were not things Really and Abſolutely exiſting in the Objects without, but Relative things, being Paſſions or Senſations that may be diverſify'd by the different Tempers and Complexions of the Body.

2. Afterward, *p.* 156. we have the Sum of this *Atomical* or *Mechanical* Philoſophy, more copiouſly and fully ſet down after this manner, [e] *The beginning upon which all things depend is this;*

[d] Πνίσσος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτὸ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγῶι, ὁ δ' ἵ. ὁ δὲ μὲν ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα.

[e] Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ ἧς ἅ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν. Ὡς τὸ πᾶν κινησις ἦν. ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν. Ἐστὶ δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλῆθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τελέψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα, γίγνεται ἔκγονα, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ. τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις, καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις, καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λυπαὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι. Καὶ ἄλλαι ἀπείρητοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμαι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ἀνομασμέναι. Τὸ δὲ ἂν αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἑκάσαις ὁμόγονον.

Ὄψισι

this; That the whole World is Motion, and nothing elſe beſides. Now of Motion there are two kinds, each of which containeth innumerable Branches under it; but the Power of one is Action, of the other Paſſion. From the mutual Congreſs and Contrition of both which together, are begotten innumerable Offſprings, which may all be reduced to theſe two General heads, whereof the one the Senſible, the other Senſe, which is always joined together with the Senſible. The Senſes have ſuch Names as theſe, Sight, Hearing, Taſting, Touching, Pleaſures, Pains, Deſires, Fears, and others innumerable without Names, but many that have Names. The Senſible Kind doth anſwer and correſpond to every one of theſe; To the Sight all manner of Colours,

Ὄψεσι μὲν παντοδαπᾶις χρώματα παντοδαπά· ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναὶ, & ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ γιγνόμενα. ——ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. Ἐπειδὰν ἓν ὄμμα & ἄλλό τι τῶν τοιούτων συμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε & αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐγένετο, ἑκατέρᾳ ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων [τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τὸ συναπτόμενον τὸ χρῶμα] ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε, & ἐγένετο ἔτι ὄψις, ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν. τὸ δὲ συγγεννῆσαν τὸ χρῶμα, λευκότητι περιεπλήσθη, καὶ ἐγένετο ἡ λευκότης ἄν, ἀλλὰ λευκὸν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὁτιῶν συνέβη χρῶμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. Καὶ τἆλλα δὴ ὕδωρ σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν, & πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀπολήπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ & τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι & παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως.

to the Hearing Sounds, and to the other Senſes other Senſibles, that are of kin to them.---When therefore the Eye, and ſome other thing analogous to it, meet together, they beget Whiteneſs, and a certain Senſe proportionable thereunto, neither of which would have been made, if either of theſe had not met with the other. Then theſe things being carried reſpectively, Sight to the Eyes, and Whiteneſs to the Object, which did actively beget it, the Eye becomes full of Sight, and ſees, and is not made Sight in the Abſtract, but an Eye ſeeing; and that which did Congenerate the Colour, is fitted with Whiteneſs, and is made, not Whiteneſs in the Abſtract, but a thing White, whether Wood or Stone. The ſame is to be conceived of all other Senſible things, as Hard and Hot, and the like, that nothing is by it ſelf abſolutely any of theſe things, but they are all made from a Mutual Congreſs of the Outward Object and the Senſe, by means of Motion.

3. HERE we ſee it plainly aſſerted, that the Whole World is made by nothing elſe but the Motion of Particles, by means of which all things are Generated and Corrupted; neither did *Protagoras* acknowledge any other Motion but local, as is plainly intimated: And that all theſe Senſible Qualities which we

take notice of by the several Senses, as *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Sapors*, *Odours*, and the like, are not things really existing without us, but Passions or Sensations in us, caused by several Local Motions upon the Organs of Sense. Which, if that be not sufficient that I have already alledged, is yet more plainly expressed after this manner, *p.* 182. [f] *Nothing is absolutely any one thing by it self, neither the Agent nor the Patient, but from both of these meeting together, are generated at once both the Senses and the Sensible things.*

4. THESE Passages which I have cited are so clear and evident, that they cannot possibly be capable of any other Sense than what I have expressed; and therefore those two *Latin* Interpreters *Ficinus* and *Serranus*, that lived before the Restitution of this Mechanical Philosophy, and therefore understood it not, yet expound them after the same manner. The first thus, [g] *Colour is neither the Sight of the Eyes, nor the Motion of Bodies,*

[f] Μέμνησαι γὰρ ὅτι ὅτως ἐλέγομεν, ἓν μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιῶν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνομένων ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, ⁊ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτικτόντων, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἅττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

[g] Color neque Oculorum aspectus est, neque corporum motus, sed ex aspectu motuque medium quiddam resultans: Id est, talis circa Oculos Passio.

but a certain middle thing resulting from the Sight and Motion, that is, such a Passion about the Eyes. The other in this manner: [h] *That from the different Disposition of the Beholder, and so the different Affection of the Intermediate Sensible Organ, the various Colours are both made and seen, but so as that they are all Phantastical, nor have any Subsistence but in the Mind, are varied by the different Congress of Motion, which is to be concluded concerning all the Senses.* Only *Protagoras*, in order to his *Sceptical* Design, made these Sensible things not only Relative to Animals in General, but also to Individuals, because it is Impossible to demonstrate, as he urges, that all Brute Beasts, nay, that any two Men have the very same Phantasms or Ideas of *Red* or *Green*, these being *Idiopathies*, and because Experience shews, that not only the Gratefulness and Ungratefulness of *Tastes* and *Smells*, but also that *Heat* and *Cold* are Relative to Individuals.

[h] Ex varia aspicientis διαθέσει, variaque adeo Intermedii Sensilis Schesi, Colores varios & videri & fieri, ita tamen ut omnia sint φανταστικὰ, nec nisi in animo subsistant, vario autem Motus congressu varientur; quod de omnibus Sensibus constituendum est.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

1. WHEREFORE we have made it evident, that that very *Mechanical* or *Atomical* Philoſophy, that hath been lately reſtored by *Carteſius* and *Gaſſendus*, as to the main Subſtance of it, was not only elder than *Epicurus*, but alſo than *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, nay, than *Democritus* and *Leucippus* alſo, the commonly reputed Fathers of it. And therefore we have no Reaſon to diſcredit the Report of *Poſidonius* the *Stoick*, who, as *Strabo* tells us, affirmed this *Atomical* Philoſophy to have been antienter than the Times of the *Trojan* War, and firſt to have been brought into *Greece* out of *Phenicia*. [i] *If we may believe* Poſidonius *the Stoick, the Doctrine of Atoms is antienter than the Times of the* Trojan *War, and was firſt invented and deliver'd by one* Moſchus *a* Sidonian, or rather a *Phenician*, as [k] *Sextus Empiricus* cites the Teſti-

[i] Lib. 16. Edit. Caſaub. *p.* 757.

[k] Εἰ δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τῷ Ποσιδωνίῳ, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων δόγμα παλαιόν ἐστιν, ἀνδρὸς Σιδονίου Μόσχου πρὸ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν χρόνων γεγονότος.

mony of *Posidonius*. [1] Democritus *and* Epicurus *invented the Doctrine of Atoms, unless we make that Physiology to be antienter, and derive it, as* Posidonius *the Stoick doth, from one* Moschus, *a* Phenician [m]. And since it is certain from what we have shewed, that neither *Epicurus* nor yet *Democritus* were the first Inventers of this Physiology, this Testimony of *Posidonius* the Stoick ought in Reason to be admitted by us.

2. Now what can be more probable than that this *Moschus* the *Phenician*, that *Posidonius* speaks of, is the very same Person with that *Moschus* the Physiologer, that *Jamblichus* mentions in the Life of *Pythagoras*, where he affirms, that *Pythagoras* living some time at *Sidon* in *Phenicia*, conversed with the Prophets that were the Successors of *Mochus* the Physiologer, and was instructed by them. [n] *He conversed with the Prophets that were the Successors of* Mochus *and other* Phenician *Priests* And what can be more certain than

[1] Advers. Mathemat. *p.* 367.

[m] Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, εἰ μήτι ἀρχαιοτέραν ταύτην θετέον τὴν δόξαν, καθ' ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Στωϊκὸς Ποσειδώνιος, ἀπὸ Μόχου τινὸς ἀνδρὸς Φοίνικος καταγομένην.

[n] Τοῖς τε Μώχου τοῦ φυσιολόγου προφήταις ἀπογόνοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ φοινικικοῖς ἱεροφάνταις.

that

that both *Mochus* and *Moſchus*, the *Phenician* and Philoſopher, was no other than *Moſes* the *Jewiſh* Lawgiver, as *Arcerius* rightly gueſſes, ° *It ſeems that it ought to be read* Moſchus, *unleſs any had rather read it* Mochus *or* Moſes. Wherefore according to the Antient Tradition, *Moſchus* or *Moſes* the *Phenician* being the Firſt Author of the *Atomical* Philoſophy, it ought to be called neither *Epicurean* nor *Democritical*, but *Moſchical* or *Moſaical*.

3. It muſt be acknowledged, that neither of theſe two Famous and Renowned Philoſophers, *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, had the good Hap to be rightly and thoroughly inſtructed in this antient *Phenician* and *Moſchical* or *Moſaical* Philoſophy; *Protagoras* ſo much abuſing it to *Scepticiſm*, and the taking away of the Natural Diſcrimination of Good and Evil, might probably beget a Prejudice in *Plato* againſt it, tho' he doth not confute the Phyſiological Part of it in all his *Theætetus*, where Good Occaſion was offer'd him; And yet in his *Timæus* he hath a little Smattering of it, where he endeavours to reſolve the Differences of the Four Elements, *Fire*, *Air*, *Water*, *Earth*,

° Μόχυ legendum videtur, niſi quis Μόχυ vel Μωσέως legere malit.

into,

into the Different Geometrical Figures of their Inſenſible Parts, making the ſmall Particles of the *Earth* to be Cubical, by reaſon of their Solidity and Immobility, but of the *Fire*, *Pyramidal* [p]. [q] *It is reaſonable that that Figure which hath the ſmalleſt Baſes, ſhould be attributed to that Body which is moſt moving, cutting and piercing.* And that he doth not mean Myſtically in this, but Phyſically, appears from his own Explication of it concerning the Inſenſible Parts, *p.* 56. [r] *Theſe Cubes and Pyramids in the Earth and the Fire can only be perceived by the Mind and Underſtanding, ſince the ſingle Particles alone are not Senſible, but only the Aggregation of many of them together.*

4. But *Ariſtotle* plainly rejects it. *Jacobus Carpentarius*, in his Notes upon *Alcinous*, treating of the Nature of Univerſals, writes thus. [s] *Some do not altogether deny Univerſals, but*

[p] *Pag.* 55. Ser. Edit.

[q] Τὸ ἔχον ὀλιγίστας βάσεις ἐυκινητότατον ἀνάγκη πυρικέναι, τμητικώτατόν τε ὀξύτατον ὂν πάντη πάντων.

[r] Πάντα δὲ δεῖ ταῦτα διανοεῖσθαι σμικρὰ οὕτως ὡς καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον μὲ τῶν γένος ἑκάστε λόγῳ σμικρότητα δὲν ὁρώμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν, συναθροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τὸς ὄγκυς αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι.

[s] Quidam Univerſalia non omnino quidem tollunt, ſed ea tantum eſſe volunt quando intelliguntur, nihil vero haberi in Natura

but will have it that they only are when they are underſtood, but that there is nothing in Nature which anſwers to the Notion of the Mind. Which to me indeed is the ſame thing as if they ſhould ſay that Colours are not in their Nature Actually any thing, but are made ſuch when they are in very Deed ſeen. Which Opinion alſo hath had its Aſſertors, but is condemned by Ariſtotle. This Opinion, that Colours are not actually exiſtent according to thoſe very Ideas that we have of them before Viſion, is the [t] *Myſtery* of the Old *Atomical* or *Moſaical* Philoſophy, which *Carpentarius* underſtood not; which makes them not Qualities abſolutely exiſting without us, but Paſſions and Senſations in us. And indeed this Philoſophy is condemned by *Ariſtotle*, in his Third Book [u] *Of the Soul*, c. 2. and that as the received Doctrine of the antient Phyſiologiſts before his Time. [x] *The Former Phyſiologiſts*,

Natura quod Mentis Notioni reſpondeat: Quod mihi ſane perinde eſt ac ſi dicerent Colores nihil actu eſſe, ſed tales effici quando reipſa videntur. Quæ etiam Opinio ſuos habuit Aſſertores, ſed ab Ariſtotele eſt damnata.

[t] Arcanum.

[u] De anima.

[x] Οἱ πρότεροι φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο δ' καλῶς ἔλεγον, οὐδὲν οἰόμενοι εἶτε λευκὸν εἶτε μέλαν ἄνευ ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γύσεως.

faith

ſaith he, *were (generally) miſtaken in this, in that they thought Blackneſs and Whiteneſs were no abſolute Qualities without the Sight, nor Sweet and Sowre without the Taſte.* Again, he endeavours to confute the ſame Philoſophy which reſolves thoſe Senſible Qualities into Figures, Site and Motion of Particles; not only attributing it to *Democritus*, but alſo making it the moſt generally received Phyſiology before his Time. [y] Democritus *and moſt of the Phyſiologers Commit a Great Abſurdity in this, in that they make all Senſe to be* Touch; *which is a thing at firſt Sight plainly impoſſible. Moreover, they do not diſtinguiſh betwixt the Objects common to all the Senſes, and thoſe which are proper and peculiar to the ſeveral Senſes apart. For* Magnitude *and* Figure, Roughneſs *and* Smoothneſs, Sharpneſs *and* Bluntneſs, *which belong to Bulk, are Com-*

[y] Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσι. Καί τοι εἰ καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἐκάστη ἁφή τις ἐστι· τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἐστὶ ἀδύνατον, ἐκ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν. Ἔτι δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πασῶν χρῶνται ὡς ἰδίοις. Μέγεθος γὰρ καὶ σχῆμα, καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐστὶ, εἰ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλὰ ὄψεώς γε καὶ ἁφῆς. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἴδια συνταῦθα ἀνάγουσιν ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος. Τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, τὸ μὲ τραχὺ φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λεῖον. Ἐις δὲ τὰ σχήματα ἀνάγει τὰς χυμὰς, καίτοι ἢ οὐδημιᾶς ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ὄψεως τα κοινὰ γναρίζειν.

mon

mon to all the Senſes; *or if not to all, yet to* Sight *and* Touch. *Whereas our Senſe is deceived concerning theſe Common Objects, but it is never deceived concerning the proper Objects of the ſeveral Senſes, as the* Sight *is not deceived about* Colours, *nor the* Hearing *about* Sounds. But moſt of the antient Phyſiologiſts refer theſe Proper Objects to the Common *Senſilia*; as *Democritus*, who, as for *White* and *Black*, makes one of them to conſiſt in [a] Roughneſs and Ruggedneſs, the other in Smoothneſs and Evenneſs of Parts. He alſo reduceth *Sapors* to Figures, tho' it belong chiefly to Sight to take Cognizance of Figures and Magnitude, and the like; *whereas according to this Philoſophy, the Senſe of* Touch *would be the moſt Critical of them. Ariſtotle* there concludes this Diſcourſe, with two General Arguments againſt that Philoſophy (that made the Senſible Qualities to be Properly Senſations in Us, and nothing elſe in the Objects without us but *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Site of Parts* and *Motion*) in this manner, [b] *That there is Contrariety in*

[a] Scabrities.

[b] Ἔτι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τῷ μέλανι τὸ λευκὸν, καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τὸ γλυκὺ τῷ πικρῷ, σχῆμα δὲ σχήματι οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐναντίον. τίνι γὰρ τῶν πολυγώνων τὸ περιφερὲς ἐναντίον; Ἔτι ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν σχημάτων, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς εἶναι ἀπείρους.

Qualities,

Qualities, but not in Figures; and that the Variety of Figures being Infinite, Taſtes, Colours, *and the reſt would be ſo likewiſe.* Which Arguments, tho' they be handſome and ingenious (that is, *Ariſtotelical*) to prove that there are ſuch Entities as Qualities *Viſible*, *Tangible*, *Taſtable*, and the like really exiſting in the Objects without us; yet as they will not counterballance the Weight of thoſe other Arguments that militate on the contrary Side, ſo they will without any Difficulty be anſwer'd by the Aſſertors of this *Novantique* Philoſophy.

5. But after *Plato*'s and *Ariſtotle*'s Time, this Old Phyſiology was again revived by *Epicurus*, but ſo blended with Immorality and Impiety, as that it ſoon ſunk again, there being nothing left of all thoſe Voluminous Treatiſes of *Epicurus* concerning it, ſaving what is preſerved in *Diogenes Laertius*, nor no other Syſtem thereof tranſmitted to Poſterity but what is comprized in the Poem of *Lucretius Carus.* So that the World was generally ſeiz'd with a deep and profound Oblivion of this Phyſiology, there being only ſome obſcure Footſteps and dark Intimations of it now and then found in the Writings of ſome learned Authors. As when *Sextus* tells us that ſome of the

Stoicks held, [c] *that Senſitive things were Relative to Animals, and depended upon our* Senſation; and [d] *That not the things themſelves were comprehended by Senſe, but only our Paſſions from them:* And when the *Pyrrhonian Scepticks* themſelves affirmed, [e] *That all things are Relative, that is, to that which judges of them, and every thing appears to be according to Senſe.*

And when *Plotinus* makes a Doubt whether Senſible things did really exiſt in the Objects without us, or were only Paſſions within us [f], [g] *It may be well doubted concerning Senſible things themſelves, that we ſeem to have the greateſt Aſſurance of, whether they really exiſt in the Objects without us, or whether they be Paſſions in us.*

6. BUT in this laſt Age it hath been ſo ſucceſsfully reſtored by the Writings of ſome learned Authors, and the Truth thereof ſo

[c] Τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι πρός τι.

[d] Τὰ πάθη μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

[e] πάντα εἶναι πρός τι, τυπτέσι πρὸς τὸ κρίνον, ὅτι πρὸς τόδε τὸ ζῶον καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τήνδε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕκαστον φάινεται.

[f] Enn. 5. Lib. 5.

[g] Ἐπὶ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἃ δὲ δοκεῖ πίστιν ἔχειν ἐναργεστάτην, ἀπιστεῖται μήποτε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχῃ τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν, καὶ νοῦ δεῖ ἢ διανοίας τῶν κρινόντων.

convin-

convincingly evidenced by many other Experiments beſides that of the Glaſſy *Priſme* and *Rainbow*, that there is little Doubt left concerning it. And indeed unleſs this Philoſophy be acknowledged to be true, we muſt of neceſſity affirm, that the Senſible and Corporeal World is altogether unintelligible. For as *Timæus Locrus* long ago obſerved, that [h] ſenſible things could not be apprehended any otherwiſe than [i] *by Senſe and a certain kind of Spurious Reaſon*, ſo it is moſt certainly true that we cannot poſſibly have any clear and intelligible Ideas of *Heat* and *Cold*, *Light* and *Colours*, as ſuch Qualities really exiſting in the Objects of Senſe without us, but as Paſſions and Senſations in our ſelves we may. Wherefore unleſs we will aſſert that theſe lower Senſible things are [k] utterly *incomprehenſible* to our Underſtanding, whilſt it is able clearly to comprehend things of a higher Nature, we muſt conclude this Old *Atomical*, *Moſchical* or *Moſaical* Philoſophy to be true.

[h] τὰ αἰσθητά.

[i] αἰσθήσει καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ.

[k] ἀκατάληπτα.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

1. BUT tho' this Old *Atomical* Philoſophy be moſt ſolidly and ſubſtantially true, the Paradoxes that *Protagoras* and others endeavoured to ground upon it, are not only ridiculouſly abſurd and contradictious in themſelves, but alſo altogether inconſequent from the ſame.

FOR as for thoſe Aſſertions, That whatever *ſeems is*, and that every Fancy is true; tho' they ſeem ridiculouſly abſurd, yet thoſe two learned Philoſophers *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* vouchſafe them a ſerious Confutation. *Plato* from hence, in his *Theætetus*, becauſe that the Fancies of them that dream would be as true and real as the Senſations of thoſe that are awake; and that all Men would be alike Wiſe, and the Opinions of the moſt Illiterate Idiots in Geometry as true as any Geometrical Theorems, and all Predictions of future things alike true: And that in the Actions of Human Life, it would be indifferent what any Man did in order to any End, and ſo all Deliberation and Conſultation ceaſe.

BUT *Ariſtotle*, in his Metaphyſicks, with ſome Mixture of Facetiouſneſs alſo writes after this manner, [l] *To thoſe that put their Finger under their Sight or between their Eyes, it will be both two and one.* But *Sextus Empiricus* beſtows more Subtilty upon it than either of them; [m] *If every Fancy be true, then when one fancies that every Fancy is not true, that muſt be true alſo, and ſo then this Propoſition that every Fancy is true, will be falſe.*

2. WHEREAS the Meaning of theſe Aſſertions, *That whatever ſeems is,* and *every Fancy is true*, was no other than this, that Nothing was abſolutely true at all, but that all Truth and Knowledge were but Seeming, fantaſtical and Relative things. And becauſe one Seeming or Appearance is as true as another, therefore they were all equally true, that is to ſay, none of them true at all. This *Ariſtotle* elſewhere rightly apprehended, [n] *He that ſaith that all things that appear are true, makes all Beings to be Relative.*

[l] Τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑποβάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς φάνεσθαι δύο, δυοῖν εἶναι λέγ. τὸ φάνεσθαι τἄληθες, καὶ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινοῦσι τὴν ὄψιν ἓν φάινεται τὸ ἕν.

[m] Εἰ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφεστάμενον ἴσαι ἀληθὶς· καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος.

[n] Ὁ λέγων ἅπαντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἅπαντα ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα πρός τι.

BUT if nothing be *Absolutely true*, but only *Relatively* to him that thinks so, then this very Opinion of *Protagoras*, that nothing was *Absolutely true*, and *that Man was the Measure of all things*, was not it self Absolutely true, but only Seemingly and Relatively to *Protagoras:* Whereas this is asserted for an Absolute Truth by him, that nothing is Absolutely True.

AND what a Ridiculous Folly was this in one that would be accounted a Philosopher, to take a great deal of Pains in writing a large Volume, and to endeavour industriously to convince the World, *That nothing was Absolutely, but only Relatively and Fantastically true:* Since it must needs follow from thence, that this very thing it self was not Absolutely true, but only Relatively to those that thought so; and the contrary altogether as true to those that thought otherwise. For it would no more concern the World to know that this was Relatively and Fantastically true to *Protagoras* that nothing was Absolutely true, than to know what *Protagoras* dreamt of the last Night. For since according to him ° *that every Man does but think* his own Truths, it cannot concern any Man to know another's

° Ἀντὶς τὰ ἀντῷ ἕκασος μόνα δοξάζει.

Opinions any more than his Dreams. And therefore *Protagoras* had done more wisely if he had spared his Pains, and kept those Private Relative Truths of his own, that is, his Dream or Imagination wholly to himself.

But by his industrious endeavouring to convince the World of this, *That nothing was Absolutely true, but only Relatively*, he plainly confuted his own Doctrine, in asserting that this was Absolutely True, that nothing was Absolutely true, which is a manifest Contradiction. There need be the less Pains taken in confuting Scepticism and Fantasticism, since it always so easily confutes it self.

3. For if nothing be Absolutely true, then not so much as this could be Absolutely true, that it seemed to *Protagoras* that nothing was Absolutely true. And it could only seem to seem to be true. Nay, it could not be Absolutely true, that *Protagoras*, to whom all Truth seemed to be Relative, had any Real Existence, much less that there are any Objects without, from whence the Impressions or Motions are made upon our Senses; or that there is any such thing as *Magnitude*, *Motion*, *Figure* and *Site of Parts*, or [p] *that Matter is*

[p] Τὴν ὕλην ῥυσὴν εἶναι, καὶ τὰς λόγους τῶν φαινομένων πάντων ἐν αὐτῇ ὑποκεῖσθαι.

Floating, and that the Reaſons of all Appearances are founded therein; which things, as *Plato* and *Sextus* tell us, were dogmatically affirmed by *Protagoras*.

CHAP. VI.

1. AGAIN, as this *Scepticiſm* or *Fantaſticiſm* of *Protagoras* is moſt abſurd and Contradictious in it ſelf, ſo there is not any Foundation for it at all in the Old *Atomical* Philoſophy, but contrarywiſe, nothing doth more effectually and demonſtratively overthrow both theſe Aſſertions, *That Knowledge is Senſe*, and that all *Truth* and *Knowledge* is but *Fantaſtical* and *Relative*, than this Atomical Philoſophy doth.

FOR firſt, ſince no Senſe can judge of it ſelf, or its own Appearances, much leſs make any Judgment of the Appearances belonging to another Senſe for [q] *thoſe things which are perceived by one of our Powers, it is impoſſible*

[q] Ἃ δι' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνη, ἀδύνατον δι' ἄλλης τούτων αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως· ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως, δι' ἀκοῆς.

to perceive them by another, as the Objects of Hearing by Sight, or the Objects of Sight by Hearing, and the like.

THE *Sight* cannot judge of *Sounds* which belong to the *Hearing*, nor the *Hearing* of *Light* and *Colours*; wherefore that which judges of all the Senſes and their ſeveral Objects, cannot be it ſelf any Senſe, but ſomething of a ſuperior Nature.

2. MOREOVER, that which judges that the Appearances of all the Senſes have ſomething Fantaſtical in them, cannot poſſibly be it ſelf Fantaſtical, but it muſt be ſomething which hath a Power of judging what Really and Abſolutely is or is not. This being not a Relative, but an Abſolute Truth, that Senſible Appearances have ſomething Fantaſtical in them. Neither could *Protagoras* ever have arrived to the Knowledge of this Truth, if he had not had ſome Faculty in him ſuperior to Senſe, that judgeth of what is and is not Abſolutely.

NOW this ſame Rational Faculty, that diſcovers, according to the *Atomical* Philoſophy, that there is ſomething in our Senſations that is merely Fantaſtical and Relative, doth aſſure us alſo not only that there are Abſolutely and Really ſuch Paſſions, Affections and Seemings

in

in us, but that they that do [r] *perceive* have an Absolute and Real Entity. For tho' it should be supposed that our Senses did deceive us in all their Representations, and that there were no Sun, no Moon, no Earth, that we had no Hands, no Feet, no Body, as by Sense we seem to have, yet Reason tells us that of Necessity That must be something, to whom these things seem to be, because nothing can seem to that that is not; this being an Absolute and Immutable Truth, [s] *That of nothing there is not any either Action or Passion whatsoever*; but also that when we are awake and use our Senses, there are Corporeal Objects really existing without us, which make those Sensible Impressions upon us, and that those Corporeal Objects have absolutely and really as many correspondent Varieties in them in respect of *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *Site* and *Motion*, as there are Varieties of sensible Ideas and Phantasms that we take notice of by them. For *Protagoras* himself, according to the Old *Atomical* Philosophy, acknowledges that *Local Motion*, *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Site of Parts*, absolutely are in Corporeal things themselves; only that *Colour*

[r] Sentire.

[s] Nihili nullam esse neque Actionem neque Passionem.

and such other things are Relative. Therefore all *Being* and *Truth*, according to *Protagoras* himself, is not Fantastical and Relative, but there is some Absolute.

3. WHEREFORE the proper and genuine Result of this old *Atomical* Philosophy, which is the Triumph of Reason over Sense, is nothing else but this, that Sense alone is not the *Criterion* or Judge of what does Really and Absolutely exist without us, but that there is a Higher and Superior intellectual Faculty in us that judges of our Senses, which discovers what is Fallacious and Fantastical in them, and pronounces what Absolutely is and is not. And *Democritus*, who did more thoroughly and perfectly understand this *Atomical* Philosophy than *Protagoras*, makes this to be the proper Result and Consequence of it, the Invalidating the Judgment of Sense concerning Bodies themselves, and the asserting a higher Faculty of Reason in us to determine what is Absolutely True and False; which is worth the noting. For so *Sextus* the Philosopher writes concerning *Democritus*: [t] Democritus *doth*

[t] Δημόκριτος δὲ ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, καὶ τέτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ δόξαν· ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν τὰ ἄτομα εἶναι καὶ κενόν.

discredit

discredit Sense, attributing not Truth to it, but only Appearance, and that Really nothing exists in the Corporeal World but Atoms and Vacuum. And *Democritus*'s own Words concerning it are these, [u] Sweet *and* Bitter, Hot *and* Cold, Colours, *and the like, are by* Law *and* Opinion, Atoms *and* Vacuum *really: That which is supposed and fancied to be are Sensibles; but these are not according to Truth, only Atoms and Vacuum. Sextus Empiricus* likewise in another Place writes thus concerning *Democritus*, [x] Democritus *in his Canons saith, that there are two kinds of Knowledge, the one by the Senses, the other by the Mind; of which that by the Mind he calls* Knowledge, *accounting it that which may be trusted for the Judgment of Truth; that by the Senses, he calleth Dark and Obscure, denying it to have any Certainty as to the Knowledge of Truth. His own Words are these: Of Knowledge there are two*

[u] Νόμῳ γλυκὺ καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν καὶ νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ χροιή· ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.

[x] Ἐν δὲ τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ δι' ἕ τῆς διανόιας, ὧν τὴν μὲ διὰ τῆς διανόιας γνῶσιν κατάγει προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρισιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτινην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρέμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τῇ ἀληθῶς ἀπλανές· λεγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν. Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτίη. Καὶ σκοτίης μὲν τὰ δὲ σύμπαντα Ὄψις, Ἀκοὴ, Ὀδμὴ, Γευσις, ψᾶυσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκεχυμένη δὲ τάυτης.

kinds,

kinds, the one Genuine, the other Dark and Obſcure; to the Dark kind of Knowledge are referred Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Taſting, Touching; *but the Genuine Knowledge is more Hidden and Recondite than this.*

Now this concerning *Democritus* I note the rather more carefully, becauſe *Epicurus* afterward dotingly fumbling about the ſame Philoſophy, made *Senſe* to be the only *Criterion* of Truth and Falſhood, and conſequently abuſed this Old Atomical Philoſophy to Atheiſm and Immorality; whereas if rightly underſtood it is the moſt Impregnable Bulwark againſt both; for this Philoſophy diſcovering that the Ideas of Senſe are Fantaſtical, muſt needs ſuppoſe another Principle in us Superior to Senſe, which judges what is Abſolutely and not Fantaſtically or Relatively only True or Falſe.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

1. NOW although what I have already ſaid may poſſibly ſeem a Sufficient Confutation of *Protagoras*'s Objection againſt the Immutable and Abſolute Natures or Eſſences of all things, from that very *Atomical Phyſiology*, which he appeals to, which, if rightly underſtood, is the moſt compliable with true *Metaphyſicks*, and the moſt Subſervient to it of any; yet notwithſtanding I think it very proper to the Buſineſs which I have in hand, to launch out farther into this Argument, to ſhew the Different Natures of *Senſe* and *Intellection* or *Knowledge*, not only that I may thereby the more fully confute this *Scepticiſm*, or rather *Fantaſticiſm* of *Protagoras*, and

and alſo aſſert the Immutable Natures or Eſſences of things, but alſo for other Purpoſes, which I ſhall give an Account of in the Cloſe of this Diſcourſe, and I hope then to make it appear that this was no Impertinent Digreſſion.

2. I ſhall begin with *Senſe*, to ſhew what it is, and that it is not *Knowledge*.

Firſt, therefore, it is acknowledged by all, *That Senſe is Paſſion*. And there is in all Senſation, without Diſpute, *Firſt*, a *Paſſion* in the Body of the Sentient, which *Bodily Paſſion* is nothing elſe but *Local Motion* impreſs'd upon the Nerves from the Objects without, and thence propagated and communicated to the *Brain*, where all *Senſation* is made. For there is no other Action of one Body upon another, nor other Change or Mutation of Bodies Conceivable or Intelligible beſides *Local Motion*; which Motion in that Body which moves another, is called *Action*, in that which is moved by another, *Paſſion*. And therefore when a Corporeal Object very remotely diſtant is perceived by us, ſince it is by ſome Paſſion made upon our Body, there muſt of neceſſity be a Continued Propagation of ſome Local *Motion* or Preſſure from thence unto the Organs of our Senſe,

or

or Nerves, and ſo *unto* the *Brain.* As when we ſee many Fixed Stars ſparkling in a Clear Night, though they be all of them ſo many thouſand Semidiameters of the Earth diſtant from us, yet it muſt of neceſſity be granted, that there are *Local Motions* or Preſſures from them, which we call the Light of them, propagated continuedly or uninterruptedly through the Fluid Heavens unto our Optick Nerves, or elſe we could not ſee them. And that Motion or Preſſure by which we ſee all other Opake Bodies, is nothing but the [y] *puſhing againſt each other* of the Ætherial [z] *Globulous Particles*, ſtriving to move outward from the Center of the *Vortex* reſiſted or rejected from the Solid Superficies of them; in the ſame manner as we feel things at a Diſtance in the dark, by the Reſiſtency which they make upon the further end of the Staff that we hold in our hands. And when we hear the Sound of a Bell or Cannon a great way off, the Tremulous Vibrations of the Air, like the Circlings of the Water, when a Stone is flung into it, are from thence continually propagated to our Ears or Acouſtick

[y] Ἀντέρεισμα. [z] Globu[illegible]

Nerves,

Nerves, the Undulations ſtill growing the wider and weaker, the further they go.

3. But for as much as *Senſe* is not meer *Local Motion* impreſs'd from one Body upon another, or a Body's bare Reaction or Reſiſtance to that Motion of another Body, as ſome have fondly Conceited, but a Cogitation, Recognition or Vital Perception and Conſciouſneſs of theſe Motions or Paſſions of the Body, therefore there muſt of neceſſity be another kind of Paſſion alſo in the Soul or Principle of Life, which is vitally united to the Body, to make up Senſation. Which Paſſion notwithſtanding is of a different kind or *Species* from the former; for the Soul, that is a Cogitative Being, is ſuppoſed to be ſuch a thing as can Penetrate a Body, and therefore cannot be conceived to be Locally moved by the Local Motion of the Body. For we ſee that *Light* which pervades the Air, though it be a Corporeal Motion, yet it is not moved or ſhaken by the Agitations of the Air, becauſe it is in a Body far more ſubtle than the Air, that runs through the Spongy Pores of it. Wherefore the *Soul*, though it be conceived to be an *Extended Subſtance*, yet being Penetrative of Body, not by filling up the Pores of it, but by *coexiſting* in the ſame

Space

Space with it, cannot be locally moved by the Motions of it.

NEITHER is this Paſſion of the Soul in Senſation a meer naked Paſſion or Suffering; becauſe it is a Cogitation or Perception which hath ſomething of Active Vigour in it. For thoſe Ideas of *Heat*, *Light*, and *Colours*, and other Senſible things, being not Qualities really exiſting in the Bodies without us, as the *Atomical* Philoſophy inſtructs us, and therefore not paſſively ſtamped or imprinted upon the Soul from without in the ſame manner that a Signature is upon a piece of Wax, muſt needs ariſe partly from ſome Inward Vital Energy of the Soul it ſelf, being Phantaſms of the Soul, or ſeveral Modes of Cogitation or Perception in it. For which Cauſe ſome of the *Platoniſts* would not allow Senſations to be Paſſions in the Soul, but only [a] *Active Knowledges of the Paſſions of* the Body.

4. BUT, as I ſaid before, *Senſe* is a Paſſion in the Soul alſo, *viz.* ſuch a Paſſion as a Vital and Cogitative Being is capable of, becauſe we find by Experience that it is not elicited from the Soul it ſelf, but obtruded upon it

[a] Παθῶν γνώσεις.

from

from without; so that the Soul cannot chuse but have such Sensations, Cogitations or Affections in it, when such or such External Objects are presented to the Outward Senses. The Soul receiving its Information from without, by sympathizing with the Passions of its own Body concerning what Individual Bodies exist round about it, and the general Modes of them; which no innate Reason of its own could possibly discover to it. And therefore the Soul being necessarily determined to exert such Cogitations within it self, when such *Local Motions* are impress'd upon the Body which she is vitally United to, these Sensations are certain kinds of Passive Energies of the Soul. For the *Soul* and *Body* by reason of that vital Union which is betwixt them, making up one [b] *Compound* or *Animal*, do of necessity mutually suffer from Each other, the Body being Variously moved by the Soul, and the Soul again Variously affected from the Body, or the Motions which are made upon it. Neither doth the Soul suffer indifferently from any Body, but all Sense arises from that Natural Sympathy or Compassion which the Soul hath with that Indi-

[b] Com. ositum.

vidual

vidual Body with which it is Vitally United. And had not the Soul such a Passive Principle in it, it could not possibly be vitally united to any Body, neither could there be any such thing as an Animal or Living Creature.

MOREOVER, these Sensitive Cogitations, as we shall shew afterward, do plainly differ, in the Mode of them, from those pure Cogitations that are the Actions of the Soul it self; there being a Vast Difference between the Senses of *Hunger* and *Thirst*, and meer Volitions in the Soul to eat and drink, as likewise betwixt that *Grief* and *Sadness* that arises from some ill Tidings told and understood by the Mind, (though there be something of Corporeal Passion consequent or concomitant here also) and betwixt a Sense of Pain when the Body is hurt. And in like manner in those other Sensations of *Light* and *Colours*, *Heat* and *Cold*, the Soul doth not Meerly know or understand the *Figure* and *Motions* of those Corporeal Particles, but hath certain confused Affections and Phantasms within it self by reason of them. From whence it is evident that these Sensitive Cogitations are not Pure Actions springing from the Soul it self, but Compassions with the Body. And there-

fore that Opinion of the *Platoniſts* is no way to be admitted, that *Senſations are not Paſſions*, but [c] *Knowledges of the Paſſions*, as if they were free and ſincere Actions of the Soul, or releaſed and Unpaſſionate Knowledges in it of the Paſſions of the Body.

5. WHEREFORE *Senſations* formally conſidered are certain Paſſions or Affections in the Soul fatally connected with ſome Local Motions in the Body, whereby the Soul perceiveth ſomething elſe beſides thoſe Immediate Corporeal Motions in the *Nerves*, *Spirits* or *Brain*. For though the Soul do only ſympathize with the Motions of its own Body, yet by Senſe it doth not take immediate Cognizance of thoſe very Motions themſelves, in the *Brain*, *Spirits* and Nerves, perceiving them as they are in themſelves, but it is ſecretly inſtructed by Nature to take notice of ſome other things thereby that may concern the Body.

FOR, firſt, the Soul is ſometimes ſo affected by reaſon of thoſe Local Motions of the Blood and Heart communicated by the Nerves unto the Brain, as that it perceives ſomething within it ſelf, *viz.* certain [d] *Paſſions* of Joy or Pleaſantneſs, Dulneſs and Sadneſs, or Contri-

[c] Παθῶν γνῶσις. [d] Pathemata.

ſtation,

ſtation, Iraſcible and Concupiſcible Inclinations, when we know no Rational Cauſe for them within our ſelves, and therefore they could not ſpring from the Soul it ſelf.

AGAIN, the Soul is ſometimes ſo affected by Motions communicated from the Nerves that belong to the Stomach and [e] *Windpipe*, as that it perceives or takes notice of *Hunger* or *Thirſt* in thoſe parts of the Body, and the like may be ſaid of the other Pains or Pleaſures, Pruriences and Titillations of the Body, which the Soul perceives as things exiſting in ſome certain Parts of the Body it ſelf; when the Nerves are in a certain way moved.

LASTLY, The Soul is frequently ſo affected by the Motions of thoſe five other Conjugations of Nerves, as that by Natural Inſtinct it takes notice of ſome Corporeal things exiſting without our Bodies, whence that Motion upon the Nerves comes, as *Light*, *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Heat* and *Cold*, *Hardneſs*, *Softneſs*, *Gravity*, *Levity*, *Odours*, *Sapours*: The Objects being many times remotely diſtant from us; though it does not perceive them in the ſame manner as they abſolutely exiſt without us,

[e] Oeſophagus.

Now though all these three kinds mentioned be Equally *Passions* and *Sensations* in the Soul, yet the use of Speech hath appropriated the Denomination of Passions only to the former, and stiled the two Latter by the Name of *Sensations*, the First of them being commonly called *Internal Corporeal Senses*, the Second *External*. Wherefore *Corporeal Senses* in general may be thus defined, to be *Affections in the Soul Caused by Certain Local Motions made upon some parts of the Body, by reason of the Vital Sympathy betwixt the Soul and Body, whereby the Soul seems to perceive Corporeal things existing without it self, either in its own Body, or else at a distance from it.*

CHAP. II.

1. WHEREFORE, *Sense* being a Passion in the Soul, or a *Compassion* with its *own* Body, which it is vitally united to, that is diversified according to the difference both of Local Motions and of Bodily Organs through which those Motions are conveyed; there

there being a neceſſary and fatal Connection between certain Motions in ſome parts of the enlivened Body, and certain Affections or Sympathies in the Soul, which *Democritus* ſeems to intimate in thoſe Words, [f] *By Law a thing is Cold, or by Law Hot*, that Hot and Cold, and the like, were Paſſions or Phantaſms Fatally Connected with certain Local Motions in the Body. *Senſe* is a kind of dull Confuſed and Stupid Perception obtruded upon the Soul from without, whereby it perceives the Alterations and Motions within its own Body, and takes Cognizance of Individual Bodies exiſting round about it, but doth not clearly Comprehend what they are, nor penetrate into the Nature of them, it being intended by Nature, [g] as *Plotinus* ſpeaks, not ſo properly *for Knowledge*, as for the *Uſe of the Body*. For the Soul ſuffering under that which it perceives by way of *Paſſion*, cannot maſter or conquer it, that is to ſay, know or underſtand it. For ſo *Anaxagoras* in *Ariſtotle* very fitly expreſſes the Nature of *Knowledge* and *Intellection* under the Notion

[f] Νόμῳ ψυχρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν.
[g] Πρὸς χρείαν, ὐ πρὸς γνῶσιν.

of [h] *Conquering.* [i] *Wherefore it is neceſſary, ſince the Mind underſtands all things, that it ſhould be free from Mixture and Paſſion, for this end, as* Anaxagoras *ſpeaks, that it may be able to maſter and conquer its Objects, that is to ſay, to know or underſtand them.* In like manner *Plotinus*, in his Book of *Senſe and Memory* [k], makes [l] *to ſuffer* and [m] *to be conquered* all one, as alſo to [n] *know and to conquer*; for which Cauſe he concludes that that which ſuffers doth not know, [o] *That which we make to ſuffer,* [p] in ſaying ſo *we make it not to know, becauſe to know is to Conquer, and not to be maſtered or conquered. Senſe*, that ſuffers from External Objects, lies as it were proſtrate under them, and is overcome by them: Wherefore no *Senſe* judges either of its own Paſſion, or of the Paſſion of any other Senſe, but *Judgment* or *Knowledge* is the Active Energy of an Unpaſſionate Power in the Soul.

[h] Κρατῆιν.

[i] Ariſt. De Anima, Lib. 3. Cap. 4. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπὶ πάντα νοῆι, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι τὸν νοῦν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ.

[k] Plot. De Senſu & Memoria. Cap. 2.

[l] Πάσχειν. [m] κρατεῖσθαι. [n] γινώσκειν & κρατεῖν.

[o] Πάσχειν ἀλλὰ μὴ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς ποιῆσαι, ὅτι κρατεῖν δεῖ δοῦναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι.

[p] Eo nomine.

2. And

2. And for this Cauſe *Ariſtotle* himſelf tells us, that the Soul is an Heterogeneous thing, and hath [q] ſeveral *Parts* in it of a very different Nature from one another. Firſt, a Higher and *Active* Part, which he calls [r] that which acts ſeparately from the Matter, and is Impaſſible, and this is [s] *that which knows and underſtands*; the other a Lower, *Paſſive* or Sympathetical Part which ſuffers from without, and acts in Conjunction with the Body, and this is [t] *that to which* Senſation *belongs*. So that *Knowledge* and *Intellection* are the clear, ſerene and unpaſſionate Perceptions of that Higher Part of the Soul which acts alone, by and from it ſelf. *Senſations* are the Energies of that lower, Paſſive and Sympathetical Part, whereby the Soul is Vitally united to the Body, and cleaving to it, makes up one *Animal* with it. Or elſe they may be ſaid to be the Cogitations of the whole [u] Compound or *Animal*, which is the Reaſon that they are ſo cloudy and confounded, becauſe they ariſe from the very [x] Mixture and Con-

[q] Μόρια. [r] Τὸ χωριστὸν & ἀπαθὲς.
[s] τὸ νοητικὸν. [t] τὸ αἰσθητικὸν.
[u] Compoſitum. [x] Crafis.

fuſion of the Soul and Body as it were blended together.

3. For though the Soul be a diſtinct Subſtance, and of a different Nature from the Body, yet notwithſtanding in every Animal it is intimately conjoyned with the Body, and Cleaves to it in ſuch a Manner, as that both together Compound and make up one thing. And therefore it is not preſent with it only as a Mariner with a Ship, that is, meerly Locally, or knowingly and unpaſſionately preſent, they ſtill continuing two diſtinct Things; but it is vitally united to it, and paſſionately preſent with it. And therefore when the Body is hurt, the Soul doth not unpaſſionately know or underſtand it, as when a Mariner knows that a Ship hath ſprung a Leak, or when a Man is informed that his Neighbour's Houſe is ſet on fire; but it feels a ſtrong and vehement Pain, and hath a dolorous Senſe or Perception of it, as being one thing with it. So in like manner when the Body wants either Meat or Drink, the Soul doth not unpaſſionately know this as an Indifferent By-ſtander, and therefore rationally only will or deſire Meat and Drink for it, but it feels a paſſionate Senſe of *Hunger* and *Thirſt* in it ſelf, as being Intimately concerned in

the Buſineſs. Now the ſame is true alſo in thoſe other Senſations, in which the *Animal* ſeems to be leſs concerned, as of *Light* and *Colour*, *Heat* and *Cold*, *Sounds* and *Odours*, that they are not ſimple Knowledges or Intellections of that part of the Soul which acts alone by it ſelf, but they are the Perceptions of that which is vitally united with the Body, and ſympathizing with the Motions and Paſſions of it, makes up [a] one *Compound* with it. Wherefore though all Cogitations be formally in the *Soul*, and not in the *Body*, yet theſe ſenſitive Cogitations being in the Soul no otherwiſe than as vitally united to the Body, they are not ſo properly the Cogitations of the Soul, as of [b] *the mixed*, or [c] *both together*, as *Plotinus* calls it, the Compound of Soul and Body, or, as that Philoſopher will have it, of the *Body and a certain Vivificating Light, imparted from the Soul to it.* And therefore, as he obſerveth out of *Ariſtotle*, [d] 'as 'it is abſurd to ſay the Soul Weaves,' (or indeed the Body either, Weaving being a mixt Action of the Man and Weaving Inſtruments) ſo it

[a] Compoſitum.

[b] Τὸ μικτὸν. [c] συναμφότερον.

[d] Ὥσπερ ἄτοπον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν.

[f] is

is absurd to say that the Soul alone doth [c] *Covet, Grieve* or *Perceive:* these things proceeding from the *Compound* or the Coalescence of Soul and Body together; being not pure Mental, but Corporeal Cogitations of the Soul, as it vitally informs the Body, and is Passionately united to it.

4. *Sense* therefore is a certain kind of drowsy and Somnolent Perception of that Passive Part of the Soul, which is as it were asleep in the Body, and acts concretely with it. So *Plotinus* expresses it, [f] *Sense is of that part of the Soul that sleeps, for that of the Soul that is immersed into the Body, is as it were asleep.* It is an Energy arising from the Body, and a certain kind of Drowsy or Sleeping Life of the Soul blended together with it. The Perceptions of which [g] *Compound*, or *of the Soul as it were half asleep and half awake*, are confused, indistinct, turbid and encumbred Cogitations, very different from the Energies of the *Noetical* Part, that acts alone, without Sympathy with the Body, which are free,

[c] Concupiscere, Dolere *or* Sentire.

[f] [Enn. 3. l. 6.] Τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ψυχῆς ἐστιν ἐνδιάστης ὅσον ἐν σώματι ψυχῆς, τοῦτο ἔνδοθι

[g] Compositum *or* Animæ Semisomnis.

clear,

clear, ſerene, Satisfactory and awakened Cogitations, That is to ſay, Knowledges.

And that theſe Cogitations of the Paſſive Part of the Soul called *Senſations*, are not *Knowledges* or *Intellections*, is evident by Experience alſo; not only in the Senſes of *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, *Pain* and *Corporeal Titillation*, but alſo in all thoſe other Perceptions of *Light* and *Colours*, *Heat* and *Cold*, *Sounds*, *Odours* and *Sapours*. For if they were *Knowledges* or *Intellections*, then all Men would reſt Satisfied in the Senſible Ideas or Fantaſms of them, and never enquire any further, at leaſt when the Stroke or Impreſſion made upon Senſe were ſtrong and vigorous, as when we ſee the Clear Light of the Meridian Sun, or hear the Loud Noiſe of Thunder, whereas the one doth but dazzle our Eyes, the other deafens our Ears, but neither enlighten nor inform our Underſtandings. Whereas, on the Contrary, the Minds of Men are reſtleſsly inquiſitive after ſome further Intellectual Comprehenſion of all theſe things that we perceive by our ſeveral Senſes. Neither is this true of the Vulgar only, but it is very Obſervable, that the moſt acute Philoſophers in all Ages have complained of their Ignorance of theſe things; and indeed have confeſſed themſelves more

puzzled and at a loſs about theſe Senſible things, than thoſe abſtract Immaterial things which are remote from bodily Senſe. [h] *The Eſſences of Light and Colours* (ſaith *Scaliger*) *are as dark to the Underſtanding, as they themſelves are open to the Sight.* Nay, undoubtedly ſo long as we conſider theſe things no otherwiſe than *Senſe* repreſents them, that is, as really exiſting in the Objects without us, they are and muſt needs be Eternally Unintelligible. Now when all Men naturally enquire, what theſe things are, What is *Light*, and what *are Colours*, the Meaning hereof is nothing elſe but this, that Men would fain know or comprehend them by ſomething of their *Own* which is Native and Domeſtick, not foreign to them, ſome *Active* Exertion or Anticipation of their own Minds, as I ſhall ſhew afterwards.

WHEREFORE though *Senſe* be adequate and Sufficient for that end which Nature hath deſigned it to, *viz.* to give Advertiſement of Corporeal things exiſting without us, and their Motions for the Uſe and Concernment of the Body, and ſuch general Intimations of

[h] Luminis & Colorum Eſſentiæ ſunt intellectui tam obſcuræ, quam ſunt ipſa viſui manifeſta.

the

the Modes of them, as may give the Understanding sufficient Hints by its own Sagacity to find out their Natures, and invent Intelligible *Hypotheses* to solve those Appearances by; (For otherwise *Reason* alone without Sense could not acquaint us with *Individual Existent things* without us, or assure us of the Existence of any thing besides *God*, who is the only necessarily existent Being;) Yet notwithstanding *Sense*, as *Sense*, is not *Knowledge* or *Intellection*; which I shall still make further appear by these following more particular Considerations.

CHAP. III.

1. FOR, first, *Sense* only Suffering and receiving from without, and having no *Active Principle* of its own, to take Acquaintance with what it receives, it must needs be a Stranger to that which is altogether adventitious to it, and therefore cannot know or understand it. For to *Know* or *Understand* a thing, is nothing else but by some Inward Anticipation of the Mind, that is Native

tive and Domeſtick, and ſo familiar to it, to take Acquaintance with it; of which I ſhall ſpeak more afterward.

2. *Senſe* is but the Offering or Preſenting of ſome Object to the Mind, to give it an Occaſion to exerciſe its own Inward *Activity* upon. Which two things being many times nearly conjoyned together in Time, though they be very different in Nature from one another, yet they are vulgarly miſtaken for one and the ſame thing, as if it were all nothing but meer Senſation or Paſſion from the Body. Whereas *Senſe* it ſelf is but the *Paſſive Perception* of ſome Individual Material Forms, but to *Know* or *Underſtand*, is Actively to Comprehend a thing by ſome Abſtract, Free and Univerſal [i] *Reaſonings, from whence the Mind* [k] *as it were looking down* (as *Boetius* expreſſeth it) *upon the Individuals below it, views and underſtands them.* But *Senſe* which lies Flat and Grovelling in the Individuals, and is ſtupidly fixed in the Material Form, is not able to riſe up or aſcend to an Abſtract Univerſal Notion; For which Cauſe it never *Affirms* or *Denies*

[i] Ratio's.

[k] Quaſi deſuper ſpectans concepta forma quæ ſubſunt dijudicat.

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any thing of its Object, becauſe (as *Ariſtotle* obſerves) in all Affirmation, and Negation at leaſt, the Predicate is always Univerſal. The Eye which is placed in a Level with the Sea, and touches the Surface of it, cannot take any large Proſpect upon the Sea, much leſs ſee the whole Amplitude of it. But an Eye Elevated to a higher Station, and from thence looking down, may comprehenſively view the whole Sea at once, or at leaſt ſo much of it as is within our Horizon. The Abſtract Univerſal [1] *Reaſons* are that higher Station of the Mind, from whence looking down upon Individual things, it hath a Commanding view of them, and as it were *a Priori* comprehends or Knows them.

But Senſe, which either lies in the ſame Level with that Particular Material Object which it perceives, or rather under it and beneath it, cannot emerge to any Knowledge or Truth concerning it.

3. *Senſe* is but a ſlight and Superficial Perception of the Outſide and Accidentals of a Corporeal Subſtance, it doth not Penetrate into the Profundity or Inward Eſſence of it.

[1] Rationes.

For

For a *Body* may be changed as to all the ſeveral Senſes, and remain really the ſame that it was before. Wherefore though Men are commonly ſaid to know things when they ſee and feel them, yet in truth by their bodily Senſes they perceive nothing but their Outſides and External Induments. Juſt as when a Man looking down out of a Window into the Streets, is ſaid to ſee Men walking in the Streets, when indeed he perceives nothing but Hats and Cloaths, under which, for ought he knows, there may be *Dædalean* Statues moving up and down. Neither is this ſpoken only in reſpect of that Defect of *Sight* (to omit the other Senſes) which is a little relieved by *Microſcopical Glaſſes*, that it cannot perceive the Figures and Contextures of thoſe Minute Particles out of which Bodies are compounded, nor penetrate beyond the Superficies into their Corporeal Profundity; for though our *Sight* were ſo much more than *Lyncean*, that it could diſcover the very Pores in Glaſs through which the *Light* paſſes, as *Ariſtotle* complains it cannot; nay, though it could diſcern the Particular [m] *Globulous Particles*, in the Motion of which *Light* conſiſteth, and the *Tri-*

[m] Globuli.

angular

angular Spaces between them through which the Smalleſt and moſt Subtle *Striated* Matter paſſes; yet notwithſtanding it would not reach to the Eſſential Profundity either of Body, or Sphericalneſs, or Triangularity, which nothing but the ſubtle [n] Sharpneſs of the Mind can penetrate into; ſo as to comprehend the Immutable [o] Reaſon of any of them. And therefore it is rightly pronounced by that Excellent Reſtorer of the Old *Atomical* and *Moſchical* Philoſophy, [p] *That even Bodies themſelves are not properly perceived by the Senſes, or by the Imagination, but by the Underſtanding alone; nor are therefore perceived becauſe they are touched or ſeen, but only becauſe they are underſtood.*

4. THE Eſſence of nothing is reached unto by the Senſes looking Outward, but by the Mind's looking inward into it ſelf. That which wholly looks abroad outward upon its Object, is not one with that which it perceives, but is at a diſtance from it, and there-

[n] Acies. [o] Ratio.

[p] Ipſamet Corpora non propriè à ſenſibus vel ab imaginandi facultate, ſed ſolo Intellectu percipi, nec ex eo percipi quòd tangantur aut videantur, ſed tantùm ex eo quòd intelligantur

fore cannot Know and Comprehend it; but Knowledge and Intellection doth not meerly [q] look out upon a thing at distance, but makes an Inward Reflection upon the thing it knows, and according to the Etymon of the Word, [r] *the Intellect* doth [s] *read inward Characters written within it self*, and Intellectually comprehend its Object within it self, and is the same with it. For though this may be conceived to be true of Individual things Known (although the Mind understands them also under abstract Notions of its own) yet, at least in *Aristotle*'s Sense, it is unquestionably true, [t] *In Abstract things themselves*, which are the Primary Objects of Science, *the Intellect and the thing known are really one and the same.* For those Ideas or Objects of Intellection are nothing else but Modifications of the Mind it self. But [u] *Sense is of that which is without*, Sense wholly gazes and gads abroad, and therefore doth not know and comprehend its Object, because it is different from it. [x] *Sense is a Line, the Mind is a Circle.* Sense is like

[q] Prospicere. [r] Intellectus.

[s] in Interioribus legere.

[t] Ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον.

[u] Αἴσθησις τοῦ ἔξω.

[x] Αἴσθησις γραμμὴ, νοῦς κύκλος.

a Line

a Line which is the Flux of a Point running out from it ſelf, but Intellect like a Circle that keeps within it ſelf.

5. SENSE apprehends Individual Bodies without, by ſomething derived from them, and ſo *a Poſteriori*, [y] *The Senſes being laſt, are the Images of the things.* The Senſible Ideas of things are but Umbratile and Evanid Images of the ſenſible things, like Shadows projected from them; but Knowledge is a Comprehenſion of a thing Proleptically, and as it were *a Priori.* But now to lay aſide Metaphyſicks, and ſpeak plainly, all that which comes from the Individual Object of Senſe from without, (as we have already declared) is nothing at all but Local Motion or Preſſure, when an enlivened Body is jogged or thruſt upon by ſome other Body without. But to receive or feel a Jogg, Knock or Thruſt from without made upon the Body which the Soul is united to, this is not to Know, no not ſo much as what Local Motion is, much leſs to know all other things. For Knowledge is not a Knock or Thruſt from without, but it conſiſteth in the A-

[y] Ὕστεραι ἔσται αἰσθήσεις εἰκόνες εἰσι.

wakening and Exciting of the Inward Active Powers of the Mind.

6. THIS Point which I have hitherto insisted upon concerning the Shallowness, Dulness and Bluntness of Sense, in that it cannot penetrate to the Essences of things, is very ingeniously and Philosophically handled by *Plato*, in his *Theætetus*; where he demonstrates against *Protagoras*, that Science is not Sense, but that there is another Power in the Soul besides that of Sense or Passion, to which Science, Knowledge and Intellection is to be referred after this manner. First, *Socrates* obtains this from *Theætetus*, that Sense is when the Soul, by or through several Organs of the Body, takes Cognizance of several Corporeal things without. And, Secondly, that one Sense or Organical Perception cannot take Cognizance of the Object of another; as Sight cannot see Sounds, nor the Hearing hear Light and Colours: And therefore where we think of the Objects of several Senses comparing them together, and considering of some things common to them all, this cannot be Sense or Organical Perception; because one Sense cannot *consider the Object of another Sense.* [z] *If*

[z] Τί οὖν περὶ ἀμφοτέραν διάνοιαν, ὃν ἂν διάγῃ τῷ ἑτέρᾳ ὀργάνῳ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἄν.

any

any thing concerns both, it cannot perceive it by either Organ. As when we consider Sound and Colour together at once, and attribute several things to them in common; as First of all, Essence; And then that in each of them is Identity with it self, and Diversity to the other, that both of them are two, and each of them one; That they are not like, but unlike to one Another; What Sense or Organ is there by which the Soul perceives all these things, *viz.* Essence and non Essence, Identity, Diversity, Unity, Duality, Similitude, Dissimilitude, things Common both to Sound and Colour? Surely It cannot be neither by the Senses of Sight or of Hearing, because these cannot consider one another's Objects. Neither can we find any other Organ in the Body by which the Soul may passively take Cognizance of all these things, and consider the Objects of both those other Senses of Sight and Hearing. Whereby he makes *Theætetus* confess, that these things the Soul doth not Organically perceive by any Sense, but by it self alone without any Bodily Organ. And therefore [a] *Some things the Soul perceives*

[a] Τὰ μὲν αὐτὴν δι' αὐτῆς ψυχὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων.

by it self, or by its own Active Power, as Essence, Similitude, Dissimilitude, Identity, Alterity, Good and Evil, Honest and Dishonest. *Other things it perceives by and through the Organs of the Body:* As for Example, by the Sense of Touch the Soul perceives nothing but the Hardness of that which is Hard, and the Softness of that which is Soft, and the like. But *Essence*, and what *Hardness* and *Softness* is, and their Contrariety to one another; and again, the Essence of Contrariety it self, the Soul alone by it self discoursing endeavours to judge of. Wherefore there is this difference between those things that come into the Soul by the Passions of the Body, and those things that arise from the Ratiocinative Power of the Soul it self: [b] *That both Men and Beasts do naturally perceive as soon as they be born those things that Come into the Soul by the Passions of the Body. But Ratiocinations concerning these things as to the Natures and Essences of them, and their*

[b] Τὰ μὲ ἐυθὺ γενομένοις πάρεστι φύσει ἀισθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε & θηρίοις, ὅσα διὰ τὲ σώματος παθήματα ἐπι τὴν ψυχὴν τίνει· τὰ δὲ περὶ τέτων ἀναλογίσματα πρός τε ὐσίαν & ὠφέλειαν μόγις & ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων & παιδείας παραγίγνεται, ἔις ἂν & παραγίγνεται.

Utilities,

Utilities, are slowly by Labour and help of Institution attained unto. Now that which doth not reach to the *Essence* of any thing, cannot reach to Truth or Knowledge. Wherefore he concludes, [c] *That there is no Knowledge or Science in Passions, but in the Discourse of the Mind upon them; for in this latter way it is possible to reach to the Essence and Truth of things, but Impossible in the Former.* And that we ought not [d] *to seek Knowledge any more in Sense, but in that of the Soul, whatsoever it be called, which doth alone by it self contemplate things that are.*

CHAP. IV.

1. BUT I have still something more to add concerning this Argument before I dismiss it; Wherefore in the next Place I

[c] Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, οὐ δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας οὐτάυθα μὲν ὡς ἔοικε δυνατὸν ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δ' ἀδύνατον.

[d] Ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην οὐ προσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι ὅτι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ſhall make it further appear, that Senſe is not Science or Intellection, becauſe the Soul by Senſe doth not perceive the Things themſelves, or the Abſolute Natures of them, but only her own Paſſions from them. This *Sextus* the Philoſopher took Notice of, [c] *The Senſes do not reach to the Objects that are placed without, but to their own Paſſions alone.* And this is that which *Protagoras* ſo much inſiſted on, that [f] All our *Senſible Ideas* of Light and Colours, Sounds, Odours, Sapors, Heat and Cold, and the like, are not Abſolute but Relative Things. For neither is [g] *Senſation* any thing of the Soul conſidered Abſolutely in it ſelf, it being no Pure and Sincere Cogitation of the Soul alone, neither is [h] *the Senſible Idea* any Abſolute Quality of the Object without, but both theſe (*viz.* [i] *Senſe and Senſible*) are certain middle things begotten betwixt the Agent and the Patient, and reſulting from the Activity of the Object without, and the Paſſion of the Mind within, and ſeverally reſpecting each of them. Or, as he

[c] Pyrr Hyp. l. 2. c. 7. Αἱ αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενα οὐ καταλαμβάνουσι, μόνα δὲ εἰ ἄρα τὰ ἑαυτῶν πάθη.

[f] Τὰ αἰσθητὰ. [g] Αἴσθησις.

[h] Τὸ αἰσθητὸν. [i] Αἴσθησις & αἰσθητὸν.

expreſ-

expreſſed it, [k] *From the Congreſs or Colliſion of theſe two together are generated at once both Senſe and the Senſible*; *for the Senſible* (*formally conſidered*, according to that Idea that we have of it) *hath no Exiſtence before Senſation, but is begotten with it.* And therefore [l] *Colour, and the reſt, is neither any thing really exiſting in the Object without, nor yet any thing in the Soul it ſelf, but a middle thing betwixt both*, that is, a Paſſion. Which is the very ſame with that which *Ariſtotle* imputes to the antient Phyſiologers as a Paradox, that Black and White were not without the Sight.

THE Truth of which is ſo evident in ſome Inſtances, that none can poſſibly gainſay it. For when the Body is either Prickt with a Needle or Wounded with a Sword, no Man can imagine that thoſe Pains that reſult from thence were ſuch Real and Abſolute Qualities exiſting in the Needle or Sword before our Senſation, but that they are our own Paſſions, and ſo Relative things to us, or Perceptions

[k] Ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.

[l] Ὁ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμὲν χρῶμα ὅτε τὸ προσβάλλον ὅτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενόν ἐστι, ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι,

of

of the Motions of the Needle or Sword Relatively to the enlivened Body, and as they are hurtful to it. And the ſame is vulgarly acknowledged in thoſe Colours that are therefore called Phantaſtical, as in the [k] *Rainbow* and the *Priſme*, whereas in Reality all Colours are as Phantaſtical as the Colours of the Rainbow, and the Colours of the Rainbow as Real as any other. And it is likewiſe true of the other Proper Objects of the ſeveral Senſes. For as *Sextus* the Philoſopher obſerves, [l] *Honey is not the ſame thing with my being ſweetened, nor Wormwood the ſame with my having Senſe of Bitterneſs.* That which we know by Senſe concerning Honey and Wormwood, is only that our Taſte is ſo affected from them; but what abſolute Mode or Diſpoſition of Parts in them Cauſes theſe different Senſations in us, belongs to ſome other Faculty of the Soul to diſcover. And hence it comes to paſs, that though the Natures or Eſſences of things be Simple, yet one and the ſame thing perceived by our ſeveral Senſes begets ſeveral Paſſions and Phantaſms in us. Flame, which is

[k] Iris.

[l] Οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔστι τὸ μέλι τῷ γλυκάζεσθαί με, & τὸ ἀψίνθιον τῷ πικράζειν.

nothing

nothing but a Violent Agitation of the ſmall Particles of a Body by the Rapid Subtle Matter; the ſame Motion communicated to the Eye or Optick Nerves begets one kind of Senſible Idea or Phantaſm called Light, but to the Nerves of Touch another quite Different from it called Heat; therefore neither Light nor Heat, according to thoſe ſenſible Ideas that we have of them, are really and abſolutely in the Flame without, which is but one kind of Motion or Agitation of Matter, but only Phantaſtically and Relatively,. the one to our Sight, the other to our Touch. And hence it proceeds alſo that Senſations are diverſified from the ſame thing to ſeveral Individuals of the ſame kind, and to the ſame Individual at ſeveral Times, by reaſon of ſome difference in the *Idioſyncraſy* or *Proper Temperament* of the Body, as (to omit the Inſtance of thoſe that are Icterical) appears plainly in the Degrees of Heat and Cold, the Gratefulneſs or Ungratefulneſs of ſeveral Taſtes and Odours to ſeveral Individuals, or to the ſame conſidered both in Sickneſs and in Health; which things could not be, if all Senſible Ideas were abſolute Qualities in the thing it ſelf, and ſo taken Notice of by Senſe. And it is worth the while to ſee how *Protagoras*

tagoras philoſophized about this latter Inſtance; improving it to this Purpoſe. [m] *When I drink Wine, being in Health, it appears pleaſant and Sweet. For the Agent and the Patient betwixt them beget both Senſe and Sweetneſs, ſeverally reſpecting the Agent and the Patient. For Senſe reſpecting the Patient, makes and denominates the Tongue Sentient, and Sweetneſs reſpecting the Agent (that is, the Wine) makes and denominates that ſweet, not* Abſolutely but *reſpectively to the Tongue of one that is in Health. But when the Patient is altered by Sickneſs, and becomes different from what it was, then it receives quite another Taſte than formerly, for it comes to a very different Patient. Quite different things are produced by the Perſon and the drinking of the Wine; Reſpecting the Tongue a Senſe of Bitterneſs, and as to the Wine its being made and denominated bitter.*

[m] Ὅταν οἶνον πίνω ὑγιάινων, ἡδὺς μοὶ ὁ γλυκὺς. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ τότε ποιοῦν τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. Καὶ ἡ μὲ αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος ἔσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσσαν ἀπειργάσατο. Ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώσσῃ ἂν εἶναι ἐφαίνεᾶ. Ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενέντα ἀλλότι ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ὃ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαθεν, ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθε. Ἕτερα δὴ ἂν ἐγεννησάτην ὁτε τοιᾶτος, καὶ ἡ τᾶ οἴνᾳ πόσις περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότατος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα.

WHERE-

WHEREFORE ſince by Senſe the Soul doth not perceive Corporeal Objects, as they are truly, Really and Abſolutely in themſelves, but under ſome Phantaſtical Repreſentations and Diſguiſes, Senſe cannot be Knowledge, which comprehends a thing as it is. And indeed if the Soul had no other Power in it but only this of Paſſion or Senſation, (as *Protagoras* ſuppoſed) then there could be no ſuch thing at all as any Abſolute Truth or Knowledge. But that Hypotheſis of his, as we have already ſhewed, plainly Contradicts and Confutes it ſelf. For that which pronounces that our Senſible Ideas of things are Phantaſtical and Relative, muſt needs be ſomething in us Superiour to Senſe, that is, not Relative or Phantaſtical, but that judges what Really and Abſolutely *Is* and *Is not*.

2. BUT to ſtrike this Buſineſs home, I ſhall in the laſt place further Obſerve, that Senſe cannot be Knowledge, nor the Certainty of all things ultimately reſolvable into Senſe, as many Men beſide *Protagoras* conceive, for this Reaſon, becauſe the Nature of Senſe conſiſts in nothing elſe but meer *Seeming* or *Appearance*. This was intimated before in that Definition that we gave of Senſe, that it

is

is [n] *a Paſſion or Affection in the Soul, whereby it* Seems *to perceive ſome Corporeal things exiſting.* That is, Senſe is when the Soul is ſo affected, as if there were ſuch a Corporeal thing exiſting. So that all the Reality that is neceſſarily required to Senſe, is only this, that there be Really a Paſſion in the Soul, or that the Soul be Really ſo affected, as if there were ſuch a thing; that is, that it have Really ſuch a Seeming or Appearance, but not that the thing Really be, as it appears. For as to a Thing's being Such or Such, its having ſuch a Mode or Quality, we have already demonſtrated by Reaſon, that in this reſpect, moſt of our Senſible Ideas are Phantaſtical things. And the ſame may be Evinced and made Evident alſo by Senſe it ſelf; For it is as true and Real a Senſation, when a Man looking upon a Staff that is partly in the Air, and partly in the Water, ſees it Crooked, (though it be Really ſtraight) as when he looks upon it all in the Air, and ſees it ſtraight as really it is; for we are as really Affected, and there is as much a Seeming in one as in the other. And innumerable Inſtances might be given in this kind, to prove that as to

[n] Ἐν τῷ δοκεῖν, or ἐν τῷ φαίνεσθαι.

things

things being ſuch or ſuch, there is no other Truth or Reality neceſſarily required in Senſation, but only that of Appearance.

But this is not all, for I ſhall obſerve in the next place that there is not ſo much as the Reality of Being or Exiſtence of the Object neceſſarily required to Senſation; but there may be a true Senſation, though there be no Object at all Really exiſting without the Soul. A Known and approved Inſtance whereof we have in thoſe that, after they had their Arms and Legs cut off, have been ſenſible, when they were awake, of a Strong and Violent Pain in their Fingers and Toes, though really they had no ſuch Members. And we have all Conſtant Experience of the ſame in our Dreams, which are as true Senſations, as thoſe which we have when we are awake, and when the Objects are really exiſtent without us. Becauſe the Soul is as really affected, and hath as lively Images, Ideas and Phantaſms of Senſible Things as exiſtent then, as when we are awake, and many times is really Senſible of violent and exquiſite Pain, which is a Real Senſe, though it be but a Phantaſtical Thing; and immediately vaniſhes away upon our awakening. Becauſe there was nothing really in the

Body, that by the Motions of the Nerves could beget a Real Pain.

3. Now the Reaſon of this, that the Soul may be paſſively affected in this manner, when there is no Object at all really exiſting without it; is from hence: Becauſe by Senſe the Soul doth not ſuffer immediately from the Objects themſelves, but only from its own Body, by reaſon of that Natural and vital Sympathy which it hath with it, neither doth it ſuffer from its own Body in every part of it, or from the Outward Organs of Senſe immediately; as from the Eye when we ſee, the Tongue when we taſte, or the exteriour Parts of the Body when we feel, but only in the Brain, or from the Motions of the Spirits there. But ſo as that it doth not take immediate Cognizance of thoſe very Motions immediately as they are in themſelves, but by the ſecret Inſtinct of Nature doth by means of them take Cognizance of thoſe Corporeal Things exiſting without us, from whence the Original of the Motion comes: As for Example, of the Stars that are ſo vaſtly diſtant, when we look upon the Heavens. Whence it comes to paſs, that if that Body from which the Soul immediately ſuffers, and that is the Spirits in the Brain, be ſo moved,

as

as it would be moved by the Nerves when any outward Objects present make their several Impressions upon the Organs of Sense, the Soul must needs have the same Passions, Affections and Sensations in it, as if the Objects were really existing without. Now this may come to pass either by the Fortuitous Motions or Agitations of the Spirits themselves, casually falling into the same Figurations, that the Motions of the Nerves would impress upon them from some outward Objects; or else by the Spirits rushing against certain Prints, Traces or Marks in the Brain, made by former Sensations when we were awake, whereby their Motions are determined. Or, lastly, by the Phantastical Power of the Soul it self, which as it suffers from the Body, so it can likewise act upon it; and according to our Customary Actions, or Inward Affections, Inclinations or Desires, may move the Spirits variously, and beget divers Phantasms in us.

And that Dreams are many times thus begotten or excited by the Phantastical Power of the Soul it self, is Evident from the Orderly Connexion and Coherence of Imaginations, which many times are continued in a long Chain or Series; with the Fiction of Interlocutory Discourses and Dialogues, consisting

of apt Anſwers and Replies made interchangeably to one another, and contain ſuch things as never were before printed upon the Brain in ſuch a Series or Order; which therefore could not proceed either from the fortuitous Dancings or Subſultations of the Spirits, or from the Determination of their Motion, by antecedent Prints or Traces made by former Senſations in the Subſtance of the Brain.

4. And the Dreams that we have in our Sleep, are Really the ſame kind of things with thoſe Imaginations that we have many times when we are awake, when the Fancy, being not commanded or determined by the Will, roves, and wanders, and runs at random; and ſpins out a long Thread or Concatenated Series of Imaginations or Phantaſms of Corporeal Things, quite different from thoſe things which our outward Senſes at the ſame time take notice of. And ſome Perſons there are to whom theſe Waking Dreams are very Ordinary and Familiar.

And there is little doubt to be made but if a Man ſhould ſuddenly fall aſleep in the midſt of one of theſe Waking Dreams, when his Fancy is roving and ſpinning out ſuch a long Series of Imaginations, thoſe very Imaginations

ginations and Phantasms would [q] *of course* become Dreams, and run on, and appear not as Phantasms or Imaginations only of things feigned or nonexistent, but as Perceptions of things really existent, that is, as Sensations.

WHEREAS these Imaginations that we have of Individual Corporeal things when we are awake, and our Outward Senses employed upon their several Objects, do not seem to be Sensations of things Really existing and Present, as our Dreams do, but to be certain faint, evanid, shadowy and umbratile things, in comparison of those Sensations which we have at the same time with them when we are awake, that is, not as things existent without us, but as our own Cogitations. The Reason whereof is, because though they be both of the same kind, yet those Motions of the Spirits which are caused by the Nerves, from the Objects without when we are awake, being more vigorous, durable, constant and prevalent, do naturally obscure or extinguish those other weaker Phantasms or Imaginations which we have at the same time: And Reason interposing, brings in its Verdict for those Stronger Phantasms also whose Objects

[q] Ipso facto.

are durable and permanent, by means whereof the latter only seem to be Real Sensations, the former counterfeit and Fictitious Imaginations; or meer Picture and Landskip in the Soul. And this *Aristotle* long ago observed in this manner. [r] *In the day they are shut out and disappear, the Senses and Understanding working, as the lesser Fire is made to disappear by the Greater; and small Griefs and Pleasures by Great ones. But when we are at rest in our Beds, the least Phantasms make Impressions upon us.* In the day-time, and when we are awake, those more fleeting Fancies and Imaginations, which proceed not from the Motions of the Nerves, caused by the Objects without, must needs yield and give place, as being baffled and confuted by those stronger, more durable and lasting Motions that come from the Nerves, caused by permanent Objects, Reason also carrying it clearly for the latter, by means whereof the former cannot appear as Real Things or Sensations. But when we are asleep, the same Phantasms and Imaginations are more strong, vivid and

[r] Μεθ' ἡμέραν ἐκκρίνονται, ἐνεργησῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων & τῆς διανοίας, & ἀφανίζονται ὥσπερ παρὰ πολὺ πῦρ ἔλαττον, & λύπαι & ἡδοναὶ μικραὶ παρὰ μεγάλας. πυκναμένων δὲ ἐπιτολάζει κὴ τὰ μικρά.

lively;

lively; becauſe the Nerves are relaxated, there are often no Motions tranſmitted by them from the outward Objects into the Brain, to confound thoſe Motions of the Spirits within, and diſtract the Soul's Attention to them; Juſt as the ſame Loudneſs of a Voice in a ſtill Evening will be heard a great deal further and clearer, than in the Day-time when the Air is agitated with many contrary Motions croſſing and confounding one another. But now there are no other Motions of the Spirits, beſides theſe which cauſe Dreams to compare with them; and diſgrace them, or put them out of Countenance; and as it were, by their louder Noiſe and Clamours, ſo to poſſeſs the Animadverſive part of the Soul, that the weaker Murmurs of the other cannot obtain to be heard, as it is when we are awake, or in the Day-time. And therefore in Sleep the Mind Naturally admits theſe Phantaſms as Senſations, there appearing none other to contradict that Verdict.

5. WHEREFORE, Phantaſms and Senſible Ideas are really or Materially the ſame thing, which *Ariſtotle* intimates, affirming that [s] *Fan-*

[s] Φαντασία is ἄισθησίς τις ἀσθενής.

cy is a weak kind of Senſe, and that [t] *Phantaſms are as Senſations*; for both Phantaſms and Senſations are Paſſions or Sufferings in the Soul from the Body. And yet notwithſtanding every Phantaſm doth not ſeem to be a Corporeal Thing really exiſting without the Soul, as a [u] Senſation doth. Wherefore there are two Caſes in which a Phantaſm doth not ſeem to be [x] *a Senſation*. Firſt, when a Phantaſm is raiſed or excited purpoſely and voluntarily, by the mere [y] Command or Empire of our own Will; as by Experience we find it often is. For it is in our Power to fancy what Corporeal Thing or Perſon (formerly known to us) we pleaſe, though it be abſent from us. Nay, and to compound ſuch Things as we never ſaw before; as a Golden Mountain, a Centaur, a Chimæra. Now in this Caſe, when the Soul is conſcious to it ſelf, that theſe Phantaſms are Arbitrarily raiſed by it, or by its own Activity, it cannot look upon them as Senſations, or Things really exiſting without it ſelf, but only as Evanid Images, Pictures and Adumbrations of Things within it ſelf. And ſuch Phantaſms as theſe

[t] Φαντάσματα are ὅιον αἰσθήματα.
[u] Αἴσθημα. [x] Αἴσθημα. [y] Imperium.

do

do usually accompany most of our other Cogitations. Wherefore [z] *Phantasms* do not seem to be [a] *Sensations* or Perceptions of things as really existing without the Soul, when they are Voluntary, or when the Soul is inwardly Conscious that they are raised up by its own Activity.

Secondly, NEITHER doth every Involuntary Phantasm, or such as the Soul is not Conscious to it self to have purposely excited or raised up within it self, seem to be [b] *a Sensation* or Perception of a thing, as existing without us; for there may be Straggling Phantasms, which come into the Mind we know not how; and bubble up of themselves, which yet the Soul may distinguish from [c] *Sensations* or Perceptions of things, as existing really without it; because of some other Phantasms at the same time in the Soul, whose Vigours and Lustre do cloud and eclipse them. For when there are Phantasms of several Kinds at the same time in the Soul, or such as arise from different Motions of the Spirits, the Soul silently comparing both together, naturally looks upon the more vigorous, strong

[z] Phantasmata. [a] Αἰσθήματα.
[b] Αἴσθημα. [c] Αἰσθήματα.

and permanent of those Phantasms only as Real Existences; but the more Faint, Flitting and Transitory, as Imaginary things. Now there are two kinds of Involuntary Phantasms, as I have already intimated, in the Soul, when we are awake. One that proceeds from such Motions of the Spirits as are caused by the Nerves moved from the Objects without: Another that proceeds from the Spirits of the Brain, otherwise moved than by the Nerves: And therefore [d] *when we are awake*, and have Phantasms of both these kinds together in the Soul, those Phantasms that arise from the Motions of the Nerves caused by the Objects without, appearing very different from those other Phantasms that arise from the Spirits otherwise moved than by the Nerves, both in respect of their Vigour and Constancy, do therefore to all such Persons, as are not distempered either in Body or in Mind, naturally seem to be Real, or Things existing without the Soul, but the latter Imaginary. Whereas in Sleep, when the Nerves being relaxated, communicate no Motion to the Spirits, the very same Phantasms (there being now no other and Stronger to compare with them

[d] In vigiliâ.

and

and discredit or disgrace them) do naturally appear to the Soul as Sensations of things Really existing without the Soul.

6. Now the Truth of this Matter doth Evidently appear from hence, in that by reason of some Disease either of Body or Mind, Mens Spirits may be so furiously, violently and strongly agitated, that those Phantoms which do not arise from the Motion of the Nerves, being most prevalent and Predominant, even when they are awake, may become [e] *Sensations* and Appearances of Things as really Existing without the Soul; that Men may confidently believe they hear, see and feel those things that are not, and be imposed upon in all their Senses. Which is a thing that frequently happens, not only in Phrenetical, Maniack and Hypochondriacal Persons, of which there are many Instances recorded, but also in others possessed with strong Passions of Fear, Love, and the like. Wherefore as Sense, that is, the Phantasms that arise from the Motion communicated to the Spirits of the Brain by the Nerves, do ordinarily baffle and confute Imaginations and Fancy; that is, those Phantasms that arise

[e] Αισθήματα.

from

from the Spirits, otherwiſe moved than by the Nerves, ſo likewiſe Imaginations growing wild, rampant and exorbitant, may in the ſame manner baffle and confute all our Senſes.

7. WHICH Exorbitancy of Fancy or Imagination prevailing over Senſe, or thoſe Phantaſms which ariſe from the Motion communicated to the Brain from the Objects without by the Nerves, may either proceed originally from ſome Diſeaſe in the Body, whereby the Animal Spirits being furiouſly heated and agitated, may be carried with ſo great a Force and Career, as that the Motions cauſed from the Objects by the Nerves being weakned, may yield and give place to them, and their Phantaſms be in a manner ſilent, vanquiſhed and obliterated by them; thoſe ſtronger Phantaſms that ariſe from the Agitation of the Spirits themſelves, poſſeſſing the place of them, the Affection or Animadverſion of the Soul being always won by thoſe Phantaſms that make the loudeſt Noiſe, or have the greateſt Vigour. Or elſe the ſame thing may proceed Originally from ſome Diſeaſe or Diſtemper in the Soul it ſelf. When the Lower, Irrational and Paſſive Part of the Soul (in which the Concupiſcible and Iraſcible Affections are ſeated) and ſo by Conſequence,

ſequence, the Phantaſtick Power of the Soul (the ſame Power that begets in us thoſe waking Dreams before-mentioned) grows exceſſively and exorbitantly Predominant, inſomuch that it doth not only weaken and extinguiſh the Noetical Powers, which are always proportionably debilitated as this is invigorated, but alſo prevent the Power of Senſe it ſelf, the Immoderate Activity of the Fancy not permitting the Soul to ſuffer from, or be Paſſive to, the Action of the Objects upon it, nor quietly to receive the Impreſſions of them, without ruffling and confounding them. And this is that ſad and lamentable Condition that the Soul of Man is liable and obnoxious to, by its overmuch Indulgence to that Paſſive and Irrational and Corporeal Part in which the Affections, Appetites and Deſires are ſeated; a Condition which, if it continue always, is worſe than Death it ſelf, or Perfect Annihilation. To have not only Reaſon degraded and dethroned, but even Senſe it ſelf Perverted or extinguiſhed, and in the room thereof boiſterous Phantaſms protruded from the Irrational Appetites, Paſſions and Affections (now grown Monſtrous and Enormous) to become the very Senſations of it, by means whereof it is eaſy to conceive that the Divine

[f] *Vengeance* may make the Soul its own Tormentor, though there were no other Hell without it, not only by repreſenting moſt loathſome and affrightful, diſmal and Tragical Scenes of things to it ſelf, but alſo by Cruciating it ſelf with exquiſite and Senſible Pains. And the ſerious Conſideration hereof ſhould make us very careful how we let the Reins looſe to that Paſſive Irrational Part of our Soul, which knows no Bounds nor Meaſures, leſt thereby we unawares precipitate and plunge our ſelves headlong into the moſt ſad and deplorable Condition that is imaginable.

8. I SHALL not diſcourſe here, of that Power alſo which Evil [g] *Spirits* may poſſibly have upon thoſe that have either mancipated themſelves unto them, or otherwiſe forfeited that ordinary Protection which Divine Providence commonly affordeth to all, by acting immediately upon the Spirits of the Brain, and thereby endeavour to give an Account of thoſe Phænomena of Wizards and Witches vulgarly talked of, Their Seeming Tranſportations in the Air, Nocturnal Conventicles and Junkettings,

[f] Nemeſis. [g] Genii.

and

and other ſuch like things, as ſeem plainly Contradictious and unreconcilable to Philoſophy: But we have already ſaid enough to Prove that Senſe is nothing but Seeming and Appearance. And therefore we can have no Certainty by Senſe alone either concerning the Abſolute Natures of Individual Corporeal things without us, nor indeed of their Exiſtence; but all the Aſſurance that we have thereof ariſes from Reaſon and Intellect judging of the Phantaſms or Appearances of Senſe, and determining in which of them there is an Abſolute Reality, and which of them are but meerly Relative or Phantaſtical.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

1. HAVING hitherto ſhewed that Senſe or Paſſion from Corporeal Things exiſtent without the Soul, is not Intellection or Knowledge, ſo that Bodies themſelves are not known or underſtood by Senſe; It muſt needs follow from hence, that Knowledge is an Inward and Active Energy of the Mind it ſelf, and the diſplaying of its own Innate Vigour from within, whereby it doth Conquer, [a] Maſter and Command its Objects, and ſo begets a Clear, Serene, Victorious, and Satisfactory Senſe within it ſelf.

[a] Κρατῶν.

WHERE-

WHEREFORE though it be vulgarly conceived that Knowledge arises from the Force of the Thing Known, acting upon that which knows from without; yet contrarywise it is most certain, to use *Boetius*'s Expression, [b] *That Intellection and Knowledge do not arise from the Force and Activity of the Thing Known from Without, upon that which Knows, but from the Inward Power, Vigour and Activity of the Mind that Knows actively, Comprehending the Object within it self, and Subduing and Prevailing over it.* So that Knowledge is not a Passion from any thing without the Mind, but an Active Exertion of the Inward Strength, Vigour and Power of the Mind, displaying it self from within; and the Intelligible Forms by which Things are Understood or Known, are not Stamps or Impressions passively printed upon the Soul from without, but Ideas vitally protended or actively exerted from within it self.

2. A THING which is merely Passive from without, and doth only receive Foreign and Adventitious Forms, cannot possibly Know, Understand or Judge of that which it re-

[b] Id quod scitur, non ex suâ Vi, sed ex Comprehendentis Vi & Facultate sciri vel cognosci.

ceives,

ceives, but muſt needs be a Stranger to it, having nothing within it ſelf to know it by. The Mind cannot know any thing, but by ſomething of its own, that is Native, Domeſtick and Familiar to it. When in a great Throng or Crowd of People, a Man looking round about, meets with innumerable ſtrange Faces, that he never ſaw before in all his Life, and at laſt chances to eſpy the Face of one Old Friend or Acquaintance, which he had not ſeen or thought of many Years before; he would be ſaid in this Caſe to have Known that one, and only that one Face in all that Company, becauſe he had no inward, previous or Anticipated Form of any other Face, that he looked upon, in his Mind; but as ſoon as ever he beheld that one Face, immediately there revived and ſtarted forth a former Anticipated Form or Idea of it treaſured up in his Mind, that, as it were taking Acquaintance with that newly received Form, made him Know it or remember it. So when Foreign, Strange and Adventitious Forms are exhibited to the Mind by Senſe, the Soul cannot otherwiſe Know or Underſtand them, but by ſomething Domeſtick of its own, ſome Active Anticipation or Prolepſis within it ſelf, that occaſionally reviving

and meeting with it, makes it know it, or take Acquaintance with it. And this is the only true and allowable Senſe of that Old Aſſertion, that Knowledge is Reminiſcence, not that it is the Remembrance of ſomething which the Soul had ſome time before Actually Known in a Pre-exiſtent State; but becauſe it is the Mind's comprehending of things by Some Inward Anticipations of its own, Something Native and Domeſtick to it, or Something actively exerted from within it ſelf.

And thus *Plotinus* argues, when he endeavours to prove that the Immediate [c] Objects of Knowledge and Intellection, are not Things without the Mind acting upon it at a Diſtance, but contained and comprehended within the Mind it ſelf. [d] *Otherwiſe how ſhould the Mind know or judge when it had really apprehended any thing, that this is Good, that Honeſt or Juſt, theſe things being all Strangers to the Mind, and Coming into it from without. So that the Mind could not have any Principles of Judgment within it ſelf in this Caſe, but*

[c] Τὰ νοητά.

[d] Πῶς δὲ κ γνώσεται ὅτι ἀντελάβετο ὄντως, πῶς δὲ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο ἢ ὅτι καλὸν ἢ δίκαιον; Ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ἄλλο αὐτῷ, κ οὐκ ὢν αὐτῷ αἱ τῆς κρίσεως ἀρχαὶ αἷς πιστεύσει, ἀλλὰ κ αὗται ἔξω κ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐκεῖ.

theſe would be Without it, and then the Truth muſt needs be without it alſo.

3. If Intellection and Knowledge were mere Paſſion from without, or the bare Reception of Extraneous and Adventitious Forms, then no Reaſon could be given at all why a Mirrour or Looking-glaſs ſhould not underſtand; whereas it cannot ſo much as Senſibly perceive thoſe Images which it receives and reflects to us. And therefore Senſe of it ſelf, as was before intimated, is not a mere Paſſion, but a Paſſive Perception of the Soul, which hath ſomething of Vital Energy in it, becauſe it is a Cogitation; to which Vital Energy of the Soul thoſe Senſible Ideas of Light, Colours, Heat, and the like, owe all their Entity. Much leſs therefore can Intellection be a Pure Paſſion. But if Intellection and Knowledge were a Mere Paſſive Perception of the Soul from without, and nothing but Senſe, or the Reſult of it, then What Reaſon could be given, why Brute Animals, that have all the ſame Senſes that Men have, and ſome of them more acute, ſhould not have Intellection alſo, and be as capable of Logick, Mathematicks and Metaphyſicks, and have the ſame Notions of Morality, of a Deity and Religion that Men have? Where-

fore it must of necessity be granted, that besides Passion from Corporeal things, or the Passive Perception of Sense, there is in the Souls of Men another more Active Principle or [e] an *Innate Cognoscitive Power*, whereby they are enabled to Understand or Judge of what is Received from without by Sense. And some, that would otherwise make the Soul as naked a thing as is possible, are forced to acknowledge thus much. And hereby they Grant all that we Contend for and they deny, Though considering not in the mean time what they say. For this Innate Cognoscitive Power in the Soul, can be nothing else but a Power of Raising Intelligible Ideas and Conceptions of things from within it self. For it is not possible that any Knowledge should be without an Objective Idea or Conception of something known included in it, or that [f] *the Intellection* should be in one Faculty, and [g] *the Conception* in another, one in the Intellect, and the other in the Fancy. That Knowledge should be Actively produced from within, and the Conception or Objective Idea passively received from without, That

[e] Vis cognoscendarum rerum innata.
[f] Νόησις. [g] Νόημα.

the Mind ſhould exert an Act of Knowledge or Intellection without an Object, or upon an Object without it ſelf, and not comprehended by it, That the Idea of the Thing Known ſhould not be comprehended in the Knowledge of it. Whereas, as *Ariſtotle* himſelf hath obſerved, [h] *Actual Knowledge is in Reality the ſame with the Thing Known, or the Idea of it*, and therefore inſeparable from it. It being nothing but the Mind's being conſcious of ſome Intelligible Idea within it ſelf.

4. And therefore, whereas the Only Objects of Senſe are Individual Corporeal things exiſting without the Mind, which the Soul perceives by looking out from it ſelf upon that from which it ſuffers, not actively comprehended within it ſelf; The Primary and Immediate Objects of Intellection and Knowledge, are not Things exiſting without the Mind, but the Ideas of the Mind it ſelf actively exerted, that is, the Intelligible [i] *Reaſons* of things. [k] *The Intellection is not of what is without, as Senſe is.* And [l] *The Im-*

[h] Τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι.

[i] Rationes.

[k] Νόησις ἡ τοῦ ἔξω οὐκέτι ἡ αἴσθησις.

[l] Ὅτι δὲ ἔξω τὸ νῷ τὰ νοητά.

mediate

mediate Objects of Intellection are not without the Mind that Understands. They are Assertions that *Plotinus* at large demonstrates. And *Aristotle* frequently asserts the same, [a] *In Abstracted things that which understands and that which is understood are the same; for the Theoretical Science and the* [b] *Knowable* or Object of Knowledge are all one. And [c] *the Mind altogether is that which understands Things:* These being all but several Modifications of Intellect. For as hard and Soft, Hot and Cold, and the like Corporeal Qualities, are but Several Modifications of Matter, so the Several Objective Ideas of the Mind in Scientifical Speculation, are but Several Modifications of the Mind knowing. Wherefore Individual things existing without the Soul, are but the Secondary Objects of Knowledge and Intellection, which the Mind understands not by looking out from it self as Sense doth, but by reflecting inwardly upon it self, and comprehending them under those Intelligible Ideas or [d] *Reasonings* of its own, which

[a] Ἐπὶ τῶν ἀφῃρημένων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοούμενον· ἡ γὰρ θεωρητικὴ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστι.

[b] Scibile.

[c] Ὅλως δὲ νοῦς ὁ τῶν ὄντων τὰ πάντα νοῦς.

[d] Λογισμοὺς.

it protrudes from within it self; so that the Mind or Intellect may well be called (though in another Sense than *Protagoras* meant it) [q] *The Measure of all things.*

5. For the Soul having an Innate Cognoscitive Power Universally, (which is nothing else but a Power of raising Objective Ideas within it self, and Intelligible [r] *Reasons* of any thing) it must needs be granted that it hath a Potential Omniformity in it. Which is not only asserted by the Platonists, that the Soul is [s] *all things Intellectually*, but also by *Aristotle* himself [t] *That the Soul is in a manner All Things.* The Mind being a kind of Notional or Representative World, as it were a Diaphanous and Crystalline Sphære, In which the Ideas and Images of all things existing in the Real Universe may be reflected or represented. For as the Mind of God, which is the Archetypal Intellect, is that whereby he always actually comprehends himself, and his own Fecundity, or the Extent of his own Infinite Goodness and Power; that is, the Possibility of all things; So all Created Intellects

[q] Τὸ Μέτρον πάντων.

[r] Rationes. [s] Πάντα νοητῶς.

[t] Τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα πῶς πάντα.

being

being certain Ectypal Models, or Derivative Compendiums of the same; although they have not the Actual Ideas of all things, much less are the Images or Sculptures of all the Several Species of existent Things fixed and engraven in a dead manner upon them; yet they have them all Virtually and Potentially comprehended in that one [u] *Cognoscitive Power* of the Soul, which is a Potential Omniformity, whereby it is enabled as Occasion serves and Outward Objects invite, gradually and successively to unfold and display it self in a Vital manner, by framing Intelligible Ideas or Conceptions within it self of whatsoever hath any Entity or Cogitability. As the Spermatick or Plastick Power doth Virtually contain within it self, the Forms of all the Several Organical Parts of Animals, and displays them gradually and Successively, framing an Eye here and an Ear there.

6. Now because Intellection and Knowledge are not Passion from without, but an Active Exertion of the Mind from within it self, hence it comes to pass, as *Aristotle* hath observed, that the Mind by knowing that which is [x] *exceedingly Intelligible*, the most

[u] Vis cognitrix. [x] Σφόδρα νοητὸν.

Radiant and Illuſtrious Truths, is not debilitated thereby or overpowered, as Senſe is in perceiving that which is [y] exceedingly Senſible, as the Brightneſs of the Sun; but contrarywiſe the more invigorated thereby, and the better enabled to comprehend leſſer and Smaller Truths; becauſe though Senſe is Paſſive and Organical, yet Knowledge is Inorganical and an Active Power and Strength of the Mind, which the more it is exerted, is the more thereby invigorated and enlarged.

FROM hence likewiſe it is, as the ſame *Ariſtotle* hath obſerved, [z] *That thoſe Knowledges which are more abſtract and remote from Matter, are more accurate*, intelligible and demonſtrable, than thoſe which are Converſant about Concrete and Material things, *as Arithmetick than Harmonicks*, which are Numbers Concrete with Sounds; and ſo likewiſe Geometry than Aſtronomy, or the Mixed Mathematicks; whereas if all Knowledge did ariſe from Corporeal things by way of Senſe and Paſſion, it muſt needs be contrarywiſe true, that the more Concrete and Sen-

[y] Σφόδρα αἰσθητὸν.

[z] Ἀκριβεστέραν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἐπιστήμης, τὴν μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴν τῆς ἁρμονικῆς.

sible

ſible things were, the more Knowable they would be. Moreover, from hence it is alſo, as Experience tells us, that Scientifical Knowledge is beſt acquired by the Soul's Abſtraction from the Outward Objects of Senſe, and Retiring into it ſelf, that ſo it may the better attend to its own Inward Notions and Ideas. And therefore it is many times obſerved, that Over-much Reading and Hearing of other Men's Diſcourſes, though learned and elaborate, doth not only diſtract the Mind, but alſo debilitates the Intellectual Powers, and makes the Mind Paſſive and Sluggiſh, by calling it too much outwards. For which Cauſe that wiſe Philoſopher *Socrates* altogether ſhunned that Dictating and Dogmatical Way of Teaching uſed by the Sophiſters of that Age, and choſe rather an Aporetical and Obſtetricious Method; becauſe Knowledge was not to be poured into the Soul like Liquor, but rather to be invited and gently drawn forth from it; nor the Mind ſo much to be filled therewith from without, like a Veſſel, as to be kindled and awakened. *Laſtly*, from hence is that ſtrange Parturiency that is often obſerved in the Mind, when it is ſollicitouſly ſet upon the Inveſtigation of ſome Truth, whereby it doth endeavour, by ruminating

and

and revolving within it self as it were to *conceive it within it self*, [a] *to bring it forth out of its own Womb*; by which it is evident, that the Mind is Naturally Conscious of its own Active Fecundity, and also that it hath a *Criterion* within it self, which will enable it to know when it hath found that which it sought.

7. WHEREFORE it is evident from what we have declared, that there are two kinds of Perceptive Cogitations in the Soul: The one Passive, when the Soul perceives by suffering from its Body, and the Objects without; the other Active, when it perceives by exerting its own Native Vigour from within it self. The Passive Perceptions of the Soul have two several Names given unto them; for when the Soul, by sympathizing with the Body, seems to perceive Corporeal things, as present and really existing without it, then they are called [b] *Sensations*. But when the Passive Affections of the Soul are looked upon not as Things really existing without the Mind, but only as Pictures of Sensible things in the Mind, or more Crass or Corporeal Cogitations, then they are called [c] *Phantasms* or

[a] Parturire.

[b] Αἰσθήματα. [c] Φαντάσματα.

Imagi-

Imaginations. But these [d] *Phantasms* and *Sensations* being really the same things, as we said before, both of them being Passions or Affections in the Soul, caused by some local Motions in the Body, and the Difference between them being only Accidental, insomuch that [e] *Phantasms* may be changed into [f] *Sensations*, and sometimes also [g] *Sensations* into [h] *Phantasms*, therefore all these Passive Perceptions of the Soul may be called in general [i] *Phantasms*. But the Active Perceptions which rise from the Mind it self without the Body, are commonly called [k] *Conceptions of the Mind*; and so we have the two Species of Perceptive Cogitations; the one [l] *Phantasms*, and the other [m] *Conceptions of the Mind*.

8. Now that all our Perceptive Cogitations are not [n] *Phantasms*, as many contend, but that there is another Species of Perceptive Cogitations distinct from them, arising from the Active Vigour of the Mind it self, which we therefore call [o] *Conceptions of the Mind*,

[d] Φαντάσματα & Αἰσθήματα.
[e] Φαντάσματα. [f] Αἰσθήματα.
[g] Αἰσθήματα. [h] Φαντάσματα.
[i] Φαντάσματα. [k] Νοήματα.
[l] Φαντάσματα. [m] Νοήματα.
[n] φαντάσματα. [o] Νοήματα.

is demonstrably evident from hence; because Phantasms are nothing else but Sensible Ideas, Images or Pictures of Outward Objects, such as are caused in the Soul by Sense; whence it follows, that nothing is [p] *the Object of Fancy*, but what is also [q] *the Object of Sense*, nothing can be fancied by the Soul, but what is Perceptible by Sense. But there are many Objects of our Mind, which we can neither See, Hear, Feel, Smell nor Taste, and which did never enter into it by any Sense; and therefore we can have no Sensible Pictures or Ideas of them, drawn by the Pencil of that Inward Limner or Painter which borrows all his Colours from Sense, which we call Fancy; and if we reflect on our own Cogitations of these things, we shall sensibly perceive that they are not Phantastical, but Noematical. As for Example, Justice, Equity, Duty and Obligation, Cogitation, Opinion, Intellection, Volition, Memory, Verity, Falsity, Cause, Effect, Genus, Species, Nullity, Contingency, Possibility, Impossibility, and innumerable more such there are that will occur to any one that shall turn over the Vocabularies of any Language, none of which can

[p] φαντασὸν. [q] Αἰσθητὸν.

have

have any Senſible Picture drawn by the Pencil of the Fancy. And there are many whole Propoſitions likewiſe, in which there is not any one Word or Notion that we can have any genuine Phantaſm of, much leſs can Fancy reach to an Apprehenſion of the Neceſſity of the Connexion of the Terms. As for Example, [r] *Nothing can be and not be at the ſame time.* What proper and genuine Phantaſms can any perceive in his Mind either of [s] *Nothing*, or [t] *Can*, or [u] *be*, or [x] *And*, or [y] *Not be*, or [z] *at the ſame*, or [a] *Time.*

9. NEITHER was it Aſſerted by *Ariſtotle*, as ſome have taken for granted, That all our Perceptive Cogitations are Phantaſms, but contrarywiſe, that there are [b] *Conceptions of the Mind* which are diſtinct things from [c] *Phantaſms*, only that the latter were always Individual Companions of the former. This appears from thoſe Words of his, [d] *The Conceptions of the Mind ſomewhat differ from Phantaſms, they are not Phantaſms, but nei-*

[r] Nihil poteſt eſſe & non eſſe eodem tempore.
[s] Nihil, [t] poteſt, [u] eſſe,
[x] Et [y] non eſſe, [z] eodem, [a] tempore.
[b] Νοήματα. [c] Φαντάσματα.
[d] De anima. l. 3. c. Νοήματα τινὶ διΐσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι, ἢ οὐδὲ ταῦτα φαντασμάτα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄνευ φανταμάτων.

ther

ther are they without Phantasms. Where he inclines to this, that the [e] *Conceptions of the Mind* are not [f] *Phantasms*, but that they have Phantasms always joined with them; So again afterward He asks, [g] *Whether Intellection be Fancy, or rather a different Thing from Fancy, but such as never goes without it.* Which indeed he affirms in other Places, that the Mind doth never [h] *conceive* without a Phantasm. Now this is true of Sensible and Corporeal things, that we never Understand them, but we have also some confused Phantasms or other of them in our Mind, and yet besides the [i] *Phantasms*, the Mind exerts [k] *Conceptions* also upon them, or else it could not understand them, Phantasms being but imperfect, incomplete, and Superficial Cogitations, which sometimes go before, and Invite or call in the mean while the Perceptions of the Mind, and sometimes follow and attend upon the [l] *Conceptions of the Mind*, as the Shadow upon the Substance, but never comprehend the Thing. And indeed as we our selves con-

[e] Νοήματα. [f] Φαντάσματα.
[g] Εἰ τὸ νοεῖν φαντασία, ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας.
[h] Νοεῖν. [i] Φαντάσματα.
[k] Νοήματα. [l] Νοήματα.

sist

ſiſt of Soul and Body Naturally united together, ſo are the Cogitations that we have of Corporeal things uſually both Noematical and Phantaſmatical together, the one being as it were the Soul, and the other the Body of them. For when a Geometrician conſiders a Triangle, being about to demonſtrate that it hath three Angles Equal to two Right Angles, no doubt but he will have the Phataſmatical Picture of ſome Triangle in his Mind; and yet notwithſtanding he hath alſo a Noematical Perception or Intellectual Idea of it too, as appears from hence, becauſe every expreſs Picture of a Triangle muſt of neceſſity be either Obtuſeangular or Rectangular, or Acutangular, but that which in his Mind is the Subject of this Propoſition thought on, is the [m] *Reaſon* of a Triangle Undetermined to any of theſe Species. And the like might be obſerved alſo of the Word Angles in the ſame Propoſition. In like manner, whenever we think of a Phantaſmatical, Univerſal, or Univerſalized Phantaſm, or a thing which we have no clear Intellection of; as for Example, of the Nature of a Roſe in general, there is a Complication of ſomething Noe-

[m] Ratio.

matical,

matical, and ſomething Phantaſmatical together; for [n] *Phantaſms* in themſelves alone, as well as [o] *Senſations*, are always Individual things. And by a Roſe conſidered thus Univerſally and Phantaſmatically, we mean a Thing which ſo affects our Senſe in reſpect of Figure and Colour.

10. But as for thoſe other Objects of Cogitation, which we affirmed before to be in themſelves neither [p] *the Objects of Senſe*, nor [q] *the Objects of Fancy*, but only [r] *things underſtood*, and therefore can have no Natural and Genuine Phantaſms properly belonging to them; yet it is true, notwithſtanding that the Phantaſtick Power of the Soul, which would never willingly be altogether idle or quite excluded, will buſily intend it ſelf here alſo. And therefore many times, when the Intellect or Mind above is Exerciſed in Abſtracted Intellections and Contemplations, the Fancy will at the ſame time buſily employ it ſelf below, in making ſome kind of Apiſh Imitations, counterfeit Iconiſms, Symbolical Adumbrations and Reſemblances of thoſe Intellectual Cogitations of Senſible and Corporeal

[n] Φαντάσματα. [o] Αἰσθήματα.
[p] Αἰσθητὰ. [q] Φανταστὰ. [r] Νοητὰ.

things.

things. And hence it comes to paſs, that in Speech, Metaphors and Allegories do ſo exceedingly pleaſe, becauſe they highly gratify this Phantaſtical Power of Paſſive and Corporeal Cogitation in the Soul, and ſeem thereby alſo ſomething to raiſe and refreſh the Mind it ſelf, otherwiſe lazy and ready to faint and be tired by over-long abſtracted Cogitations, by taking its old Companion the Body to go along with it, as it were to reſt upon, and by affording to it certain craſſe, palpable, and Corporeal Images, to incorporate thoſe abſtracted Cogitations in, that it may be able thereby to ſee thoſe ſtill more ſilent and ſubtle Notions of its own, ſenſibly reflected to it ſelf from the Corporeal Glaſs of the Fancy.

SOMETIMES alſo there are other ſpurious Phantaſms that do little or nothing ſymbolize with the Noetical Cogitations, that yet are arbitrarily or cuſtomarily annected to them, merely becauſe the Phantaſtick Power would not ſtand wholly idle and unemployed; ſo that when the Mind thinks of ſuch an Intelligible Idea, the Fancy will preſently hold forth ſuch a cuſtomary Phantaſm before it, [s] *as*

[s] Ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες.

those that use Artificial Memory, make certain Phantasms at pleasure to signify certain Cogitations.

But lastly, rather than the Fancy shall quite stand out and do just nothing at all, it will sometimes exercise it self (especially in Speech) in raising Phantasms of the very Sounds and Names, by which the Notions of the Mind are signified respectively. So that it is very true both that there are active [t] *Cogitations of the Mind* distinct from [u] *Phantasms*; and such of which there can be no Natural and Genuine Phantasms or Sensible Pictures; and yet according to *Aristotle*'s Opinion, that frequently those [x] *Conceptions of the Mind* (at least in the Vulgar, that are little accustomed to abstracted Cogitation) have some kind of Spurious and counterfeit, or Verbal and Nominal Phantasms joined with and accompanying of them.

11. As for that Opinion, that the [y] *Conceptions of the Mind* and intelligible Ideas or [z] *Reasons* of the Mind should be raised out of the

[t] Νοήματα. [u] Φαντάσματα.
[x] Νοήματα. [y] Νοήματα.
[z] Rationes.

[a] *Phan-*

[a] *Phantasms* by the strange Chymistry of [b] *an Agent Intelligence*; This as it is founded on a Mistake of *Aristotle*'s Meaning, who never dreamed of any such a Chimerical [c] *Agent Intelligence*, as appears from the *Greek* Interpreters that best understood him; so it is very like to that other Opinion called *Peripatetical*, that asserts the Eduction of Immaterial Forms out of the Power of Matter; and as both of them arise from the same Sottishness of Mind that would make Stupid and Senseless Matter the Original Source of all things; so there is the same Impossibility in both, that Perfection should be raised out of Imperfection, and that Vigour, Activity and awakened Energy, should ascend and emerge out of dull, sluggish, and drowsy Passion. But indeed this Opinion attributes as much Activity to the Mind, if at least the Agent Intelligence be a Part of it, as ours doth; as he would attribute as much Activity to the Sun, that should say the Sun had a Power of educing Light out of Night or the dark Air, as he that should say the Sun had a Power of exerting Light out of his own Body.

[a] Φαντάσματα.

[b] Intellectus agens. [c] Intellectus agens.

The former being but an improper Way of expreſſing the ſame thing, which is properly ſignified in the latter way,

But that other Opinion, that aſſerts that the Abſtract and Univerſal [d] *Reaſons* of things, as diſtinct from Phantaſms, are nothing elſe but mere Names without any Signification, is ſo ridiculouſly falſe, that it deſerves no Confutation at all.

CHAP. II.

1. THAT there are ſome Ideas of the Mind which were not ſtamped or imprinted upon it from the Senſible Objects without, and therefore muſt needs ariſe from the Innate Vigour and Activity of the Mind it ſelf, is evident, in that there are, *Firſt*, Ideas of ſuch things as neither are Affections of Bodies, nor could be imprinted or conveyed by any Local Motions, nor can be pictured at all by the Fancy in any ſenſible Colours; ſuch as are the Ideas of Wiſdom,

[d] Rationes.

Folly,

Folly, Prudence, Imprudence, Knowledge, Ignorance, Verity, Falſity, Vertue, Vice, Honeſty, Diſhoneſty, Juſtice, Injuſtice, Volition, Cogitation, nay, of Senſe it ſelf, which is a Species of Cogitation, and which is not perceptible by any Senſe; and many other ſuch like Notions as include ſomething of Cogitation in them, or refer to Cogitative Beings only; which Ideas muſt needs ſpring from the Active Power and Innate Fecundity of the Mind it ſelf, Becauſe the Corporeal Objects of Senſe can imprint no ſuch things upon it. *Secondly*, in that there are many Relative Notions and Ideas, attributed as well to Corporeal as Incorporeal things that proceed wholly from the Activity of the Mind Comparing one thing with another. Such as are Cauſe, Effect, Means, End, Order, Proportion, Similitude, Diſſimilitude, Equality, Inequality, Aptitude, Inaptitude, Symmetry, Aſymmetry, Whole and Part, Genus and Species, and the like.

2. But that which impoſes upon Mens Judgements here, ſo as to make them think, that theſe are all Paſſive Impreſſions made upon the Soul by the Objects of Senſe, is nothing elſe but this; becauſe the Notions both of thoſe Relative Ideas, and alſo of thoſe

other Immaterial things, (as Vertue, Wisdom, the Soul, God) are most Commonly Excited and awakened occasionally from the Appulse of Outward Objects knocking at the Doors of our Senses. And these Men not distinguishing betwixt the Outward Occasion or Invitation of those Cogitations, and the immediate Active or Productive Cause of them, impute them therefore all alike, as well these intelligible, as the other Sensible Ideas, or Phantasms, to the Efficiency or Activity of the outward Objects upon us. Wherefore that we may the better understand how far the Passion of Sense reaches, and where the Activity of the Mind begins, we will compare these three Things together: *First*, a Mirror, Looking-glass or Crystal Globe; *Secondly*, a Living Eye, that is, a Seeing or Perceptive Mirror or Looking-glass; *Thirdly*, a Mind or Intellect Superadded to this Living Eye or Seeing Mirror.

3. First therefore, when the same Objects are equally Exposed or held before a Crystal Globe or Looking-glass, and a Living Eye; there are all the same Impression made upon the Crystal Globe, that there are upon the Living Eye; which appears from

hence, becauſe the Eye looking upon the Cryſtal Globe or Mirror, will ſee all the ſame Images reflected to it ſelf from thence, that it perceived before immediately from the Objects themſelves. The Motion and Preſſure of the Etherial [a] *Globulous Particles*, in which the Nature of Light is conceived to Conſiſt, from every Opake Object, bearing alike every way upon that which reſiſts, and therefore as much upon the Mirror as the Eye: So that there is every jot as much Corporeal Paſſion in the Mirror or Cryſtal Globe, as in the Glaſſy part of the Living Eye; for, as we ſaid before, the Corporeal Part of the Eye is indeed nothing elſe but a Mirror or Looking-glaſs. And yet notwithſtanding, the Mirror or Chryſtal Globe doth not ſee or Perceive any thing as the Eye doth; From whence we learn, *Firſt*, that Things are never perceived meerly by their own Force and Activity upon the Percipient, but by the Innate Force, Power and Ability of that which perceives. And therefore, *Secondly*, that Senſe it ſelf is not a meer Corporeal Paſſion; but a Perception of the Bodily Paſſions proceeding from ſome Power and Ability ſuppoſed to reſide in

[a] Globuli.

a Senſitive Soul, Vitally united to that reſpective Body. Which Perception, though it have ſomething of Energy in it, as being a Cogitation; yet it is rightly called a Paſſion of the Soul, becauſe it is not a clear Intellective or Cognoſcitive Perception of the Motions of the Body, but a Paſſive or Sympathetical Perception only. Whereby, according to Nature's Inſtinct, it hath ſeveral Seemings or Appearances begotten in it of thoſe reſiſting Objects without it at a Diſtance, in reſpect of Colour, Magnitude, Figure and Local Motion; by reaſon of the Difference of thoſe Rectilinear Motions communicated from them by the Intermediate [c] *Globulous Particles*, and impreſſed upon the Optick Nerves.

WHEREFORE the Living Eye immediately perceives nothing but theſe Corporeal Paſſions which are made equally upon it, and the Mirror or Cryſtal Globe alike, by the Motion of that Intermediate or ſubtle Body which cauſeth Light; which Corporeal Paſſions being alſo Paſſively perceived by that Vital Principle called the Senſitive Power reſiding in the Eye, all Paſſion from the Outward Object there ceaſeth, and goes no fur-

[c] Globuli.

ther:

ther: But that Power of the Soul that next followeth, which is the third thing that we mentioned before, the Intellect, begins immediately to exert and display its Activity upon the Object passively perceived by Sense.

4. But the better to illustrate the Business in hand, let us again suppose some Ingenious Piece of Mechanism, or Artificial *Automaton*; as for Example, an Horologe or Watch, at once held before the Mirror or Crystal Globe, and also exposed to the Particular View of the Living or Sentient Eye, both in the Outside and Interiour Fabrick of it; so that as every Part in it is reflected from the Mirror, so it may be Consciously perceived also by the Sentient Eye, in a Particular Successive View. Now the Sentient Eye will be conscious or Perceptive of nothing in all this, but only its being Variously affected, from different Colours, Figures, Protuberancies, Cavities, Sculptures, Local Motions, one after another, all the same things which were impressed on the Crystal Globe or Mirror, and reflected from it, there being no Difference at all betwixt the one and the other, but that the Eye was Conscious or Perceptive of what it suffered, but the Mirror not. But now the Mind or Intellect being superadded to this Sentient Eye,

Eye, and exerting its Active and more Comprehenſive Power upon all that which was reflected from the Mirror, and paſſively perceived by the Sentient Eye, as it doth actually and Intellectually comprehend the ſame Things over again, which Senſe had perceived before in another Manner (of which we muſt ſpeak afterward) ſo it proceeds further, and compares all the ſeveral Parts of this ingenious *Machine* or Self-mover one with another, taking Notice, Firſt, of the Spring, as the Original and Cauſe of all the Motion in it; of the Chain or String, by the Mediation of which that Motion is communicated to the Fuſee; of the Balance that reciprocating moderates the Motion of the ſeveral Wheels, ſome greater, ſome leſſer, propagating the Motion from one to another; of the Horary Circle divided into Equal Parts; and, laſtly, of the Index, moving round about the Circle, through equal Space in equal Time, all theſe in their ſeveral [f] *Relations* to one another and the Whole. Whereupon the Intellect, beſides Figure, Colour, Magnitude and Motions, raiſes and excites within it ſelf the Intelligible Ideas of Cauſe, Effect, Means, End,

[f] Scheſes.

Priority

Priority and Posteriority, Equality and Inequality, Order and Proportion, Symmetry and Asymmetry, Aptitude and Inaptitude, Sign and Thing signified, Whole and Part, in a manner all the Logical and Relative Notions that are. Whereas the Sentient Eye, by which this whole Mechanism was represented to the Intellect, perceived none of all these things; neither Cause nor Effect, nor Equality nor Irregularity, nor Order nor Proportions, nor Symmetry nor Asymmetry, nor Sign nor Thing signified, nor Whole nor Part; since there is no Colour nor Figure in any of these Things. And if the Sentient Eye could dispute with the Mind or Intellect, it would Confidently avow and maintain, that there were no such Entities as those in this [g] *Self-moving Machine*, and that the Understanding was abused and deceived in those Apprehensions; Since all that was impressed from the Object was, by the Sentient Eye, faithfully transmitted to it, and the Intellect received all its Intelligence or Information from it. And to make its Cause Good, Sense would appeal to the Mirrour or Crystal Globe standing by, in which there were no

[g] Automaton.

Images

Images of any of thoſe Inviſible Ideas or Logical Notions Reflected. Wherefore ſince Senſe doth freely conceive and ingenuouſly own, that none of theſe Ideas are paſſively and phantaſmatically ſtamped upon it from the Objects without; be they what they will, Real or not Real, certain it is that they are the Objects of the Intellect, and they muſt of Neceſſity be raiſed in it by its own Innate Vigour and Activity.

5. INDEED though it ſhould be granted, that the [h] *Relations* of Cauſe and Effect, Whole and Parts, and the like, were Meer Notions of the Mind and Modes of conceiving in us, that only ſignify what Things are Relatively to Intellect; yet it would not follow from hence, that they had no Reality at all, but were abſolute Non Entities; Becauſe Intellect being a Real Thing, and that which indeed hath more of Entity in it than Matter or Body, the Modifications of Intellect muſt needs be as Real Things as the Modifications of Matter; and therefore Cauſe and Effect, Whole and Part, Symmetry and Aſymmetry, and all the Other Logical Notions would have as much Reality in them as Hard

[h] Scheſes.

and

and Soft, Moiſt and Dry, Hot and Cold, which, though but Modifications of Matter, are looked upon as very Real Things; and ſuch Intellectuals as were Relative to Intellect be as Real, as thoſe Senſible Phantaſms which are Relative to Senſe. But this muſt not be granted, that the Modes of Conception in the Underſtanding, (where all Truth is) are diſagreeable to the Reality of the Things conceived by them; and ſo being unconformable, are therefore Falſe. Wherefore that theſe [i] *Relations* are not (Though Senſe doth not perceive them) meer Notions or Figments of the Mind, without any Fundamental Reality in the Things themſelves without us, correſponding to them, appears from hence, becauſe Art and Wiſdom are moſt Real Things, which beget Real Effects of the greateſt Moment and Conſequence in Nature and Human Life of any Thing; and yet are Converſant about nothing elſe but only the Relations, Proportions, Aptitudes of Things to one another, and to certain Ends. Now if theſe were all meer Figments, and nothing but Logical Notions or [k] *Beings of Reaſon*, then there could be no ſuch Realities produced

[i] Scheſes. [k] Entia Rationis.

out

out of them. Nay, then Art and Wiſdom themſelves muſt needs be Figments and Fancies, and likewiſe it would be indifferent whatever a Man did in order to any End or Effect; and all Men (as *Protagoras* held) would be really alike wiſe and ſkilful. Then there would be no other Extrinſecal Cauſality of any Effect but that of Efficiency, Force or Power; which, in Corporeal Things, is nothing elſe but Local Motion. And no ſuch Thing as the Cauſality of Skill and Art (that is commonly called the Exemplary Cauſe) diſtinct from Force, Power and blind Impetuoſity. Nay, then Virtue, Juſtice, Honeſty, muſt of Neceſſity be Figments alſo, becauſe Moral Good and Evil are Schetical and Relative Things; and which is more yet, External Convenience and Inconvenience, Utility and Inutility themſelves, be nothing elſe but Fancies alſo.

6. BUT though the Verdict and Teſtimony of Senſe ought to be admitted as authentick in this Particular, as to what is or is not Paſſively impreſſed upon us from without, becauſe it is not poſſible that any thing ſhould be impreſſed upon the Intellect from Senſible things, but it muſt needs paſs through the Medium of Senſe, and ſo be traſmitted there-

by

by unto the Understanding, which cannot be, unless Sense be Conscious thereof; Yet notwithstanding, Sense is not at all to be heard, as to the Reality or Non Reality of these Relative Ideas, it being no Competent Judge in that Controversy. Because since the Knowledge of Things doth not arise from the Activity, Energy and Radiation of the Objects without upon us, Passively Received by Sense, but from the Active and Comprehensive Energy or Activity of the Mind it self, as we have already observed, [1] *That in Knowing all Things, it rather useth its own Power, than that of the Things which are known. For since all Judgement is the Act of him that judgeth, it must needs be that every one perform his own Work, not by the Power of another, but by his Own Faculty,* as the aforecommended *Boetius* expresseth it. We ought not to conclude that those Relative Ideas are therefore meer Figments or Modes of conceiving in us, because Sense is not Conscious of any such Things Passively impressed upon

[1] In Cognoscendo cuncta, suâ potiùs facultate quàm rerum quæ cognoscuntur uti. Cum enim omne Judicium Judicantis actus existat, necesse est ut suam quisque operam non ex alienâ, sed ex propriâ facultate perficiat.

it

it from Without, and becauſe that lower and Narrow Faculty Comprehends them not; but rather acquieſce in the Sentiment of that larger and more Comprehenſive Faculty the Intellect, that judges of Things by exerting its own Active Power upon them.

7. WHEREFORE, if we well conſider it, we ſhall find that not only the Beauty and Pulchritude, but alſo the Strength and Ability of Natural and Corporeal Things themſelves, depend upon theſe Relations and Proportions of one Thing to another. For what is Pulchritude in Viſible Objects, or Harmony in Sounds, but the Proportion, Symmetry and Commenſuration of Figures, and Sounds to one another, whereby Infinity is Meaſured and Determined, and Multiplicity and Variety vanquiſhed and triumphed over by Unity, and by that means they become grateful and pleaſing Objects to the Ear and Eye of Intellectual Auditors and Spectators, there being as it were certain Ludicrous Irritations and Symbolical Reſemblances of Art and Wiſdom, nay, and Vertue too (as we ſhall ſhew afterward) that is, of Intellectuality in general appearing in them, Whereby the Mind beholds as it were its own Face and Image reflected to it ſelf from a Corporeal Glaſs.

BUT

But becauſe many will be ready to ſay here, that Beauty is nothing but a Fancy neither, and therefore cannot argue any Reality in theſe Schetical Things; I add that even the Strength and Ability of Corporeal Things themſelves depends upon the mutual [m] *Relations* and Proportions of one thing to another. And this all Men will be ſenſible of as ſomething. And the Truth hereof Evidently appears from the Mechanical Powers. Nay, the Health and Strength of the Body of Animals, ariſes from the Configuration of the Organical Parts, and the fit Contemperation of Humours and the Inſenſible Parts with one another; ſo that if this Harmonical [n] *Temperature* of the whole Body be diſturbed and put out of Tune, Weakneſs and [o] *Languiſhing* will immediately ſeize upon it. Nay, doth not all the Strength, as well as the Comelineſs and Beauty of an Army, conſiſt in Order? And therefore if we ſhould ſuppoſe ſome ſubtle Sophiſter, and Popular Orator, ſent from the Quarters of an Enemy into a Vaſt, Numerous and puiſſant Army, that ſhould inſinuate into the Common Soldiers ſo far, as generally to perſwade them, that Or-

[m] Scheſes. [n] Craſis. [o] Languor.

der was nothing but a meer Fancy or Logical Notion; a Thing craftily deviſed by their Commanders, meerly to keep them in Subjection, that they might the better tyrannize over them, and rule them as they pleaſe; inſomuch that they ſhould all at length altogether neglect their Ranks and Files, and put themſelves wholly into Diſorder and Confuſion, and in this Faſhion prepare themſelves to encounter their approaching Enemy, would they not hereby be betrayed to certain Ruin, though the Enemy ſhould be but a Small Handful of Men, but well ordered and well commanded? For Order is that which makes Things, [p] *with United Forces*, to conſpire all to one End, whereby the Whole hath the Force and Ability of all the ſeveral Particular Strengths conjoined and United into one.

8. THEREFORE I ſay, in the next place, returning to our former Inſtance of an *Automaton*, or Horologe, that though thoſe ſeveral Relative Ideas of Cauſe, Effect, Symmetry, Proportion, Order, Whole and Part, and the like, conſidered formally as [q] *Conceptions of the Mind*, be only in the Intellect it ſelf (as the Ideas and Conceptions of all other Things

[p] Junctis Viribus. [q] Νοήματα.

likewiſe are;) yet notwithſtanding the Intellect doth not forge or falſify any thing in apprehending of them, in that Material [r] *Self-Mover* repreſented to it by Senſe, becauſe all the ſeveral [s] *Relations* are fundamentally and Really in the ſame, though they could not be ſtamped upon Senſe materially, and received paſſively from it. And therefore that the true Nature, Formal [t] *Reaſon*, Eſſence and Idea of this [u] *Self-Mover*, Watch or Horologe, is really compounded and made up of thoſe ſeveral [x] *Relations*, as Ingredients into it, ſo that it cannot poſſibly be underſtood without them; though Senſe could not reach to the Comprehenſion of any one of them, much leſs of this whole Logical Syſtem or [y] *Collection* of them. It being impoſſible that the Nature of [z] *a Self-Mover*, Horologe or Watch, ſhould be otherwiſe Underſtood than by the Comprehenſion of theſe Relative Ideas; and by ſuch a Logical, Unitive, Comprehenſive Power and Activity, as can frame out of them one Idea of the Whole. For an Horologe or Watch is not meer Silver or Gold, Braſs and

[r] Automaton. [s] Scheſes. [t] Ratio.
[u] Automaton. [x] Scheſes.
[y] Compages. [z] Automaton.

Steel, any way jumbled, mingled or confounded together, but it is such an Apt and Proportionable Disposition of Certain Quantities of those several Materials into several Parts of such certain Figures, contemperated together, as may Harmoniously conspire to make up one Equal and Uniform Motion, which running as it were parallel with the Motion of Time, and passing round the Horary Circle, and being measured in that Horary Circle, may also measure out and distinguish the Quantity of that Silent and Successive Flux, which, like a still and deep River, carries down all Things along with it indiscernably, and without any Noise; and which, in its Progressive Motion, treads so lightly and softly, that it leaves no Traces, Prints or Footsteps at all behind it.

9. WHEREFORE the Eye of Sense, though it be fixed never so much upon the Material Outside of this [a] *Self-Mover*, yet it never comprehends the Formal Nature of it within it self, as it is [b] *a Whole* made up of several Parts, United not so much by Corporeal Contact or Continuity, as by their Relative Conspiration to one Certain End. Sense being

[a] Automaton. [b] Totum.

like

like one of those narrow Telescopes, by which the Eye looking upon the Moon, can never view it all at once, and see the Site and Configuration of all the several Mountains and Valleys, and Seas in it, and have one comprehensive Idea of the Whole; but taking it in the Piecemeal Part after Part, leaves the Intelligent Spectator afterwards to compile and make up one Entire Draught or Map of Stenography out of all those several Particular or Partial Views.

So that if we will speak properly, we cannot say that the Eye sees any [c] *Machine* or [d] *Self-mover*, for it is but variously affected from the Material Part of it, perceiving several Passions in it self from the several Colours and Figures of it, it being so far from comprehending the Formal [e] *Reason* of it, as it is a [f] *Whole* made up of several Parts, according to several [g] *Relations* and Proportions contributing thereto, that it cannot reach to any one Relative Idea, neither doth bare Fancy go any further than Sense. Or else the Difference between Intellect and Sense may be resembled by the Difference betwixt the Sense

[c] Machina. [d] Automaton.
[e] Ratio. [f] Totum. [g] Scheses.

of Sight and Touch. For Touch groping, perceives but as it were a Point at once, the Eye Comprehends the whole Superficies. Senſe ſees particular Things abſolutely, Intellect Compares them according to thoſe Relations they have to one another, has a Comprehenſive Idea of a [h] *Whole* made up of ſeveral Parts as one Thing. And therefore the Form, [i] *Reaſon* or Intelligible Idea of a [k] *Self-Mover* or Horologe, was never ſtamped or impreſſed upon the Soul from without, but upon occaſion of the Senſible Idea excited and exerted from the inward Active and Comprehenſive Power of the Intellect it ſelf.

10. THERE are many other ſuch Ideas of the Mind, of certain [l] *Wholes* made up of ſeveral Corporeal Parts, which, though Sometimes Locally diſcontinued, yet are joyned together by [m] *Relations*, and Habitudes to one another (founded in ſome Actions of them, as they are Cogitative Beings) and by Order all conſpiring into one thing; which, though they are altogether imperceptible by Senſe, and therefore were never ſtamped or impreſſed upon the Mind from the Objects without;

[h] Totum. [i] Ratio. [k] Automaton.
[l] Totums. [m] Scheſes.

yet,

yet, notwithstanding, are not meer Figments or [n] *Beings of Reason*, but Things of the Greatest Reality, founded in certain Actions of Thinking and Cogitative Beings; which are altogether imperceptible by Sense, and therefore could not possibly be outwardly stamped upon the Mind; as for Example, a Polity or Commonwealth, called an Artificial Man, which is a Company of many United together by Consent or Contract under one Government, to be regulated by some certain Laws as it were by one Will for the Good of the Whole; where, though the Eye may see the Particular Persons, (or at least their outsides) that are the respective Members thereof, yet it can neither see the Bond which unites them together, which is nothing but Relation, nor comprehend the [o] *Whole* that is made up of them, that is, a Polity or Commonwealth, according to the Formal Nature of it, which is an Idea that proceeds meerly from the Unitive Power and Activity of the Mind it self.

In a word, all the Ideas of things called Artificial or Mechanical, contain something in them that never came from Sense, nor was ever stamped upon the Soul from the Objects

[n] Entia Rationis. [o] Totum.

without, which, though it be not meerly notional or Imaginary, but really belongs to the Nature of that Thing, yet is no otherwise than Intellectually Comprehended. As for Example, an House or Palace is not only Stone, Brick, Mortar, Timber, Iron, Glass, heaped together; but the Very Essence and Formal [p] *Reason* of it is made up of Relative or Schetical Notions, it being a certain Disposition of those several Materials into a [q] *Whole* or [r] *Collection*, consisting of several Parts, Rooms, Stairs, Passages, Doors, Chimneys, Windows, convenient for Habitation, and fit for the several Uses of Men; in which there is the Logick of Whole and Parts, Order, Proportion, Symmetry, Aptitude, Concinnity, all complicated with Wood, Stone, Iron and Glass, as it were informing and adorning the Rude and Confused Mass of Matter, and making it both beautiful and Serviceable. And therefore for this Cause, no Man that is in his Wits will say, that a stately and Royal Palace hath therefore less Reality, Entity, and Substantiality in it, than an Heap of Rubbish confusedly cast together; because, forsooth, the Idea of it partly

[p] Ratio. [q] Totum. [r] Compages.

consists

consists of Logical Notions, which are thought to be *Meer Imaginary* Things; whereas the [s] *Whole* is all Solid Matter without this Notional Form. For this Logical Form, which is the Passive Stamp or Print of Intellectuality in it, the first Archetypes contained in the Idea or Skill of the Architect, and thence introduced into the Rude Matter, successively with much Pains and Labour, is the only Thing that distinguishes it from meer Dirt and Rubbish, and gives it the Essence of an House or Palace. And it hath therefore the more of Entity in it, because it partakes of Art or Intellectuality. But the Eye or Sense of a Brute, though it have as much Passively impressed upon it from without, as the Soul of a Man hath, when it looks upon the most Royal and Magnificent Palace, if it should see all the Inside also as well as the Outside, could not Comprehend from thence the Formal Idea and Nature of an House or Palace, which nothing but an Active Intellectual Principle can reach unto.

II. NEITHER is this true of such Things only as are Commonly called Artificial, but also of Natural Compounded Things, such

[s] Totum,

as

as Plants and Animals are. And indeed if we Conſider Things Philoſophically, we ſhall not find any ſuch Eſſential Difference as is Commonly ſuppoſed, betwixt Things called Artificial and Natural. For there is a Nature in all Artificial Things, and again, an Artifice in all Compounded Natural Things. Plants and Animals being nothing elſe but Artificial Mechaniſms, the latter of which Eſpecially are contrived with infinitely more Wit, Variety and Curioſity than any Mechaniſms or [t] *Self-Movers* that were ever yet produced by Human Art. Wherefore the true Form of an Animal, if we attend only to the Mechaniſm of the Body (for we muſt acknowledge ſomething elſe not only in Men but alſo in Brutes, if they have any Cogitation beſides Mechaniſm, which is a Subſtance of another Nature, or a Cogitative Being united to the Body) is an Idea that includes many Relative and Logical Notions in it, and therefore could never be ſtamped upon the Soul by Senſe; For Senſe only takes Notice of ſeveral Colours and Figures either in the outſide or the inſide of any Animals, but doth not ſum them up into one [u] *Whole*. But the Idea of it, as col-

[t] Automata. [u] Totum.

lected

lected into one Mechanical [x] *Self-Mover*, consisting of many Organical Parts fitly proportioned together, and all Harmoniously conspiring to one End, to make it every way a fit Habitation for a Cogitative Substance to reside in, in respect of Nutrition, Local Motion, Sense, and all other Functions of Life: Such an Idea, I say, that hath something of Logick in it, is only Conceivable by the Unitive, Active and Comprehensive Power of the Intellect.

THE same is to be affirmed of that huge and Vast *Automaton*, which some will have to be an Animal likewise, the Visible World or Material Universe, Commonly called [y] *Cosmos* or *Mundus*, the World, from the Beauty of it: Whether we mean thereby that one Single Vortex, to which our Planetary Earth belongs, or a System of as many Vortices as we see fixed Stars in the Heavens, their Central Suns and Circumferential Planets moving round about them respectively. Now Sense looking round about, and making many Particular Views, sees now one fixed Star, and then another; now the Moon, then the Sun; here a Mountain, there a Valley; at one Time

[x] Automaton. [y] Κόσμος or Mundus.

a Ri-

a River, at another a Sea, Particular Vegetables and Animals one after another: But it cannot sum up or unite all together, nor rise to any Comprehensive Idea of the Whole at once, as it is one or many Mechanical [z] *Self-Movers* most Curiously and Artificially framed of innumerable Parts; In which there are all manner of Logical [a] *Relations* possible offered to the Mind, but all so fitly proportioned with such admirable Symmetries and Correspondencies in respect of one another and the Whole, that they perfectly conspire into one most Orderly and Harmonious Form.

HITHERTO therefore we have seen, that the Relative Ideas that we have in our Mind, are not Passions impressed upon the Soul from the Objects without; but arise from the innate Activity of the Mind it self; and therefore because the Essences or Ideas of all Compounded Corporeal Things themselves, whether Artificial or Natural; that is, whether made by the Artifice of Men or Nature, always necessarily include these Logical [b] *Relations* in them, we have demonstratively proved from thence, that no Corporeal Compounded

[z] Automatons. [a] Schesis. [b] Schesis.

Thing whatſoever is underſtood by Senſe, nor the Idea of it paſſively ſtamped upon the Mind, from the Objects without, but comprehended only by the large Unitive Power of the Intellect, and exerted from the Innate Activity thereof.

12. But the Caſe is ſtill clearer concerning thoſe other Ideas before-mentioned, of the ſeveral Modes of Cogitative Beings, or ſuch as involve or include ſome Relation to them; that theſe are not by the Paſſive Impreſſes from the Outward Objects by Senſe; although they are often occaſionally invited and drawn forth by them. Which we ſhall illuſtrate by the former Inſtance of an Artificial [c] *Self-Mover* exhibited firſt to the View of Senſe, and afterward actively comprehended by the Underſtanding. After the Mind hath framed a clear Idea of this [d] *Self-Mover* within it ſelf, the End or Deſign whereof is to meaſure the Equal Motion either of the Sun and Heavens, or Earth, (according to Different Aſtronomical Hypotheſes) by the Equal Motion of this [e] *Self-Mover*, and ſo to diſtinguiſh or mark out to us the Quantities of that ſilent and undiſcerned Flux of Time; and

[c] Automaton. [d] Automaton. [e] Automaton.

when

when it hath conſidered how aptly conducible Every part of this Mechaniſm is to that Deſign, and how there is neither the leaſt Redundancy nor Deficiency in any Thing in order thereunto, and of the Beauty and Elegancy of the Fabrick, making a further and a more Inward Reflection upon the ſame, it plainly perceives this accurate Contrivance to be but a Paſſive Print or Stamp of ſome Active and Living Art or Skill upon it: wherefore the Ideas of Art and Skill are upon this Occaſion naturally exerted from it; neither doth it reſt in conſidering of Art and Skill abſtractedly, but becauſe theſe are Modes of an Exiſtent Cogitative Being, it thinks preſently of ſome Particular Intelligent Being, the Artificer or Author of this curious Fabrick, and looking further into it, finds his Name alſo engraven in Legible Characters upon the ſame, whereupon he forthwith pronounces the Sound of it. Whereas the Living Eye, that is, Senſe alone in its antecedent View, as it could not eſpy any Logical [f] *Relations* or Notions there, ſo neither can it perceive any Ideas of Art or Skill in it, they having neither Figure nor Colour in them,

[f] Scheſes.

nor

nor of Author and Artificer, any more than it could see the Sound of the Artificer's Name in the engraven Sculptures or Characters of it; for the Eye could see no more than was represented in or reflected from the Crystal Globe or Mirror: Wherefore the Ideas of Art and Skill, Author and Artificer were not Passively imprinted upon the Intellect from the Material [g] *Self-Mover*, but only occasionally invited from the Mind it self, as the Figures of the Engraven Letters did not passively impress the Sound of the Artificer's Name upon him, but only occasion him to exert it from his own Activity.

13. Just in the same manner it happens many times in the Contemplation of that Great [h] *Self-Mover* of the Material Universe, which is the [i] *Artifice of God*, the Artifice of the best Mechanist, though there be no more passively impressed upon us from it, than there is upon the Diaphanous Air, or Liquid Ether contiguous to all Solid Bodies by Local Motion, of which only Sensitive Beings have a Conscious Perception; yet there is a Wonderful Scene of various Thoughts and Motions raised in the Mind thereupon, which

[g] Automaton. [h] Automaton. [i] Θεοῦ τέχνασμα.

are

are only occasionally invited by those Stamps and Impressions made from the Material Fabrick, and its various Furniture without, but owe their true Original and Efficiency to nothing else but the Innate Vigour and Activity of the Mind it self. Some of which we have already Instanced in, the Ideas of those Relative [k] *Considerations* of Corporeal Things themselves and their Parts to one another; by means of which the Intellect rises up to that Comprehensive View of the Natures of Particular Corporeal Things, and the Universal *Mundane* System within it self all at once; which Sense perceiving only by little and little, and taking in as it were Point after Point, cannot sum up its Partial Perceptions into the entire Idea of any one [l] *Whole.* But the Intellect doth not rest here, but upon occasion of those Corporeal Things thus Comprehended in themselves, naturally rises higher to the framing and exciting of certain Ideas from within it self, of other things not existing in those sensible Objects, but absolutely Incorporeal: For being ravished with the Contemplation of this admirable Mechanism and Artificial Contrivance of the Material Universe,

[k] Scheses. [l] Totum.

forth-

forthwith it naturally conceives it to be nothing elſe but the Paſſive Stamp, Print and Signature of ſome Living Art and Wiſdom; as the Pattern, Archetype and Seal of it, and ſo excites from within it ſelf an Idea of that Divine Art and Wiſdom. Nay, conſidering further, how all Things in this great *Mundane* Machine or Animal (as the Antients would have it) are contrived, not only for the Beauty of the whole, but alſo for the Good of Every Part in it, that is endued with Life and Senſe, it exerts another Idea, *viz.* of *Goodneſs and Benignity from within it ſelf, beſides that of Art and Wiſdom*, as the Queen Regent and Empreſs of Art, whereby Art is Employed, Regulated and determined; now both theſe Things, whereof the Firſt is Art, Wiſdom and Knowledge; the Second, Goodneſs, Benignity and Morality, being looked upon as Modes of ſome Intellectual Being or Mind in which they exiſt, it from hence preſently makes up an Idea of God, as the Author or Architect of this great and Boundleſs Machine; A Mind infinitely Good and Wiſe; and ſo as it were reſounds and re-echoes back the Great Creator's Name, which from thoſe Viſible Characters impreſſed upon the Material Univerſe, had pierced loudly into its

Ears, but in such an indiscernable manner, that Sense listening never so attentively, could not perceive the least Murmur or Whisper of it. And this is the most Natural Scale by which the Intellectual Mind in the Contemplation of Corporeal Things ascends to God; from the Passive Prints and Signatures of that one Art and Wisdom that appears in the Universe, by taking Notice from thence of the Exemplary or Archetypal Cause, one Infinite and Eternal Mind setting his Seal upon all. For as he that hears a Consort of Musicians playing a Lesson, consisting of six or eight several Parts, all Conspiring to make up one Harmony; will immediately Conclude, that there was some other Cause of that Harmony besides those several Particular Efficients, that struck the several Instruments; for every one of them could be but a Cause of his own Part which he played: But the Unity of the whole Harmony, into which all the several Parts conspire, must needs proceed from the Art and Musical Skill of some one Mind, the Exemplary and Archetypal Cause of that Vocal Harmony, which was but a Passive Print or Stamp of it: So though the Atheist might possibly perswade himself, that every particular Creature was the first

Author

Author or Efficient of that Part which it played in the Univerſe, by a certain Innate Power of its own; yet all the Parts of the *Mundane* Syſtem Conſpiring into one Perfect Harmony, there muſt of Neceſſity be ſome One Univerſal Mind, the Archetypal and Exemplary Cauſe thereof, Containing the Plot of the whole *Mundane* Muſick, as one entire Thing made up of ſo many ſeveral Parts within himſelf.

14. But that oftentimes there is more taken Notice of and perceived by the Mind, both in the Senſible Objects themſelves, and by occaſion of them, than was impreſſed from them, or paſſively received by Senſe; which therefore muſt needs proceed from ſome Inward Active Principle in that which Perceives, I ſhall make it further appear by ſome other Inſtances.

For, firſt, let a Brute and a Man at the ſame time be made Spectators of one and the ſame Artificial Statue, Picture or Landskip; here the Brute will paſſively receive all that is Impreſſed from the Outward Object upon Senſe by Local Motion, as well as the Man, all the Several Colours and Figures of it: And yet the Man will preſently perceive ſomething in this Statue or Picture,

which the Brute takes no Notice of at all, *viz.* Beauty and Pulchritude, and Symmetry, beſides the Livelineſs of the Effigies and Pourtraiture. The Eye of the Brute being every jot as Good a Glaſs or Mirror, and perhaps endued with a more perſpicacious Senſe or Power of Paſſive Perception, than that of a Man.

Or again, Let both a Man and a Brute at the ſame time hear the ſame Muſical Airs, the Brute will only be ſenſible of Noiſe and Sounds; but the Man will alſo perceive Harmony in them, and be very much delighted with it; nay, even Enthuſiaſtically tranſported by it. Wherefore the Brute perceiving all the Sounds, as well as the Man, but nothing of the Harmony, the Difference muſt needs ariſe from ſome inward Active Principle or Anticipation in the Man, which the Brute hath not.

And indeed the Reaſon is the ſame both in Viſibles and Audibles; for the Senſe of a Man, by reaſon of its Vicinity and Neighbourhood to Reaſon and Intellectuality, lodged in the ſame Soul with it, muſt needs be Coloured with ſome Tincture of it; or have ſome Paſſive Impreſſes of the ſame upon it: and therefore when it finds or meets with *in*

ſenſible Objects any Foot-ſteps or Reſemblances thereof, any Thing that hath Cognation with Intellectuality; as Proportion, Symmetry and Order have, being the Paſſive Stamps and Impreſſes of Art and Skill (which are Intellectual Things) upon Matter, it muſt needs be highly gratified with the ſame. But the Soul of a Brute having no Intellectual Anticipations in it, but barely Suffering from the Corporeal Objects without, can have no Senſe of any Thing but what their Activity impreſſeth upon it.

NAY further, the Man will alſo eſpy ſome Symbolical Reſemblances of Morality, of Vertue and Vice in the variouſly proportioned Sounds and Airs; for there are [m] *Ethical* (as *Ariſtotle* hath obſerved) as well as [n] *Enthuſiaſtical Harmonies*, as the Phyſiognomiſts in like manner obſerve Signatures of Morality in the Countenances of Men and their Pictures, which it is yet leſs poſſible that a Brute ſhould be ſenſible of; theſe Differences ariſing, not from the Abſolute Nature of the Objects without, or their bare Impreſſion which they make; but the Different Analogy which they have to ſome inward

[m] Ἠθικαὶ [n] ἐνθουσιαστικαὶ ἁρμονίαι.

and Active Anticipations which they meet withal in the Percipient. For the Man hath certain Moral Anticipations and Signatures ſtamped inwardly upon his Soul, which makes him preſently take Notice of whatſoever ſymbolizes with it in Corporeal Things; but the Brute hath none.

15. AND this will ſtill further appear, if we again compare the Judgement of ſome Excellent Artiſts in Painting and Muſick with that of an Ordinary Vulgar Perſon, that hath not any acquired Skill in either Faculty. For the Skilful and expert Limner will obſerve many Elegancies and Curioſities of Art, and be highly pleaſed with ſeveral Strokes and Shadows in a Picture, where a Common Eye can diſcern nothing at all; and a Muſical Artiſt hearing a Conſort of exact Muſicians playing ſome excellent Compoſure of many Parts, will be exceedingly raviſhed with many Harmonical Airs and Touches, that a Vulgar Ear will be utterly inſenſible of. Nay, ſuch an one perhaps would be more pleaſed with the ſtreperous Noiſe of a Single Fiddle, or the Ruſtical Muſick of the Country-Bagpipes, or the Dull Humming of a *Jew*'s Trump, than the fulleſt and moſt exquiſitely compoſed Harmony.

AND

And the Reaſon is the ſame with what was before ſuggeſted, becauſe the Artiſts of either kind have many Inward Anticipations of Skill and Art in their Minds; which being awakened by thoſe Paſſive Impreſſions of the ſame Skill or Art in the Outward Objects that Strike upon their Senſes, there ariſes immediately an Inward Grateful Senſe and Sympathy from the Correſpondence and Analogy that is betwixt them; Art and Skill in the Mind of the Muſical Hearer, finding [p] *ſomething akin* to its ſelf in thoſe Harmonious Airs, ſome Foot-ſteps and Reſemblances of it ſelf gratefully cloſing with them. Of which Vital Sympathy, there is vulgarly thought to be ſome Reſemblance in Nature; when, upon the ſtriking of a String in one Viol, another String, that is an Uniſon to it in a diſtant Viol, will dance and leap; and that not from any Mechanical Cauſe (as ſome conceive) Paſſively only, but from a Vital and Active Principle in Nature, which is affected with Concord and Harmony. Now there is yet a Pulchritude of another kind; a more Interiour Symmetry and Harmony in the Relations, Proportions, Aptitudes and Corre-

[p] Συγγενές τι.

ſpondencies of Things to one another in the Great *Mundane* Syſtem, or Vital Machine of the Univerſe, which is all Muſically and Harmonically compoſed; for which Cauſe the Antients made *Pan*, that is, Nature to play upon an Harp; but Senſe, which only paſſively perceives particular outward Objects, doth here, like the Brute, hear nothing but meer Noiſe and Sound and Clatter, but no Muſick or Harmony at all; having no Active Principle and Anticipation within it ſelf to comprehend it by, and correſpond or vitally ſympathize with it; whereas the Mind of a Rational and Intellectual Being will be raviſhed and Enthuſiaſtically tranſported in the Contemplation of it; and, of its own Accord, dance to this Pipe of *Pan*, Nature's Intellectual Muſick and Harmony.

16. BUT I ſhall yet further illuſtrate this Buſineſs, that the Mind may Actively Comprehend more in the outward Objects of Senſe, and by occaſion of them, than is paſſively received and impreſſed from them, by another Inſtance. Suppoſe a learned written or printed Volume, held before the Eye of a Brute-Creature or illiterate Perſon; either of them will paſſively receive all that is impreſſed upon Senſe from thoſe Delineations; to whom there will

will be nothing but ſeveral Scrawls or Lines of Ink drawn upon White Paper. But if a Man that hath inward Anticipations of Learning in him, look upon them, He will immediately have another Comprehenſion of them than that of Senſe, and a ſtrange Scene of Thoughts preſently repreſented to his Mind from them; he will ſee Heaven, Earth, Sun, Moon and Stars, Comets, Meteors, Elements, in thoſe Inky Delineations; he will read profound Theorems of Philoſophy, Geometry, Aſtronomy in them; learn a great deal of new Knowledge from them that he never underſtood before, and thereby juſtly admire the Wiſdom of the Compoſer of them: Not that all this was paſſively ſtamped upon his Soul by Senſe from thoſe Characters; for Senſe, as I ſaid before, can perceive nothing here but Inky Scrawls, and the intelligent Reader will many times Correct his Copy, finding *Errata's* in it; but becauſe his Mind was before furniſhed with Certain inward Anticipations, that ſuch Characters ſignify the Elements of certain Sounds, thoſe Sounds, certain Notions or Cogitations of the Mind; and becauſe he hath an Active Power of Exciting any ſuch Cogitations within himſelf, he reads in thoſe ſenſible Delineations, the

Paſſive

Paſſive Stamps or Prints of another Man's Wiſdom or Knowledge upon them, and alſo learns Knowledge and Inſtruction from them, not as infuſed into his Mind from thoſe ſenſible Characters, but by reaſon of thoſe Hints and Significations thereby Propoſed to it, accidentally kindled, awakened and excited in it: For all but the Phantaſms of black Inky Strokes and Figures, ariſes from the Inward Activity of his own Mind: Wherefore this Inſtance in it ſelf ſhews, how the Activity of the Mind may Comprehend more in and from ſenſible Objects, than is paſſively imprinted by them upon Senſe.

But now, in the Room of this Artificial Book in Volumes, let us Subſtitute the Book of Nature, the whole Viſible and Material Univerſe, printed all over with the Paſſive Characters and Impreſſions of Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs, but legible only to an Intellectual Eye; for to the Senſe both of Man and Brute, there appears nothing elſe in it but as in the other, ſo many Inky Scrawls, *i. e.* nothing but Figures and Colours; but the Mind or Intellect, which hath an Inward and Active Participation of the ſame Divine Wiſdom that made it; and being printed all over with the ſame Archetypal

pal Seal, upon occaſion of thoſe ſenſible Delineations repreſented to it, and taking notice of whatſoever is cognate to it, Exerting its own Inward Activity from thence, will not have only a Wonderful Scene and large Proſpect of other Thoughts laid open before it, and Variety of Knowledge, Logical, Mathematical, Metaphyſical, Moral diſplayed; but alſo clearly Read the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs, in every Page of this great Volume, as it were written in large and legible Characters,

BOOK IV.

CHAP. III.

1. E have hitherto ſhewed, that there are many Ideas of the Mind, which, though the Cogitations of them be often occaſionally invited from the Motion or Appulſe of Senſible Objects without made upon our Bodies; yet notwithſtanding the Ideas themſelves could not poſſibly be ſtamped or Impreſſed upon the Soul from them, becauſe Senſe takes no Cognizance at all of any ſuch Things in thoſe Corporeal Objects, and therefore they muſt needs ariſe from the Innate Vigour and Activity of the Mind it ſelf. Such as are, *Firſt*, the Relative Ideas of the ſeveral *Schoſes* or Reſpects which

which are betwixt Corporeal Things themſelves compared with one another. Which Relative Ideas being not Comprehended by Senſe, and yet notwithſtanding, the Natures of all Compounded Corporeal Things, whether Artificial or Natural, that is, whether made by the Artifice of Men or Nature, Conſiſting of them, We have demonſtratively proved from thence, that the Natures of no Compounded Corporeal Things can poſſibly be Known or Comprehended by Senſe. And again, the Ideas of Cogitative Beings, and the ſeveral Modes of them, together with all ſuch Notions as involve ſome Reſpect or Relation to them. For although theſe alſo be often occaſionally invited and Elicited by the Objects of Senſe, when the Mind, in the Contemplation of them by its own Active Strength, perceives the Signatures of Art, Counſels, Contrivance, Wiſdom, nay, and Goodneſs alſo, (all which are Modes of Cogitative Beings) printed upon them; yet they cannot owe their Being or Efficiency to the Activity of thoſe Outward Objects, but meerly to the Activity of the Mind it ſelf.

I Should now proceed to ſhew, that Even thoſe ſimple Corporeal Things themſelves, which by Senſe we have a Paſſive Perception

ception of, in Individual Bodies without us, are alſo known and underſtood by the Active Power of the Mind Exerting its own Intelligible Ideas upon them.

2. THAT Senſation is not Knowledge of thoſe Corporeal Things that we ſenſibly perceive, we have before largely ſhewed; and indeed it ſufficiently appears from hence, becauſe upon the Seeing of Light and Colours, though never ſo clearly, the Feeling of Heat and Cold ſmartly, the Hearing of loud Sounds and Noiſes, we naturally enquire further, What this Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, and Sounds are, which is an undoubted Acknowledgement that we have not a Clear and Satisfactory Comprehenſion of thoſe Things which make ſo ſtrong a Stroke and Impreſſion upon our Senſes; and therefore the Mind deſires to Maſter and Conquer them by its Own Active Strength and Power, and to Comprehend them by ſome Ideas of its own, which are not Foreign, but Native, Domeſtick and Intrinſical to it.

NOW if Senſe it ſelf be not Knowledge, much leſs can any Secondary or Derivative Reſult from Senſe be Knowledge; for this would be a more Obſcure, Shadowy and Evanid Thing than Senſe it ſelf is. As when

the Image of a Man's Face, received in a Mirror or Looking-glaſs, is reflected from thence into a Second Mirror, and ſo forward to a Third; ſtill the further it goes, the more Obſcure, Confuſed and imperfect it grows, till at laſt it becomes altogether imperceptible. Or as in the Circlings and Undulations of Water, cauſed by the falling of a Stone into it, that are ſucceſſively propagated from one to another; the further and wider they go, the Waves are ſtill the leſs, ſlower and weaker, till at length they become quite undiſcernable. Or as a Secondary Echo, that is, the Echo of an Echo, falls as much ſhort of the Primary Echo in Proportion, as that doth of the Original Voice. Or, *Laſtly*, If we could ſuppoſe a Shadow to caſt a Shadow, this Secondary Shadow, or Projection of a Shadow, would fall as much ſhort of the Primary Shadow, as that did of the Subſtance it ſelf. So if the Knowledge of Corporeal Things were but a Secondary and Derivative Reſult from Senſe, (though it cannot be conceived that the Paſſion of Senſe ſhould ray upon the Intellect, ſo as to beget a Secondary Paſſion there, any more than one Shadow ſhould caſt another) then Knowledge would be much a weaker Perception of them than Senſe it ſelf is,

is, and nothing but as it were the Secondary Reflection of an Image, or the Remote Circlings and Undulations of the fluid Water, or the meer Echo of the Echo of an Original Voice: Or, *Laſtly*, nothing but the Shadow of the Shadow of a Subſtance. Whereas it is a far more real, ſubſtantial and ſatisfactory, more penetrative and comprehenſive Perception than Senſe is, reaching to the Very Inward Eſſence of the Things perceived. And therefore it muſt of Neceſſity proceed from the Active Power of the Mind it ſelf, exerting its own Intelligible Ideas upon that which is Paſſively perceived, and ſo comprehending it by ſomething of its own that is Native and Domeſtick to it. So that beſides the [a] *Senſations* or [b] *Phantaſms*, the Senſible Ideas of Corporeal Things paſſively impreſſed upon us from without, there muſt be alſo [c] *Conceptions*, or Intelligible Ideas of them Actively Exerted from the Mind it ſelf; or otherwiſe they could never be Underſtood.

3. WHEREFORE, that we may the better illuſtrate this Buſineſs, let us ſuppoſe ſome Individual Body; as for Example, a White

[a] Αἰσθήματα. [b] Φαντάσματα. [c] Νοήματα.

or

or Black Triangular Superficies, or a Solid [d] *Four-Square* included all within a Triangular Superficies, expoſed firſt to the View of Senſe or a Living Eye; and then afterward conſidered by the Intellect, that we may ſee the Difference betwixt the Paſſive Perception of it by Senſe, and the Active Comprehenſion of it by the Underſtanding. Now Senſe, that is a Living Eye or Mirror, as ſoon as ever it is Converted toward this Object, will here Paſſively perceive an Appearance of an Individual Thing, as exiſting without it, White and Triangular, without any Diſtinction Concretely and Confuſedly together; and it will perceive no more than this, though it dwell never ſo long upon this Object; for it perceives no more than is impreſſed upon it; and here the Paſſion of Senſe ends and goes no further. But the Mind or Intellect reſiding in the ſame Soul that hath a Power of Senſation alſo, then beginning to make a Judgment upon that which is thus Paſſively perceived, Exerts its own Innate Vigour and Activity, and diſplays it ſelf gradually after this manner. For, *Firſt*, with its ſubtle Diviſive Power, it will Analyſe and reſolve this Con-

[d] Tetrahedrum.

crete Phantaſmatical [e] *Whole*, and take Notice of ſeveral diſtinct Intellectual Objects in it. For Conſidering that every White or Black Thing is not neceſſarily Triangular, nor every Triangular Thing White or Black, it finds here two diſtinct Intellectual Objects; the one White, the other Triangular: And then again, becauſe that which is Nothing can have no Affections, it concludes, that here is ſomething as a Common [f] *Subject* to both theſe Affections or Modifications, which it calls a Corporeal Subſtance; which being one and the ſame Thing, is here both White and Triangular. Wherefore it finds at leaſt three diſtinct Objects of Intellectual Cogitation, Corporeal Subſtance, White, and Triangular, all Individual. But then reflecting again upon theſe ſeveral Objects, and that it may further enquire into the Natures and Eſſences of them, it now bids adieu to Senſe and Singularity; and taking an higher Flight, conſiders them all Univerſally and abſtractly from Individuating Circumſtances and Matter. That is, it no more ſeeks the Knowledge and Comprehenſion of theſe Things without it ſelf, from whence it hath already paſſively per-

[e] Totum. [f] Subſtratum.

ceived

ceived them by Senſe; but revolving within it ſelf upon its own Inward Notions and Active Anticipations (which muſt needs be univerſal) it looks for ſome Domeſtick Ideas of its own to underſtand theſe General Natures by, that ſo from thence with a Deſcending View it may comprehend under them thoſe Invididuals that now affect the Senſe.

4. First therefore, for Corporeal Subſtance in general, which is the [g] *Subject* both of Colour and Figure, not to purſue any long and tedious Proceſſes, it quickly concludes the Eſſence of it to be this; A Thing Extended Impenetrably, or which hath impenetrable Longitude, Latitude and Profundity: And becauſe it is not here Conſidered meerly as a Notion or Objective Cogitation, but as a Thing actually exiſting without the Mind, therefore it exerts another [h] *Notion* of Exiſtence or Singularity alſo; which added to the former, makes it up a Thing that hath Impenetrable Extenſion Exiſting. Now none of theſe Ideas, neither of Eſſence nor Exiſtence, nor Thing, nor Subſtance, nor Something nor Nothing; nor Impenetrability nor Extenſion, nor Longitude, Latitude and Profundity,

[g] Subſtratum. [h] Ratio.

were Impreſſed or ſtamped upon the Mind, either from this Individual, or any other ſenſible Object; for they can be neither ſeen nor perceived by any Corporeal Senſe; but are meerly excited from the Innate Activity of the Mind it ſelf, that ſame Power by which the Mind is enabled to Conceive of [i] *Nothing* as well as [k] *Something*; And certain it is that the Idea of *Nothing* was never impreſſed from any Thing. And if the Eſſence of Body, or Corporeal Subſtance it ſelf, be only comprehended and underſtood by the Active Ideas of the Mind, (for Senſe here perceived no ſuch Thing, but only was affected from the Etxeriour Induments thereof, Colour and Figure) then the ſeveral Modes of it, ſuch as Whiteneſs and Triangularity, which are but certain Modes of an Extended Subſtance, muſt needs be Underſtood in like manner, not by Paſſive Ideas and Phantaſms, but the Noematical or Intelligible Ideas of the Mind.

5. WHEREFORE in the next place, as for White Colour or Whiteneſs, here is a Plain and Palpable Difference betwixt Senſe and Intellection; betwixt the [l] *Phantaſm* and [m] *Con-*

[i] Nihil. [k] Aliquid.
[l] Φάντασμα. [m] Νόημα.

ception,

ception, betwixt a Senſible and Intelligible Idea; For the Senſe or Phantaſm of White, that we have from the Individual Object, is no clear Comprehenſion of any Eſſence or Intelligible [n] *Notion*; but only a Paſſion or Affection in the Soul, Cauſed by ſome Local Motions communicated to the Brain from the Object without, that is, a Drowſy, Confuſed and imperfect Perceptive Cogitation; But now the awakened Mind or Intellect revolving its own Inward Ideas, and being not able to Comprehend any ſuch Mode or Quality in extended Subſtance, as this Senſible Idea of White is, formally conſidered; for this very Reaſon, boldly and confidently concludes that this is no Real Quality in that Body it ſelf abſolutely conſidered, becauſe no ſuch Thing is Intelligible by it; in which Opinion, it is confirmed by Senſe it ſelf, in that the lower Ends of the Rainbow that reach to the Earth do not Stain or Dye any Thing with the ſeveral Colours of it; and that the ſame Drops of Dew or Rain to Eyes at ſeveral Diſtances, have all thoſe ſeveral Colours of the Rainbow in them, and none at all: And by other Experiments it appears that theſe Things are only Paſſions or Affections in the Sentient it ſelf,

[n] Ratio.

Caused by some Peculiar Modification of the Superficies of that Material Object in respect of the Figure, Site and Disposition of its Insensible Parts, whereby the Light or Intermediate [o] *Globulous Particles*, are in a Peculiar manner reflected upon the Eye, and that probably the Difference betwixt a White and a Black Object consists in this, that in one the small Particles are Polite and Solid, and therefore vividly reflect the Lighter [p] *Globulous Particles*; but in the other being differently disposed, the Light, as a Ball flung against an Heap of Sand, is not so smartly reflected from it, but as it were sinks into it, and its Motion is stifled and smothered in the Caverns of it. Wherefore the Intelligible Idea of a White Colour is this, that it is a certain Passion or Sense in the Soul, Caused by a Peculiar Modification of the Object without, in respect of the Disposition of its insensible Parts, whereby the Light or [q] *Globulous Particles* are more smartly and vividly reflected upon the Eye; Which is another kind of Comprehension of it, than the Sensible Idea or Phantasm of White is, which is no Intelligible Idea, but a Cogita-

[o] Globuli. [p] Globuli. [q] Globuli.

tive

tive Paſſion; that is, another Species of Cogitation, or an half awakened Perception. Neither are theſe Intelligible Ideas of Paſſion and Senſe Impreſſed upon the Soul from the Senſible Objects without; for the Eye ſees neither Paſſion nor Senſe, but they are actively exerted from the Mind it ſelf, and therefore Maſtered and Conquered, and Comprehended by it.

6. I NOW proceed to the laſt Intellectual Object Comprehended in this Individual Body, which is Triangularity, or ſome one Particular Species of a Triangle; as for Example, an Equilateral, or a Rectangular Triangle; For there can be no Individual Triangle but muſt be of one Determinate Species or another.

NOW becauſe the Phantaſm of ſuch a Triangle doth not only bear a Reſemblance of the Outward Material Object, which the Phantaſms of Colours and the like do not, but alſo of the True Intelligible Idea of a Triangle it ſelf; and becauſe when Men think never ſo abſtractly and Mathematically of a Triangle, they have Commonly ſome rude Phantaſm or Picture of it before them in their Imagination, Therefore many confidently perſwade themſelves, that there is no other Idea of a Triangle or other Figure, be-

ſide the bare Phantaſm or Senſible Idea impreſſed upon the Soul from ſome Individual Object without; that is, No active Noematical Idea inwardly exerted from the Mind it ſelf. Which indeed is all one as to ſay, that there is no Intellection or Knowledge of a Triangle at all; for as much as neither Senſe nor Fancy, which are but Superficial, imperfect and Incomplete Perceptive Cogitations, reach to the Comprehenſion of the [r] *Notion* or Eſſence of any Thing. Wherefore now to make the Contrary appear, we will again view this Material Triangle, or [s] *Four-Square* before our Eyes, making a nearer Approach to it; and upon this ſecond Contemplation of it, we plainly obſerve much Inequality in the Superficies, Unevenneſs and Inequality in the Lines, and Bluntneſs in the Angles. From whence it evidently appears that that Idea that we had in our Minds of a Perfect Triangle, as a Plain Superficies terminated by three ſtraight Lines joyned together in three Angles, ending in ſo many Points, was not impreſſed upon our Soul from this Individual Object, it being different from it, and far more Exact and Perfect than that is. And there-

[r] Ratio. [s] Tetrahedrum.

fore

fore it must needs be granted that it was but occasionally or accidentally invited and drawn forth from the Mind, upon the Sight of it, just in the same manner as when a Man looks upon Certain Lines drawn with Ink upon a piece of Paper something resembling the Face of a Man, his Mind doth not fix and stay it self in the Consideration of those Inky Lines; but presently upon this occasion excites within it self the Idea of a Man's Face. Or when a Man walking in a Gallery where there are divers Pictures hung upon the Wall, chances amongst them to espy the Picture of a Friend or Acquaintance of his, which, though perhaps far from an exact Resemblance, yet notwithstanding makes him presently to excite the Idea of his Friend in his Imagination. Neither of which Things could possibly be, if there had not been a Previous and præexistent Idea of a Man's Face, or such a Certain Friend in his Mind before; for otherwise a Man in this Case could think of nothing but just that that was impressed upon him by Sense, The Figures of those Inky Delineations, and those several Strokes and Shadows of the Pictures. In like manner, when we look upon the Rude, Imperfect and Irregular Figures of some Corporeal Things, the Mind upon

upon this Occaſion excites from within it ſelf the Ideas of a Perfect Triangle, Square, Circle, Pyramid, Cube, Sphere, and the like, Whoſe Eſſences are ſo indiviſible, that they are not Capable of the leaſt Additions, Detraction or Variation without the Deſtruction of them, becauſe there was ſome Rude and Bungling Reſemblance of theſe Regular Figures in thoſe Material Objects that we look upon, of which probably the Maker had the Ideas in his Mind. And the Mind Naturally delights more to think of Simple and Regular, than of Compounded and Irregular Figures.

7. But if any one ſhould here object and ſay, that it doth not follow from hence, that that more Perfect Idea which Now I have of a Triangle in my Mind, the Accuracy whereof this preſent Viſible Idea before my Eyes doth not reach unto, was actively excited from the Mind it ſelf; becauſe it might be ſome time formerly impreſſed, from ſome other Individual Triangle which I had elſewhere ſeen; juſt in the ſame manner as when I looked upon a Picture, that Idea of a Man's Face in general, or of that particular Friend, that was occaſionally excited thereby, was not any Innate Idea, or an Idea that ſprung wholly

wholly from the Activity of the Mind, but was formerly impreſſed upon the Soul, from Individual Senſible Objects now remembered or called to Mind: I ſay, that this cannot poſſibly be true, becauſe there never was any Material or Senſible ſtraight Line, Triangle, Circle, that we ſaw in all our Lives, that was Mathematically exact, but even Senſe it ſelf, at leaſt by the Help of Microſcopes, might plainly diſcover much Unevenneſs, Ruggedneſs, Flexuoſity, Anguloſity, Irregularity and Deformity in them, as will appear to any one that ſhall make a Triangle upon the moſt accurate Lines that the Wit or Art of Man can make; and therefore no Material Line could ſtamp or Impreſs upon the Soul in a meer Paſſive Way thoſe exact Ideas that we now have of a Triangle or of a ſtraight Line, which is the ſhorteſt poſſible between two Points, or a Circle that is every where Equidiſtant from an Individual Center, *&c.* And if it ſhould be again replied, that notwithſtanding there being many ſuch Lines and Circles as Common Senſe cannot diſcern the leaſt Irregularity in them, howſoever they would be in the mean time really irregular to a Perfect and *Lyncean* Sight; yet, according to their Appearance, might

might impreſs thoſe Ideas that we have of a ſtraight Line or Circle; I anſwer, that this cannot be neither, there being a Vaſt Difference betwixt the Confuſed Indiſtinction of Senſe and Fancy, by reaſon of their Bluntneſs and Imperfection, and the Expreſs Accuracy, Preciſeneſs and Indiviſibility of thoſe Intelligible Ideas that we have of a ſtraight Line, Circle, Triangle, [t] *Four-Square*, and other Geometrical Figures; and therefore that imperfect, Confuſed Indiſtinction of Senſe, could never impreſs any ſuch accurate Ideas upon the Mind, but only occaſion the Mind Actively to exert them from within it ſelf.

8. NAY, though it ſhould be granted, that there were Material Lines Mathematically Exact, Perfect Triangles, Squares, Pyramids, Cubes, Spheres, and the like, ſuch as Geometry ſuppoſes, as no doubt but the Divine Power can make ſuch in fitting Matter; yet Senſe could not at all reach to the diſcerning of the Mathematical Accuracy of theſe Things, no more than it doth to the Abſolute Equality of any Quantities; as of Lines, Superficies, Bodies, Angles, which is

[t] Tetrahedrum.

found

found and determined only by the Understanding, in that [u] *Intelligible Matter* which Geometry is conversant about. So that Sense could not be able to determine, what Triangle and what [x] *Four-Square* was Mathematically exact, and what not. From whence it is demonstrably Evident, that neither the [y] *Notion* of Perfect Equality, nor the Perfect Mathematical Ideas of Figures, Triangle, Square, Circle, Pyramid, Cube, Sphere, *&c.* were impressed upon the Soul from without by Sense; Sense not at all reaching to the Discernment of them.

9. But, *Lastly*, if there were Material Lines, Triangles, Pyramids, perfectly and Mechanically Exact; yet that which made them such, and thereby to differ from other Irregular Lines, imperfect Triangles and Cubes, could be nothing else but a Conformity to an antecedent Intellectual Idea in the Mind, as the Rule and Exemplar of them; for Otherwise an Irregular Line and an Imperfect Triangle, Pyramid, Cube, are as perfectly that that they are, as the other is; only they are not agreeable to those anticipated and pre-conceived Ideas of Regular Lines and Figures actively

2

[u] Materia Intelligibilis.
[x] Tetrahedrum. [y] Ratio.

exerted

exerted in the Mind or Intellect, which the Mind Naturally formeth to it self, and delighteth to Exercise it self upon them, as the Proper Object of Art and Science, which the other Irregular Figures are not. Wherefore whenever a Man looking upon Material Objects judges of the Figures of them, and says this is a straight Line, this is a Perfect Triangle, that a Perfect Circle, but those are neither Perfect Triangles nor Circles; it is plain that here are two several Ideas of these Lines and Figures; The one outwardly impressed from those Individual Material Objects from without upon the Sense of the Beholder; the other Actively Exerted from his Inward Mind or Intellect. Which Latter busy Anticipation of it is the Rule, Pattern and Exemplar, whereby he judges of those Sensible Ideas or Phantasms. For otherwise, if there were no inward Anticipations or Mental Ideas, the Spectator would not judge at all, but only Suffer; and every Irregular and Imperfect Triangle being as perfectly that which it is, as the most perfect Triangle, the Mind now having no inward Pattern of its own before it, to distinguish and put a Difference, would not say one of them was more imperfect than another; but only comparing them with one

another, would ſay that this Individual Figure was not perfectly like to that; upon which Account the Perfect Triangle would be as Imperfectly the Imperfect Triangle, as the Imperfect was the Perfect.

10. WHEREFORE, as I ſaid before, this is juſt in the ſame Manner, as when a Man looks upon the Picture of an abſent Friend or Familiar Acquaintance, and preſently judges of it, he hath plainly two ſeveral Ideas in his Mind at the ſame Time; One Outwardly impreſſed from the preſent Picture, the other Pre-exiſtent in his Mind before; by one of which, as the Pattern or Exemplar, he makes a Judgment upon the other, and finds many Faults in it; ſaving, that here both the Ideas were Foreign and adventitious, the Pre-exiſtent Idea having been ſome time formerly impreſſed from an outward Material Object, and thence retained in the Memory or Fancy; but in the other Caſe, when a Man looking upon a Material Triangle, Square, Circle, Cube, Sphere, in which there are ſome palpable Irregularities; which he judges of by comparing them with ſome inward pre-exiſtent Ideas that he hath in his Mind of a perfect Individual Triangle, Square, Circle, Cube; and alſo conceives ſome Diſ-

like

like and Diſpleaſure at the Diſconformity of the one to the other: The Pre-exiſtent Ideas here were no foreign or adventitious Things, but native and domeſtick to him, nor at any Time formerly paſſively received from any Material Objects without, but actively exerted from the Mind it ſelf. And I think there is no doubt to be made but if a perfect adult Man, that was immediately framed out of the Earth, having a newly Created Soul infuſed, as the *Protoplaſt* had, ſhould look upon two ſeveral Kinds of Objects at the ſame time, whereof one was a Perfect Circle or Sphere, Equilateral Triangle, [z] *Four-Square*, Square or Cube; the other having ſome Reſemblances of the ſame, had notwithſtanding apparent Irregularity in ſome Parts of them; but that at firſt Sight, he would be more pleaſed with the one than with the other; which could not be, unleſs he had ſome Native or Active Idea of his own within himſelf, to compare them both with, to which one was more conformable than the other. For there could be no ſuch Thing as Pulcritude and Deformity in Material Objects, if there were no Active Power in the Soul of Framing

[z] Tetrahedrum.

Ideas

Ideas of Regular, Proportionate and Symmetrical Figures within it self, by which it might put a Difference between outward Objects, and make a Judgement of them; but that it only received Stamps and Impreſſions from without, for then it muſt needs be equally or indifferently affected with all alike, and not more pleaſed or diſpleaſed with one than with another. Now the Judgement that Men have of Pulchritude and Deformity in Senſible Things, is not meerly Artificial, from Inſtitution or Inſtruction, or of taught Things, but ſuch as Springs originally from Nature it ſelf.

11. But that there is an Intelligible Idea of a Triangle inwardly exerted from the Mind it ſelf, diſtinct from the Phantaſm or Senſible Idea that is outwardly impreſſed from the Material Object, will yet further appear from that which follows; for the Mind reflecting further upon that Idea which it hath of a Triangle, conſiders firſt the Generical Nature of it, that it is a Plain Figure, and that a Plain Figure is the Termination of a Plain Superficies; which Superficies is nothing elſe but meer Latitude without Profundity: For plain Figures are no otherwiſe conceived by Geometricians. Now it is certain that this Idea of

a Superficies, which Geometricians have, was never imprinted upon their Minds by Senſe from any Material Objects; there being no ſuch Thing any where exiſting without the Mind, as Latitude without Profundity. And therefore it muſt needs ariſe from the Activity of the Mind it ſelf. And the Idea of a Plain Superficies, that is, ſuch a Superficies as to all whoſe Parts a ſtraight Line may be accommodated, as well as the Idea of a ſtraight Line, muſt needs be actively excited from the Mind alſo. Again, it Conſiders the Difference betwixt a Triangle and other Plain Figures, that it is included in and Terminated by three ſtraight Lines joined together in three Points; which Straight Lines being the Extremities of a Superficies, are meer Longitude without either Profundity or Latitude; and which Points being the Extremities of thoſe Lines, have neither Longitude, Latitude nor Profundity in them. Which Mathematical Ideas, in like manner, of a Line without Latitude and Profundity, and a Point without Longitude, Latitude and Profundity, were never impreſſed upon *Euclid*, or any other Geometrician from without, as is evident without further Proof. Moreover, this Intelligible Idea of a Triangle, as it includes ſome Numerical

merical Conſiderations in it, which Senſe hath no Idea of, perceiving only *One* and *One* and *One*; ſo therein Sides and Angles are relatively conſidered alſo to one another; Nay, the very Notion of an Angle, and the Quantity thereof, is a Relative Thing, as *Proclus* hath obſerved, and therefore not impreſſed by Senſe.

AGAIN, the Mind conſidering the Idea of its own, as it can find out the ſeveral Properties of a Triangle by meer Cogitation, without any Thing of Senſe; as that the Greater Side always Subtends the Greater Angle, nay, and that the three Angles are always equal to two Right Angles (as we ſhall ſhew afterwards) ſo it alſo, by its own Strength, is able to find out all the Species that are Poſſible in a Plain Triangle, in reſpect of the Differences both of Sides and Angles. As in reſpect of the Sides, that it is either Æquilateral or [a] *Even-legged*, or [b] *Having Unequal Sides*; of the Angles, that it is a [c] *Straight Cornered*, or [d] *Blunt Cornered*, or [e] *Sharp Cornered* Triangle, and that there can be no Individual Triangle but muſt of Neceſſity belong to one of the three Species of either Sort. So that

[a] Iſoſceles. [b] Scalenum. [c] Rectangulum.
[d] Amblygonium. [e] Ὀξυγώνιον.

this is not gathered from Senſe, but exerted from the Active Power of the Mind.

12. THE Mind can clearly underſtand a Triangle in General, without determining its Thought to any particular Species, and yet there can be no Diſtinct Phantaſm of any ſuch Thing; for Every diſtinct Phantaſm or Senſible Picture of a Triangle muſt of Neceſſity be either Equilateral or Equicrural, or Inequilateral, [f] *Uneven-legged.* And ſo as we can in like manner clearly underſtand in our Minds, [g] *a Thing with a Thouſand Corners*, or [h] *One with Ten thouſand Corners*, though we cannot poſſibly have a diſtinct Phantaſm of either of them. But for thoſe Particular Species of Triangles which we may have Diſtinct Phantaſms of, this doth not at all hinder but that we have, notwithſtanding, Intelligible Ideas of the ſame beſides, actively exerted from the Mind it ſelf. And ſo there is a [i] *Phantaſm* and a [k] *Conception* at the ſame time Concurring together, an Active and a Paſſive Cogitation. The [l] *Conception* or Intelligible Idea being as it were Embodied in the Phantaſm, which alone in it ſelf is but

[f] Scilenum. [g] Chiliogonum. [h] Myriogonum.
[i] Φάντασμα. [k] Νόημα. [l] Νόημα,

an Incomplete Perceptive Cogitation of the Soul half awakened, and doth not comprehend the Indiviſible and Immutable [m] *Notion* or Eſſence of any Thing.

WHICH Thing to thoſe that cannot better Underſtand it by what we have already declared, might be illuſtrated in this manner; When an Aſtronomer, thinking of the Sun, demonſtrates that it is 160 times bigger than the Globe of the Earth, he hath all the while a Phantaſm or Imagination of the Sun in his Mind, but as [n] *a Circle of a Foot Diameter*; nay, he cannot for his Life have a true Phantaſm of any ſuch Magnitude which contains the Bigneſs of the Earth ſo many times, nor indeed Fancy the Earth an hundredth Part ſo big as it is. Now, as the Aſtronomer hath an Intelligible Idea of the Magnitude of the Sun very different from the Phantaſm of the ſame, ſo in like manner have we Intelligible Ideas of Corporeal Things, when we underſtand them, beſides the Phantaſms of them. The Phantaſm being as it were [o] *the Craſſer Indument*, or Corporeal Vehicle of the [p] *Intelligible Idea* of the Mind.

[m] Ratio. [n] Ὥσπερ σχεδίαν.
[o] Involucrum. [p] Νόημα.

13. HITHERTO, by the Inſtance of an Individual and Material Triangle, we have ſhewed, how the Soul, in Underſtanding Corporeal Things, doth not meerly ſuffer from without from the Body, but Actively Exert Intelligible Ideas of its own, and from within it ſelf. Now I obſerve that it is ſo far from being true, that all our Objective Cogitations or Ideas are Corporeal Effluxes or Radiations from Corporeal Things without, or impreſſed upon the Soul from them in a groſs Corporeal Manner, as a Signature or Stamp is imprinted by a Seal upon a piece of Wax or Clay; that (as I have before hinted) this is not true ſometimes of the Senſible Ideas themſelves. For all Perception whatſoever is a Vital Energy, and not a Meer Dead Paſſion; and as the Atomical Philoſophy inſtructs us, there is nothing Communicated in Senſation from the Material Objects without, but only Certain Local Motions, that are propagated from them by the Nerves into the Brain; which Motions cannot propagate themſelves Corporeally upon the Soul alſo, becauſe it penetrates and runs through all the Parts of its own Body. But the Soul, by reaſon of that Vital and Magical Union which is between it and the Body, ſympathizing with the ſeveral Motions

Motions of it in the Brain, doth thereupon exert Senſible Ideas or Phantaſms within it ſelf, whereby it perceives or takes Notice of Objects Diſtant from the Brain, either within or without the Body. Many of which Sentiments and Phantaſms have no Similitude at all, either with thoſe Local Motions made in the Brain, or with the Objects without; ſuch as are the Sentiments of Pain, Pleaſure, and Titillation, Hunger, Thirſt, Heat and Cold, Sweet and Bitter, Light and Colours, *&c.* Wherefore the Truth is, that Senſe, if we well conſider it, is but a kind of [q] *Speech*, (if I may ſo call it) Nature as it were talking to us in the Senſible Objects Without, by certain Motions as Signs from thence Communicated to the Brain. For, as in Speech, when Men talk to one another, they do but make Certain Motions upon the Air, which cannot Impreſs their Thoughts upon one another in a Paſſive manner; but it being firſt conſented to and agreed upon, that ſuch certain Sounds ſhall ſignify ſuch Ideas and Cogitations, he that hears thoſe Sounds in Diſcourſe, doth not fix his Thoughts upon the Sounds themſelves, but preſently Exerts from within him-

[q] Loquela.

ſelf ſuch Ideas and Cogitations as thoſe Sounds by Conſent ſignify, though there be no Similitude at all betwixt thoſe Sounds and Thoughts. Juſt in the ſame manner Nature doth as it were talk to us in the Outward Objects of Senſe, and import Various Sentiments, Ideas, Phantaſms, and Cogitations, not by ſtamping or impreſſing them paſſively upon the Soul from without, but only by certain Local Motions from them, as it were dumb Signs made in the Brain; It having been firſt Conſtituted and Appointed by Nature's Law, that ſuch Local Motions ſhall ſignify ſuch Senſible Ideas and Phantaſms, though there be no Similitude at all betwixt them; for what Similitude can there be betwixt any Local Motions and the Senſes of Pain or Hunger, and the like, as there is no Similitude betwixt many Words and Sounds, and the Thoughts which they ſignify. But the Soul, as by a certain ſecret Inſtinct, [r] *and as it were by Compact*, underſtanding Nature's Language, as ſoon as theſe Local Motions are made in the Brain, doth not fix its Attention immediately upon thoſe Motions themſelves, as we do not uſe to do in Diſcourſe upon meer Sounds, but preſently

[r] Et tanquam ex compacto.

exerts such Sensible Ideas, Phantasms and Cogitations, as Nature hath made them to be Signs of, whereby it perceives and takes Cognizance of many other Things both in its own Body, and without it, at a Distance from it, In order to the Good and Conservation of it. Wherefore there are two kinds of Perceptive Powers in the Soul, one below another; The first is that which belongs to the Inferiour Part of the Soul, whereby it sympathizes with the Body, which is determined by the several Motions and Pressures that are made upon that from Corporeal Things without to several Sensitive and Phantastical Energies, whereby it hath a Slight and Superficial Perception of Individual Corporeal Things, and as it were of the Outsides of them, but doth not reach to the Comprehension of the Essence or Indivisible and Immutable [s] *Notion* of any thing. The Second Perceptive Power is that of the Soul it self, or that Superiour, Interiour Noetical Part of it which is [t] *free from Passion or Sympathy*, free and disentangled from all that Magical Sympathy with the Body. Which acting alone by it self, Exerts from within the In-

[s] Ratio. [t] Ἀπαθὴς, ἀσυμπαθὴς.

telligible

telligible Ideas of Things, Virtually Contained in its own Cognoſcitive Power, that are Univerſal and Abſtract [u] *Notions*, from which, [x] *as it were looking downward* it comprehends Individual Things. Now becauſe theſe latter, which are pure Active Energies of the Soul, are many times exerted upon occaſion of thoſe other Paſſive or Sympathetical Perceptions of Individual Things anteceding; it is therefore conceived by many, that they are nothing elſe but thin and Evanid Images of thoſe Senſible Ideas, and therefore that all Intellection and Knowledge aſcends from Senſe, and Intellection is nothing but the Improvement or Reſult of Senſe. Yet notwithſtanding it is moſt certainly true, that they proceed from a quite different Power of the Soul, whereby it actively protrudes its own Immediate Objects from within it ſelf, and Comprehends Individuals without it, not Paſſively or conſequentially, but as it were Proleptically, and not with an Aſcending, but with a Deſcending Perception; whereby the Mind firſt reflecting upon it ſelf, and its own Ideas, virtually contained in its own Omniform Cognoſcitive Power, and thence de-

[u] Rationes. [x] Tanquam deſuper ſpectans.

ſcending

ſcending downward, comprehends Individual Things under them. So that Knowledge doth not begin in Individuals, but end in them. And therefore they are but the Secondary Objects of Intellection, the Soul taking its firſt Riſe from within it ſelf, and ſo by its own inward Cognoſcitive Power comprehending Things without it. Elſe how ſhould God have Knowledge? And if we know as God knows, then do we know or gain Knowledge by Univerſals. In which Senſe (though not in that other of *Protagoras*) the Soul may be truly ſaid to be the Meaſure of all Things.

Now I ſay, if the very Senſible Ideas and Phantaſms themſelves, be not meer Stamps or Impreſſions from Individual Things without in a Corporeal Manner impreſſed upon the Soul, but Active, though Sympathetical Energies of the Soul it ſelf: It is much more impoſſible that the Univerſal and abſtract Intelligible Ideas of the Mind, or Eſſences of Things, ſhould be meer Stamps or Signatures impreſſed upon the Soul, as upon a Dead Thing in a groſs Corporeal manner.

14. Wherefore here is a Double Errour committed by Vulgar Philoſophers; *Firſt*, That they make the Senſible Ideas and Phantaſms to be totally impreſſed from without in

a groſs corporeal Manner upon the Soul, as it were upon a dead Thing; and, *Secondly*, That then they ſuppoſe the Intelligible Ideas, the Abſtract and Univerſal Notions of the Mind, to be made out of theſe Senſible Ideas and Phantaſms thus impreſſed from without in a Corporeal Manner likewiſe by Abſtraction or Separation of the Individuating Circumſtances, as it were by the hewing off certain Chips from them, or by hammering, beating or anvelling of them out into thin Intelligible Ideas; as if Solid and Maſſy Gold ſhould be beaten out into thin Leaf-Gold. To which Purpoſe they have ingeniouſly contrived and ſet up an [y] *Active Underſtanding*, like a Smith or Carpenter, with his Shop or Forge in the Brain, furniſhed with all neceſſary Tools and Inſtruments for ſuch a Work. Where I would only demand of theſe Philoſophers, Whether this their ſo expert [z] *Smith* or Architect, [a] *the Active Underſtanding*, when he goes about his Work, doth know what he is to do with theſe Phantaſms before-hand, what he is to make of them, and unto what Shape to bring them? If he do not, he muſt needs

[y] Intellectus Agens.
[z] Faber. [a] Intellectus Agens.

be

be a bungling Workman; but if he do, he is prevented in his Design and Undertaking, his Work being done already to his Hand; for he must needs have the Intelligible Idea of that which he knows or Understands already within himself; and therefore now to what Purpose should he use his Tools, and go about to hew and hammer and anvil out these Phantasms into thin and subtle Intelligible Ideas, meerly to make that which he hath already, and which was Native and Domestick to him?

But this Opinion is founded in no less a Mistake of *Aristotle*'s Text concerning the [b] *Active Understanding*, who never dreamt of any such as these Men imagine, if we may believe the *Greek* Scholiasts, that best understood him; than it is of the Text of Nature; as if not only those Phantasms, but also the Intelligible Ideas themselves, were gross and corporeal Things impressed from Matter; whereas even the first of these are Passive Energies of the Soul it self, fatally united to some Local Motions in the Body, and Concurrently produced with them, by reason of that Magical Union betwixt the

[b] Intellectus Agens.

Soul

Soul and Body; but the other are the Pure Active Energies of the Mind it self, as free from Corporeal Sympathy. Neither can these Latter be made out of the Former by any Abstraction or Separation, no nor by any Depinxation or Chymical Distillation or Sublimation neither; for it is a Thing utterly impossible that Vigour, Activity and awakened Energy, as Intellections are, should be raised out of Dull, Sluggish and Drowsy Passion or Sympathy. And this Opinion is but like that other of the same Philosopher's, Concerning the Eduction or Raising of Substantial and Immaterial Forms out of the Passive Matter, Both of them proceeding from one and the same Sottishness of Mind that induces them to think that Dull, Stupid and Senseless Matter, is the first Original Source of all Activity and Perfection, all Form and Pulchritude, all Wisdom and Knowledge in the World.

And Things being rightly considered, this Opinion doth in Truth and Reality, attribute as much Activity to the Soul, that saith it hath a Power of raising or educing of Intelligible Ideas or Universal and Abstract [c] *Notions* out of Phantasms, as that other that af-

[c] Rationes.

firms

firms it hath a Power of exerting them from it ſelf; as it would attribute as much Activity to the Sun to ſay that he had a Power of raiſing or educing Light or the Day out of Night and Darkneſs, as to ſay that he had a Power of exerting it out of his own Body.

15. WHEREFORE others of this Kind of Philoſophers, that will not acknowledge any Immaterial Subſtance, that hath any Active Power of its own in it, or any thing in the Soul beſides Impreſſion from Corporeal Objects Without, Have found out another Device, and that is this, Plainly to deny that there are any Univerſal Notions, Ideas or [d] *Reaſons* in the Mind at all; But that thoſe Things which are called Univerſal, are nothing elſe but Names applied to ſeveral Individuals. Which Opinion, as it was formerly held by thoſe that were therefore called [e] *Nominaliſts*; ſo it hath been lately revived and taken up by ſome of theſe Strenuous Impugners of Immaterial and Incorporeal Subſtances. *There is nothing in the World* (ſaith a late Author) Univerſal, but Names; for the Things Named are Every one of them Individual and Singular. Now indeed this

[d] Rationes. [e] Nominales.

is

is true, and no Body denies it, of Things existing without the Mind; but this Author's Meaning herein is to deny all Universal [f] *Conceptions* and [g] *Reasonings* of the Mind, as appears by his larger Explication of the same Opinion elsewhere. [h] *This Universal is the Name, not of any Thing Existing in the Nature of Things, nor of any Idea or Phantasm formed in the Mind, but always the Name of some Word or Name; so that when an Animal or a Stone, or a Spectre, or any thing else is said to be Universal, it is to be understood only that those Words Animal, Stone, are universal Names, that is, Names Common to more Things; and the Conceptions answering to them in the Mind, are the Images and Phantasms of Singular Ani-*

[f] Conceptus. [g] Rationes.

[h] Est Nomen hoc Universale non Rei Alicujus Existentis in Rerum Naturâ, neque Ideæ sive Phantasmatis alicujus in Animo formati, sed alicujus semper Vocis sive Nominis Nomen, ita ut cum dicatur Animal vel Saxum, vel Spectrum, vel aliud quicquam esse Universale, intelligendum sit tantum voces eas Animal, Saxum, esse Nomina Universalia, id est Nomina pluribus rebus communia, & respondentes ipsis in animo Conceptus sunt singularium Animalium vel aliarum rerum Imagines & Phantasmata. Ideoque non est opus ad vim Universalis Intelligendam aliâ facultate quàm Imaginativâ, quâ recordamur voces ejusmodi modo unam rem, modo aliam in animo excitâsse. *Elect. Philos.*

mals

mals or other Things. And therefore to understand the Meaning of an Universal, there is no need of any other Faculty than that of the Imagination, whereby we are minded that Words of that sort have sometimes excited one Thing, sometimes another in our Mind. That is, there are no other Ideas in the Mind but only Phantasms of Individual Corporeal Things: Only there are Universal Names, which are applied in Common to more Individuals than one; but there is no other Object of the Mind or Cogitation but only Singular and Individual Things existing without the Soul. Wherefore this Author Consentaneously hereunto defines Understanding to be nothing else but Conception Caused by Speech; and therefore if Speech be peculiar to Man, then is Understanding Peculiar to him also. This Mysterious Notion is insisted upon and explained likewise by the Third Objector against *Cartesius*'s Metaphysicks, after this Manner. [i] *Now what do we say, if*

[i] Quid jam dicimus si forte Ratiocinatio nihil aliud sit quam Copulatio & Concatenatio Nominum sive Appellationum per Verbum hoc Est. Unde Colligimus Ratione nihil omnino de Naturâ rerum sed de eorum appellationibus, nimirum utrum copulemus rerum nomina secundum pacta vel non. Si hoc sit, sicut esse potest, Ratiocinatio dependebit

perhaps Reaſoning be nothing elſe but the Coupling and Chaining together of Names or Appellations, by theſe Words, It Is. *Whence we gather nothing at all by Reaſon concerning the Nature of Things, but concerning their Appellations; to wit, whether we Joyn the Names of Things according to Agremeents or not. If this be ſo, as it may be, Reaſoning will depend upon Names, Names upon the Imagination, and the Imagination upon the Motion of the Bodily Organs; and ſo the Mind will be nothing elſe but a Motion in ſome Parts of the Body.* According to which Philoſophy, Reaſon and Science do not ſuperadd any Thing to Senſe, or reach any further in the Knowledge of the Nature of Things, but only in making uſe of Common Names to expreſs ſeveral Individuals by at once.

16. WHEREFORE, although there be already enough ſaid to prove, that in the Underſtanding of Individual Corporeal Things, beſide Senſe and the Senſible Phantaſms from them, there are alſo Intelligible Ideas and

debit à Nominibus, Nomina ab Imaginatione, & Imaginatio ab Organorum Corporeorum Motu, & ſic Mens nihil aliud erit præterquam Motus in partibus quibuſdam Corporis Organici.

Univer-

Univerſal [k] *Notions* exerted from the Mind it ſelf, by which alone they are Comprehended; yet ſtill to make this Buſineſs clearer, and alſo to demonſtrate, that the Knowledge of Univerſal Axiomatical Truth, and Scientifical Theorems is a Thing which doth not paſſively Reſult from Senſe, but from the Actual Strength and Vigour of the Intellect it ſelf Comprehending its own Intelligible Ideas, we will here Propoſe that one Geometrical Theorem Concerning a Triangle; That it hath three Angles Equal to two Right Angles; and Conſider what the Subject of it is, [l] *Scientifically* comprehended.

First therefore, if there be no Other Object of the Mind in Knowledge but Senſible Individuals Exiſting without us, Then the Subject of this Theorem, when *Euclid* wrought it, was only Some Individual Bodies by him Compared together. Nay, *Euclid* himſelf did not Carry this Knowledge about with him in his Mind, neither was he Maſter of it any Longer than he held thoſe Individual Bodies in his Hands, or looked upon them with his Eyes; and if ſo, it could not ſignify any

[k] Rationes.

[l] Ἐπιστημονικῶς.

thing at all, to any other Perſon which either then or now had not the ſame Individual Bodies to compare, that *Euclid* had. Whereas it is plain, that the Subject of this Theorem, whatſoever it be, is ſuch a Thing as Every Geometrician, though in never ſuch diſtant Places and Times, hath the very ſame always ready at his Hand, without the leaſt Imaginable Difference. And they all pronounce Concerning the ſame thing. Which could not poſſibly otherwiſe be, unleſs it were ſome Univerſal [m] *Notion* and Intelligible Idea of the Mind.

17. AGAIN, *Secondly*, No Individual or Material Thing is the Subject of this Theorem, as Senſe takes Cognizance of it, that is, the Matter, and Colour, and Figure and Magnitude, all Concretely together. For the ſame Individual Matter may preſently be made Quadrangular or Circular, but only preciſely in reſpect of the Figure; and of that alſo no otherwiſe than as it is Conformable to the Indiviſible and Immutable [n] *Notion* or Idea of a Triangle, Comprehended in the Mind as the Exemplar of it. Now, as we have ſhewed already, there is no Material Triangle any

[m] Ratio. [n] Ratio.

where

where to be found that is Mathematically Exact and Accurate, Neither is the Individual Form of a Material Triangle immutable. And if there were any Mathematically Exact, our Senſe could be no [o] *Criterion* or *Rule to Judge* of it, nor diſcern when any thing were Indiviſibly ſuch, nor judge of the Abſolute and Mathematical Equality of the three Material Angles of it, with two other Angular Superficies. Wherefore the Subjects of this Geometrical Theorem are no Senſible Individual Bodies, but the [p] *Notions* and [q] *Ideas* of the Mind it ſelf, in which alone Mathematical Accuracy is to be found, and the Exact Equality of one Thing to another certainly and infallibly Known.

18. NAY, if we ſhould ſuppoſe that there were ſome Individual Material Triangles and Angles, abſolutely and Mathematically Exact; And that our Senſe did infallibly perceive the Indiviſible Points of them; or that we had an Infallible Pair of Compaſſes, whoſe [r] *Tops* were Mathematical Points, whereby we could Meaſure the ſeveral Angles of the Triangle and Right Angle in a perfect Circle, accu-

[o] Κριτήριον. [p] Rationes [q] Ideæ.
[r] Cuſpides.

rately

rately divided into Infinite Parts; or elſe Cutting off thoſe ſeveral Angles of the Triangle, and laying them together upon an Abſolute Plane, we ſhould thus Mechanically find them Equal to the two Material Right Angles; This would not amount to the Knowledge of this Truth, that a Triangle, as ſuch, hath of Neceſſity three Angles equal to two Right Angles; we thus Conſidering them only as Material Individuals, and Things Exiſting without the Mind by Corporeal Senſe. For though we had now found that theſe Individual Material Triangles were Equal to thoſe two Individual Material Right Angles; yet looking no further than Senſe determined to Individuals, we could not tell certainly that it was ſo with all Individual Triangles, much leſs Underſtand any Neceſſity of its being ſo, or attain to any thing of the [s] *Reaſon* of it, in which alone true Science conſiſteth. And this *Ariſtotle* hath obſerved very pertinently to our Purpoſe, *Poſt. Anal. Lib.* 1. *cap.* 25. [t] *Neither is it Neceſſary to underſtand by Senſe, but*

[s] Διότι.

[t] Οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν ἐπίστασθαι, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαί γε· ἀναγκαῖον τὸ δὲ τί ἕκαστον καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν· τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἃ γὰρ τόδε, οὐδὲ νῦν. οὐ γὰρ ἦν καθόλου. Τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ παντα χοῦ καθόλου φαμὲν εἶναι. Ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ μὲν ἀποδείξεις καθόλου, ταῦτα δὲ οὐκ

but to Perceive; but this regards a Particular Thing and Manner, and the Present Time. But it is Impossible to Perceive by Sense what relates to Every Thing, and in all Respects: For This *and* Now *relate not to an Universal; For of an Universal we say, that it is* Always *and* Every Where. *Since then Demonstrations are of an Universal, it is Plain that there is no Knowledge of the Universal Theorems of Geometry by Sense. For it is manifest, that if we could Perceive by Sense that the three Angles of a Triangle were Equal to two Right Angles, yet should we not rest satisfied in this, as having therefore a sufficient Knowledge of it (as some say;) but would seek further after a Demonstration hereof: Sense reaching only to Singulars, but Knowledge to Universals.* The Mind would not be satisfied herewith, but would still further require a Demonstration of it; which Demonstrations are not of Individuals perceived by Sense, but only of the Universal [u] *Notions* comprehended in the

οὐκ ἐστὶν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεώς ἐστιν. Ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν, ἣ οὐ (ὡς φασί τινες) ἠπιστάμεθα. Αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη τὸ τοῦ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν.

[u] Rationes.

Mind; Knowledge, as I ſaid before, being a Deſcending Comprehenſion of a Thing from the Univerſal Ideas of the Mind, and not an Aſcending Perception of them from Individuals by Senſe.

19. WHEREFORE the Apodictical Knowledge of this Truth is no otherwiſe to be attained than by the Mind's aſcending above Senſe, and Elevating it ſelf from Individuals to the Comprehenſion of the Univerſal [x] *Notions* and Ideas of Things within it ſelf, making the Object of its Enquiry and Contemplation, not this nor that Material Individual Triangle without it ſelf, but the Indiviſible and Immutable Notion of a Triangle. And thus it finds ſeveral Ways that a Triangle, as ſuch, muſt of Neceſſity have its three Angles Equal to two Right Angles.

FOR, *Firſt*, if one will Conſider any Triangle, as made out of a Parallelogram (though this be the more Compounded Figure) divided by a Diagonal Line into two equal Triangles, it is Plain in every Parallelogram there are four Angles Equal to four Right Angles, becauſe when a ſtraight Line Cuts two Parallel Lines, the two Interiour Angles

[x] Rationes.

muſt

muſt of Neceſſity be Equivalent to two Right Angles, one of them being the Complement of the other to a Semicircle. But when the Parallelogram is divided into two Equal Triangles by a Diagonal Line, the Quantity of the three Angles in each muſt of Neceſſity be half the Quantity of the Four Angles in the Parallelogram.

Or, if a Man will Conſider the [y] *Formation* of a Plain Triangle in this Manner; *Firſt*, by a ſtraight Line Cutting two Parallel Lines, and then one of theſe Parallels moving upon its Centre in the Straight Line out of its Paralleliſm, and inclining towards the other Line, if it move never ſo little out of its Paralleliſm towards the other Parallel,

[y] Geneſis.

the

the Continuation of it muſt needs cut the other Line, and make a Triangle.



And ſo much as the Interiour Angle, which with the other oppoſite, made up two Right Angles, ſo much is the third Angle; and therefore all three make up two Right Angles.

20. Now here is a groſs Errour of the Vulgar to imagine, becauſe Geometricians demonſtrating ſuch Theorems, Commonly make uſe of ſuch Senſible Schemes or Diagrams, that therefore the Knowledge of this Truth doth Reſult from Senſe, or that the Geometricians themſelves have no other Ideas in their Minds of ſtraight Lines, Parallels, Right,

Right, Acute and Obtuſe Angles, Triangles, Equality of Angles, than what are impreſſed upon their Fancy from theſe Schemes. Whereas theſe are only made uſe of to entertain the Fancy in the mean time, whilſt the Mind being intent upon the Demonſtration, actively exerts other intelligible Ideas of theſe Things from within it ſelf, and from thence Comprehends the Apodictical Neceſſity of the Theorem. Neither is the true and proper Knowledge of one Theorem or Univerſal and Neceſſary Truth, either in Geometry or Metaphyſicks, paſſively impreſſed upon the Soul from Individuals Exiſting without, or the Reſult of Meer Senſe, but it proceeds from the Active Strength and Vigour of the Mind, Comprehending the Intelligible Ideas and Univerſal [z] *Notions* of Things within it ſelf.

21. WHEREFORE we Conclude, that the Immediate Objects of Geometrical Science, properly ſo called, are not Individual Bodies or Superficies, but the Intelligible and Univerſal Ideas of a Triangle, Square, Circle, Pyramid, Cube, Sphere, actively exerted from the Mind, and Comprehended in it.

[z] Rationes.

For

For the Mind doth not ſeek its Objects of Knowledge abroad without it ſelf, but muſt needs actively Comprehend them within it ſelf: Which alſo, as we ſhall ſhow in the following Chapter, are Immutable Things, and always the ſame.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. IV.

1. O Individual Material Thing is always neceſſarily the ſame with it ſelf, but Mutable and changeable. And our Senſible Perceptions of them, are nothing but Paſſions or Affections in the Soul from ſome Local Motions in our Body cauſed by them; which Paſſions alſo are a Kind of Motions in the Soul, whereby we do not comprehend the Immutable *Ratio* or Eſſence of any thing. But Intellection and Knowledge are the Active Comprehenſion of ſomething, that is fixed and Immutable, and hath always a neceſſary Identity with it ſelf. For that which is not one Steady and Immutable Thing, cannot as

ſuch, be an Object of Intellection or Knowledge, neither can the Mind fix it ſelf upon it; for it muſt needs mock and delude the Underſtanding, perpetually Gliding and Rolling away from it, when it Endeavours to graſp or comprehend it. Neither can it be the Baſis or Subject of any Scientifical Theorem or Propoſition; For how can any thing be Certainly, conſtantly and Immutably affirmed of that which is no one certain Thing, nor always Immutably the ſame with it ſelf. Whence it plainly follows, that the Immediate Objects of Intellection and Knowledge, cannot be theſe Individual Material Things as ſuch, which our Senſes are Paſſively affected from, but muſt of Neceſſity be ſomething elſe.

2. For which Cauſe thoſe Flowing Philoſophers before-mentioned, *Heraclitus*, *Cratylus*, and *Protagoras*, that maintained, that there were no other Beings that could be the Objects of Cogitation beſides theſe Individual Material Things, which they ſuppoſed always to Flow, and never to ſtand ſtill; did conſentaneouſly to this Hypotheſis of theirs aſſert; that there was no Knowledge but Senſe, and no certain or Immutable Comprehenſion of any thing. For that this Aſſertion of theirs

was grounded meerly upon this Hypotheſis, that there was no other Being or Object of the Mind, beſides Individual Material Things, as ſuch; which they ſignified after this Manner, by ſaying, that all Things Flowed, for theſe Material Things do ſo; *Ariſtotle* plainly inſtructs us in his Metaphyſicks, *Lib.* 4. *c.* 5.

[a] " The Ground of this Opinion, which denied " all certain and Immutable Knowledge, was " from hence; becauſe Truth and Knowledge " refer to Beings or Entities, and they ſup- " poſed that there were no other Beings be- " ſides theſe Individual Senſibles only. In " which there is very much of Undetermi- " nateneſs---------And which they perceived " to be liable to perpetual Motion or Muta- " tion. Now concerning that which always " changes, nothing can be affirmed as con- " ſtantly and immutably true. And from

[a] Αἴτιον δ' ἡ δόξης τοῦτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν ὄντων μὲ τὴν ἀληθειαν ἐσκόπουν. τὰ γὰρ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον. ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου φύσις ἐνυπάρχει.———Ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐδὲν ἀληθεύομενον, περὶ γε τὸ πάντως πάντη μεταβάλλον, οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν.

Ἐκ μὲν ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξῆνθησεν ἡ ἐκροπάτη δόξα τῶν εἰρημένων ἡ τῶν φασκόντων ῥᾳκλειτίζειν, καὶ οἵαν Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐδὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἐμβῆναι. αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἅπαξ. Ariſt. Metaph. Lib. 4. c. 5.

" this

" this Suppoſition ſprung the higheſt Sect of " thoſe which are called *Heraclitical* Philoſo- " phers, and thoſe that follow *Cratylus*, who " at laſt came to this, that he only moved " his Finger, but thought that nothing at all " ought to be affirmed; and reprehended " *Heraclitus* for ſaying, that one cannot " twice enter into the ſame River, becauſe " he thought that one could not ſo much as " once do it;" that is, that no Material Thing remained one Moment the ſame.

3. WHEREFORE if there be any ſuch Thing as Intellection, Science, and Knowledge, diſtinct from External Senſe, and any Immutable Truths, then there muſt of Neceſſity be ſome other Kind of Beings or Entities, beſides theſe Individual Material Things, as the immediate Objects or Subjects of them, ſuch Things as do not flow, but [b] *always remain immutably the ſame*, or [c] *Permanent*, and *having always the ſame Nature*, as *Plato* expreſſeth theſe immediate Objects of Knowledge; or elſe, in *Ariſtotle*'s Language, [d] *an Immutable Eſſence*. Who therefore confutes both theſe Sects of Philoſophers, whereof one

[b] Ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ϗ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα.

[c] Μόνιμα ϗ μίαν ἀεὶ φύσιν ἔχοντα.

[d] Ἀκίνητ@ οὐσία.

were

was Extremely Metaphyſical, that made all Things to ſtand ſtill; whom, I confeſs, I underſtand not; the other too groſsly Material, and addicted to Senſe, that made nothing to ſtand ſtill, but all Things to flow; after this Manner: [e] *It is manifeſt, that neither they ſpeak truly who affirm all Things to Reſt, nor they that affirm all Things to move. For if all Things Reſt, then the ſame Things would always be True and Falſe; which is not ſo, becauſe he that affirms this, once was not, and again will not be. But if all Things move, then nothing can be true, and therefore all Things will be falſe.* And both he and *Plato* compounded that Controverſy thus; by acknowledging two ſorts of Entities, the one Mutable, or ſubject to Flux and Motion, ſuch as are eſpecially Individual Corporeal Things; the other Immutable, that always reſt or ſtand ſtill, which are the Proper Objects of Certain, Conſtant, and immutable Knowledge, that therefore cannot be meer Nothings, Non-Entities.

[e] φανερὸν ὅτι ἐσὶ· οἱ πάντα ῥεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, ἐσὶ· οἱ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. Εἰ μὲ γὰ ῥεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ ἔσαι· φαίνεται δὲ τῦτο μεταβάλλον· ὁ γὰ λέγων πότε ἀυτὸς ἐκ ἦν, ⊕ πάλιν ἐκ ἔσαι, εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖται, ἀυδὲν ἔσαι ἀληθές, πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ.

WHICH latter kind of Being, that is, the [f] *Immutable Essence*, as a distinct Thing from Individual Sensibles, *Aristotle* plainly asserts against *Heraclitus*, and those other Flowing Philosophers, in these Words; [g] *We would have these Philosophers to know, that besides sensible Things*, that are always Mutable, *there is another kind of Being or Entity of such Things as are neither subject to Motion, Corruption, nor Generation.* And elsewhere he tells us, that this [h] *immoveable Essence* is the Object of Theoretical Knowledge, of the First Philosophy, and of the Pure Mathematicks.

4. NOW these Immutable Entities are the Universal *Rationes*, or Intelligible Natures and Essences of all Things, which some compare to Unities, but *Aristotle* to Numbers; which formally considered, are Indivisible: saith he, [i] *The Essences of Things are like to Numbers*; because if but the least Thing be added to any Number, or substracted from it, the Number is destroyed.

[f] Ἀκίνητος οὐσία.

[g] Ἔτι δὲ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὸς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἢ ἄλλην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, ἢ ὅτι κινησις ὑπάρχει ὅτι φθορὰ ὅτι γένεσις τὸ παράπαν.

[h] Ἀκίνητος οὐσία.

[i] Εἰσί πως ἀριθμοὶ αἱ οὐσίαι.

AND

And these are the Objects of all certain Knowledge. As for Example, the Objects of Geometry are not any Individual Material Triangles, Squares, Circles, Pyramids, Cubes, Spheres, and the like; which because they are always Mutable, nothing can be immutably affirmed of them; but they are those Indivisible and Unchangeable *Rationes* of a Triangle, Square, Circle; which are ever the same to all Geometricians, in all Ages and Places, of which such Immutable Theorems as these are demonstrated, as that a Triangle has necessarily three Angles equal to two Right Angles.

But if any one demand here, where this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, these Immutable Entities do exist? I answer, *First*, that as they are considered formally, they do not properly Exist in the Individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted upon the Understanding, which some have taken to be *Aristotle*'s Opinion; because no Individual Material Thing is either Universal or Immutable. And if these Things were only lodged in the Individual Sensibles, then they would be unavoidably obnoxious to the Fluctuating Waves of the same reciprocating *Euripus*, in which all Individual Material Things are per-

petually whirled. But becauſe they periſh not together with them, it is a certain Argument that they exiſt independently upon them. Neither in the next place, do they exiſt ſomewhere elſe apart from the Individual Senſibles, and without the Mind, which is that Opinion that *Ariſtotle* juſtly condemns, but either unjuſtly or unſkilfully attributes to *Plato*. For if the Mind looked abroad for its Objects wholly without it ſelf, then all its Knowledge would be nothing but Senſe and Paſſion.-----For to know a Thing is nothing elſe but to comprehend it by ſome Inward Ideas that are domeſtick to the Mind, and actively exerted from it. Wherefore theſe Intelligible Idea's or Eſſences of Things, thoſe Forms by which we underſtand all Things, exiſt no where but in the Mind it ſelf; for it was very well determined long ago by *Socrates*, in *Plato*'s *Parmenides*, that theſe Things are nothing elſe but *Noemata*: [k] "Theſe Species or "Idea's are all of them nothing but *Noe-* "*mata*, or Notions that exiſt no where but "in the Soul it ſelf." Wherefore to ſay that there are immutable Natures and Eſſences,

[k] Τῶν ἰδεῶν ἕκαστον τῶνδε νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ.

and *Rationes* of Things, distinct from the Individuals that exist without us, is all one as if one should say, that there is in the Universe above the Orb of Matter and Body, another superiour Orb of Intellectual Being, that comprehends its own Immediate Objects, that is, the Immutable *Rationes* and Ideas of Things within it self, by which it understands and knows all Things without it self.

And yet notwithstanding though these Things exist only in the Mind, they are not therefore meer Figments of the Understanding: For if the Subjects of all Scientifical Theorems were nothing but Figments, then all Truth and Knowledge that is built upon them would be a meer Fictitious Thing; and if Truth it self and the Intellectual Nature be Fictitious Things, then what can be Real or Solid in the World? But it is evident, that though the Mind thinks of these Things at Pleasure, yet they are not Arbitrarily framed by the Mind, but have certain, determinate, and immutable Natures of their own, which are independent upon the Mind, and which are blown away into nothing at the Pleasure of the same Being that arbitrarily made them.

BUT we all Naturally conceive that thoſe Things have not only an Eternal, but alſo a Neceſſary Exiſtence, ſo that they could not ever but be, ſuch, and ſo many as they are, and can never poſſibly Periſh or Ceaſe to be, but are abſolutely Undeſtroyable.

6. WHICH is a Thing frequently acknowledged in the Writings of both thoſe Famous Philoſophers, *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*.-----The former of them calling thoſe Things, [l] Things "that were never made, but always are," and [m] "Things that were never made, nor "can be deſtroyed." [n] "Things Ingenera-"ble and Unperiſhable;" *Quæ* Plato *negat gigni ſed ſemper Eſſe* (as *Tully* expreſſeth it) *& Ratione & Intelligentia contineri.* And *Philo*, the *Platonical Jew*, calls the τὰ Νοητὰ, which are the ſame Things we ſpeak of ἀναγκαιότατα ὐσίαι, *the moſt Neceſſary Eſſences*, that is, ſuch Things as could not but be, and cannot poſſibly not be. And *Ariſtotle* himſelf calls the *Rationes* of Things in his Metaphyſicks, not only χωριστὰ and ἀκίνητα, *Things ſeparate from Matter and Immutable*, but alſo

[l] Τὰ μὴ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ὄντα.
[m] Μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα.
[n] Τὰ ἀγένητα & ἀνώλεθρα.

ἀΐδια,

ἀΐδια, or *Eternal*; and in his Ethicks likewise, he calls Geometrical Truths ἀΐδια, Eternal Things, *l.* 3. *c.* 5. "[o] where he makes "the Geometrical Truth concerning the In-"commensurability betwixt the Diameter "and the Side of a Square, to be an Eternal "Thing." Elsewhere he tells us, that "[p] Science, properly so called, is not of "Things Corruptible and Contingent," but of Things Necessary, Incorruptible and Eternal. Which Immutable and Eternal Objects of Science, in the Place before quoted, he describ'd thus: [q] "Such a Kind of Entity of "Things as has neither Motion nor Generation, "nor Corruption," that is, such Things as were never made, and can never be destroyed. To which, he saith, the Mind is necessarily determined. For Science or Knowledge has nothing either of Fiction or of Arbitrariness in it, but is [r] "the Comprehension of that "which Immutably *is*."

[o] Περὶ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τὴν διαμέτρου καὶ τὴν πλευρᾶς ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι.

[p] Οὐ τῶν φθαρτῶν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην.

[q] Οὐσίαν τῶν ὄντων ἣ ἄτε κίνησις οὐχ ὑπάρχει, ἄτε φθορὰ, ἄτε γένεσις τὸ παράπαν.

[r] Κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος.

5. MOREOVER, these Things have a Constant Being, when our Particular Created Minds do not actually think of them, and therefore they are immutable in another Sense likewise, not only because they are Indivisibly the same when we think of them, but also because they have a Constant and never-failing Entity; and always are, whether our Particular Minds think of them or not. For the Intelligible Natures and Essences of a Triangle, Square, Circle, Pyramid, Cube, Sphere, *&c.* and all the necessary Geometrical Verities belonging to these several Figures, were not the Creatures of *Archimedes*, *Euclid*, or *Pythagoras*, or any other Inventors of Geometry; nor did then first begin to be; but all these *Rationes* and Verities had a Real and Actual Entity before, and would continue still, though all the Geometricians in the World were quite extinct, and no Man knew them or thought of them. Nay, though all the Material World were quite swept away, and also all Particular Created Minds annihilated together with it; yet there is no doubt but the Intelligible Natures or Essences of all Geometrical Figures, and the Necessary Verities belonging to them, would notwithstanding remain safe and sound. Wherefore these

Things

Things had a Being alſo before the Material World and all Particular Intellects were Created. For it is not at all Conceivable, that ever there was a Time when there was no Intelligible Nature of a Triangle, nor any ſuch Thing Cogitable at all, and when it was not yet actually true that a Triangle has three Angles Equal to two Right Angles, but that theſe Things were afterward arbitrarily made and brought into Being out of an Antecedent Nothing or Non-Entity; ſo that the Being of them bore ſome certain Date, and had a Youngneſs in them, and ſo by the ſame Reaſon might wax Old, and decay again; which Notion he often harps upon, when he ſpeaks of the Εἰδῆ, or Forms of Things, as when he ſays, [s] "there is no Generation of the "Eſſence of a Sphere," that is, it is a Thing that is not made; but always is: and elſewhere he pronounces univerſally of the Εἰδῆ, [t] "The "Forms of Material Things are without Ge-"neration and Corruption," and [u] "That "None makes the Form of any thing, for it "is never generated." Divers have cenſured

[s] Τῆ σφαίραν εἶναι οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις.
[t] Ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ὅλως εἶναι τὰ εἴδη.
[u] Τὸ εἶδος οὐδεὶς ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ γεννᾶται.

Ariſtotle

Ariſtotle in ſome of ſuch Paſſages too much to Confound Phyſicks and Metaphyſicks together; for indeed theſe Things are not true in a Phyſical, but only in a Metaphyſical Senſe. That is, [x] the Immediate Objects of Intellection and Science, are Eternal, neceſſarily exiſtent, and Incorruptible.

7. Now the Plain Meaning of all this is nothing elſe, but that there is an Eternal Wiſdom and Knowledge in the World, neceſſarily exiſting, which was never made, and can never ceaſe to be or be deſtroyed; or, which is all one, that there is an Infinite Eternal Mind neceſſarily Exiſting, that actually comprehends himſelf, the Poſſibility of all Things, and the Verities Clinging to them. In a word, that there is a God, or an Omnipotent and Omniſcient Being, neceſſarily exiſting, who therefore cannot deſtroy his own Being or Nature, that is, his Infinite Power and Wiſdom.

For ſince the *Rationes*, Intelligible Eſſences, and Verities of Things, as we obſerved before out of *Plato*, are nothing but *Noemata*, that is, objective Notions or Knowledges, which are Things that cannot exiſt alone, but together with that Actual Know-

[x] Τὰ νοητὰ.

ledge

ledge in which they are Comprehended, they are the Modifications of ſome Mind or Intellect--- It is all one to affirm, that there are Eternal *Rationes*, Eſſences of Things, and Verities neceſſarily exiſting, and to ſay that there is an Infinite, Omnipotent and Eternal Mind, neceſſarily exiſting, that always actually comprehendeth himſelf, the Eſſences of all Things, and their Verities; or, rather, which is the *Rationes* Eſſences, and Verities of all Things; for the *Rationes* and Eſſences of Things are not Dead Things, like ſo many Statues, Images or Pictures hung up ſomewhere by themſelves alone in a World: Neither are Truths meer Sentences and Propoſitions written down with Ink upon a Book, but they are Living Things, and nothing but Modifications of Mind or Intellect; and therefore the Firſt Intellect is Eſſentially and Archetypally all *Rationes* and Verities, and all Particular created Intellects are but Derivative Participations of it, that are Printed by it with the ſame Ectypal Signatures upon them.

And we may undoubtedly conclude, that it is a Thing altogether as Certain, that there is an Infinite and Eternal Mind, [that is, a God] Neceſſarily Exiſting in the World, as that there ever was the *Ratio* or Intelligible Eſſence

Eſſence of a Triangle, or Circle, of Unity and Duality; and that it was Ever actually true, that a Triangle hath three Angles Equal to two Right Angles; or that *Æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt Æqualia:* or the like.

8. NEITHER does this hinder or Contradict the Truth of this Aſſertion, That many that doubt concerning the Exiſtence of a God, yet notwithſtanding confidently believe the Neceſſary Eternity of theſe Things; and perſuade themſelves, that though there were no Mind nor Intellect, and ſo no God in the World; nay, though there was no Matter neither, and no Subſtantial Entity at all, yet notwithſtanding theſe *Rationes* and Verities of Things would neceſſarily be as they are.

9. FOR there is an Abſolute Impoſſibility in this Aſſertion, that theſe Eſſences of Things and Verities ſhould *be*, though there were no ſubſtantial Entity or no Mind exiſting. For theſe Things themſelves muſt of Neceſſity be either Subſtances, or Modifications of Subſtance---For what is neither Subſtance nor Modification of a Subſtance, is a pure non-Entity---And if they be Modifications of Subſtance, they cannot poſſibly exiſt without that Subſtance whoſe Modifications they are----- Which muſt either be Matter or Mind, but they

are

are not the Modifications of Matter as ſuch, becauſe they are Univerſal and Immutable; therefore they are the Modifications of ſome Mind or Intellect; ſo that theſe cannot be Eternal without an Eternal Mind.

And theſe Men do but deceive themſelves in the Hypothetical Aſſertion, that there would have been theſe *Rationes* and Univerſal Verities, though there had never been a God or Intellect; neither conſidering what the Nature of God is, whoſe Exiſtence they would queſtion or doubt of, nor what thoſe *Rationes* and Verities are, which they would make ſo neceſſarily exiſtent, by Means whereof they do at once aſſert and queſtion the ſame Thing: For that which begets ſo ſtrong a Perſuaſion in their Minds, that the *Rationes* of Things and Univerſal Verities are ſo neceſſarily Eternal, though they do not perceive it, is nothing elſe but an Inward invincible Prepoſſeſſion of the Neceſſary Exiſtence of God, or an Infinite Eternal Omnipotent and Omniſcient Mind, (that always actually comprehends himſelf, and the Extent of his own Power, or the Ideas of all Poſſible Things) ſo deeply radicated and infixed in their Minds, as that they cannot poſſibly quit themſelves of it, though they endeavour it never

never ſo much, but it will Unawares adhere to them, even when they force themſelves to ſuppoſe the non-Exiſtence of God as a Perſon, whoſe Idea they do not clearly comprehend: That is, the Force of Nature is ſo ſtrong in them as to make them acknowledge the Thing, when they deny the Word. So that the true Meaning of this Phenomenon is nothing elſe but this, that God is a Being ſo neceſſarily exiſtent, that though Men will ſuppoſe the non-Exiſtence of him, and deny the Name, yet notwithſtanding they cannot but confute themſelves, and Confeſs the Thing.

10. NAY, it is clearly and Mathematically demonſtrable from what we have already proved, that there is ſome Eternal Mind: for as it is unqueſtionably certain, that ſomething in the World was eternal, meerly from hence, becauſe there is Being, which could not ſpring out of Nothing; and therefore if there were no God, Matter of Neceſſity muſt be eternal: So becauſe there is Mind and Underſtanding, and actual Knowledge in the World, and theſe Things could not ſpring out of Matter, Wiſdom and Knowledge muſt needs be Eternal Things, and there muſt be of Neceſſity ſome Eternal Mind.

For, *ex Hypotheſi*, that once there had been no Knowledge, no intelligible *Rationes* or Eſſences of Things, no Mind or Intellect in the World, it would have been abſolutely impoſſible that ever there ſhould have been any ſuch Thing, becauſe it could neither ſpring out of Nothing, nor, which is all one, out of Senſeleſs and Unknowing Matter.

11. Now becauſe every Thing that is imperfect muſt needs depend upon Something that is Perfect in the ſame Kind, our particular Imperfect Underſtandings, which do not always actually contain the *Rationes* of Things and their Verities in them, which are many times ignorant, doubting, erring, and ſlowly proceed by Diſcourſe and Ratiocination from one Thing to another, muſt needs be Derivative Participations of a Perfect, Infinite and Eternal Intellect, in which is the *Rationes* of all Things, and all Univerſal Verities are always actually comprehended. Which Conſideration is ſo obvious and unavoidable, that *Ariſtotle* himſelf could not miſs of it---For he tells us, that ſince our Underſtandings are but [y] *Potentially all Things*, that is, have not an Actual but Potential Omniformity only,

[y] Δυνάμει πάντα.

there

there must of Necessity be in *Rerum Natura*, another Intellect that is actually all Knowledge, and is the same to our Understandings [z] "that "Active Art is to passive Matter," and [a] "that the Light is to our Eyes," and which does not [b] "sometimes Understand, and sometimes not "understand [c]," but is always Eternal [d] "Actual Knowledge." A Sun that never sets, an Eye that never winks-----Wherefore though all our Knowledges be not stamped or impressed upon our Souls from the Matter; they are all, as it were, [e] *Ectypal Prints*, and [f] *Derivative Signatures* from one Archetypal Intellect, that is Essentially the *Rationes* of all Things and all Verities.

12. And from hence it comes to pass, that all Understandings are not only constantly furnished with Forms and Idea's to conceive all Things by, and thereby enabled to understand all the clear Conceptions of one another, being printed all over at once with the Seeds of universal Knowledge, but also

[z] Οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην.

[a] Οἷον τὸ φῶς.

[b] Ὁτὲ μὲ νοεῖν, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ νοεῖν.

[c] As it were sometimes awake, and sometimes asleep.

[d] Κατ' ἐγρήγορσιν ἐπίστημα.

[e] Ἐσφραγίσματα. [f] Ἐκμάγματα.

have

have exactly the same Idea's of the same Things; whereas if these Things were impressed upon our Souls from the Matter without, all Men would not be readily furnished with Idea's to conceive all Things by at every Time, it being meerly casual and Contingent what Things occur to Mens several Senses; neither could their Idea's be exactly alike to one another, because no Individual Objects are so; and therefore when one spoke of one Thing, another would mean another. Much less could Men so promptly and expeditely exert them upon all Occasions, if they were dead Forms passively received only, and not all virtually contained in some one Active and Vital Principle that had a Potential Omniformity in it.

WHEREFORE, as *Themistius* observes, Men could not possibly confer and discourse together in that Manner as they do, presently perceiving one another's Meaning, and having the very same Conceptions of Things in their Minds, [g] "if all did not partake of one and "the same Intellect." Neither could one so readily teach, and another learn, [h] "if

[g] Εἰ μή τις ἦν εἷς νοῦς ὃ πάντες ἐκοινωνοῦμεν.

[h] Εἰ μὴ ταὐτὸν ἦν τὸ νόημα τοῦ διδάσκοντος καὶ τοῦ μανθάνοντος.

" there were not the ſame ectypal Stamps of " Things in the Mind both of the Teacher " and the Learner".

13. MOREOVER, from hence alſo it comes to paſs that Truths, though they be in never ſo many ſeveral and diſtant Minds apprehending them, yet they are not broken, multiplied, or diverſified thereby; but they are one and the ſame Individual Truths in them all. So that it is but one Truth and Knowledge that is in all the Underſtandings in the World. Juſt as when a Thouſand Eyes look upon the Sun at once, they all ſee the ſame Individual Object. Or as when a great Crowd or Throng of People hear one and the ſame Orator ſpeaking to them all, it is one and the ſame Voice that is in the ſeveral Ears of all thoſe ſeveral Auditors; So in like manner, when innumerable Created Underſtandings direct themſelves to the Contemplation of the ſame Univerſal and immutable Truths, they do all of them but as it were liſten to one and the ſame Original Voice of the eternal Wiſdom that is never ſilent; and the ſeveral Conceptions of thoſe Truths in their Minds, are but like ſeveral Echo's of the ſame *Verba Mentis* of the Divine Intellect reſounding in them.

14. FROM

14. FROM what we have already declared, it is evident, That Wiſdom, Knowledge, and Underſtanding, are Eternal and ſelf-ſubſiſtent Things, ſuperiour to Matter and all ſenſible Beings, and Independent upon them. Which Myſtery is thus acknowledged both in Chriſtianity and *Platoniſm*, in that Wiſdom and Intellect are made the Eternal and Firſt-begotten Offspring of the Firſt Original Goodneſs, the Fountain of all Things, *Prov.* viii. 22. *The Lord poſſeſſed me in the Beginning of his Way, before his Works of old. I was ſet up from Everlaſting, from the Beginning 'ere ever the Earth was*, &c.

AND indeed that Opinion, that Knowledge, Wiſdom, and Underſtanding, is in its own Nature poſterior to Senſible and Material Things, and doth reſult out of them, or proceed only from the Radiation and Activity of the Matter on that which underſtands, is nothing elſe but downright Atheiſm. For if this were true, that Wiſdom, Knowledge, and Intellection were in its own Nature poſterior to Senſible and Corporeal Things, as being nothing but the Stamp or Impreſs of them, then it muſt needs follow that this Corporeal World was not made or framed by any antecedent Wiſdom or Knowledge,

but that it ſprang up of it ſelf from the blind, fortuitous, and giddy Motions of Eternal Atoms; from whence all that Knowledge that is in the World did afterward reſult. Which is all one as to ſay that there is no God at all.

BUT if any will here pretend, that there is indeed a Knowledge in God antecedent to all corporeal Being, and therefore no Paſſion but a Thing independent upon Matter and ſelf-originated; but yet, notwithſtanding, the Knowledge of all created Underſtandings is not a Thing immediately derived from thence, but only taken up at the Rebound or Second-hand from ſenſible and corporeal Things: This is juſt as if one ſhould ſay, that there is indeed a Brightneſs or Lucidity in the Sun, but yet notwithſtanding the Light which is in the Air, is not derived from that Light which is in the Body of the Sun, but ſprings immediately out of the Power of the dark Air; which being a Thing apparently abſurd, it may be preſumed that this Aſſertion is nothing but a verbal and pretended Acknowledgement of a God, that has an antecedent and an independent Knowledge, made by ſuch as really deny the ſame; for otherwiſe, to what Purpoſe ſhould they ſo vio-

lently and diſtortedly pervert the natural Order and Dependency of Things in the Univerſe, and cut off that Cognation and Connexion which is betwixt Things imperfect and Things perfect of the ſame Kind, betwixt created Minds and the increated Mind, which is the intellectual Scale or Ladder by which we climb up to God, if they did really believe and acknowledge any ſuch Thing. But he that can believe that all human Knowledge, Wiſdom, and Prudence, has no other Source and Original than the Radiations and Impreſſes of the dark Matter, and the fortuitous and tumultuous Jumblings thereof; it is juſtly to be ſuſpected, that he is too near akin to thoſe antient Theologues that *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks of, [i] " that " fetched the Original of God and all Things " out of Night," or the dark *Chaos* of Matter; that held there is no God at all, or that blind and Senſeleſs Matter and Chance are the only Original of all Things.

[i] Οἱ ἐκ νυκτὸς πάντα γεννῶντες.

CHAP. V.

1. WE formerly ſhewed that the Perception of External Senſe, as ſuch, is a meer Relative and Phantaſtical Thing: There being nothing abſolutely true and Real in it, but only this, that the Soul hath ſuch a Paſſion, Affection, Phantaſm, Appearance, or Seeming in it. But Senſe being but an Idiopathy, we cannot be abſolutely certain by it, that every other Perſon or Animal has the ſame Paſſion or Affection or Phantaſm in it from the ſame Corporeal Object that we Our ſelves have. [a] "Are you certain that every "other Animal has the ſame Senſe or Phan-"taſm of every Colour that you have," (ſaith *Socrates*, according to *Protagoras* his Senſe)---

[a] Ἦ σὺ διϊχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς ὁιόν σοι φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ; Θεαιτ. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Σωκ. τί δ' ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἆρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι ἓν ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι οὐδέ σοι αὐτῷ ταυτὸν, ἅτε τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὖ τὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν.

" Nay, that every other Man has the ſame. " Or, *Laſtly*, can you be ſo much as ſure " that your ſelf ſhall always have the ſame " Phantaſm from the ſame Object, when " you are not always the ſame with your " ſelf?" and Paſſions are diverſified by the ἰδιοσυγκρασία of the Patient-----.Wherefore we cannot be ſure meerly by the Paſſions of Senſe, what the Abſolute Nature of a Corporeal Object is without us, our Perception being only Relative to Our ſelves, and our ſeveral Organs and bodily Craſis.

NAY, we cannot be ſure that there is any Object at all before us, when we have a Phantaſm of Senſation of Something. Foraſmuch as not only in our Dreams, but alſo when we are awake, we have Phantaſms and Senſations in us of Things that have no Reality.

THE Reaſon of all which is, becauſe by external Senſe we do but ſuffer from Corporeal Things exiſting without, and ſo do not comprehend the Nature of the Thing as it is Abſolutely in it ſelf, but only our own Paſſion from it. Neither is our Senſe a Paſſion immediately from the Thing it ſelf that is perceived, for then it would not be altogether ſo uncertain as it is, but only from cer-

tain Local Motions in that Body which the Soul is vitally united to, by the Mediation whereof it perceives other Things at a Distance, which Local Motions and Passions may be produced when there are no such Objects.

So that if there were no other Perceptive Power or Faculty Distinct from external Sense, all our Perceptions would be meerly Relative, Seeming, and Phantastical, and not reach to the Absolute and Certain Truth of any Thing; and every one would but, as *Protagoras* expounds it, [b] "think his own "Private and Relative Thoughts Truths," and all our Cogitations being nothing but Appearances, would be indifferently alike True Phantasms and one as another.

2. But we have since also demonstrated, that there is another Perceptive Power in the Soul Superiour to outward Sense, and of a distinct Nature from it, which is the Power of Knowing or Understanding, that is, an Active Exertion from the Mind it self. And therefore has this Grand Pre-eminence above Sense, that it is no Idiopathy, not a meer Private, a Relative, Seeming, and Phantasti-

[b] Τὰ ἰδια μόνον δοξάζειν.

cal

cal Thing; but the Comprehenſion of that which Abſolutely IS and IS not.

FOR whereas the τὰ αἰσθητὰ, *Objects of external Senſe*, are nothing but Individual Corporeal Things exiſting without us, from which by Senſe we receive only Idols, Images and Paſſions; by reaſon of which, as *Plotinus* obſerves, [c] " That which is known by Senſe, " is but an Image of that Individual Body " exiſting without, which Senſe ſuffers from; " but the Object of Senſe is a Being not inward- " ly comprehended, but remaining without"-- And [d] " For this Cauſe, the Truth of the " Thing is not in Senſe, but only Opinion.

Yet the τὰ Νοητὰ, the Proper and Immediate Objects of Science, Rightly ſo called, and Intellection, being the Intelligible Eſſences of Things and their neceſſary Verities, that exiſt no where but in the Mind it ſelf; The Underſtanding by its Active Power is fully Maſter of them, and comprehends [e] " not Idols or " Images of them, but the very Things them-

[c] Τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον δι' αἰσθήσεως, τῶ πράγματος εἴδωλόν ἐστι, & οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις λαμβάνει· μένει δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἔξω.

[d] Διὰ τοῦτο οὐ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἀλλὰ δόξα, ὅτι παραδεχομένη & ἃ μὴ τοῦτο δόξα ἔστα ἄλλο παραδέχεται, ἄλλως δ' οὐτος ἐκείνης ἐξ ὧν τοῦτο ὃ παραδέχεται ἔχει.

[e] Αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐκ εἴδωλα μόνον.

" ſelves"

"selves," within it self; [f] "Knowledge is "not the Perception of Things Abroad without the Mind," but is the Mind's Comprehending it self. Otherwise, as the same Philosopher adds[g], the Mind, in considering Things, will not apprehend the Things themselves, but only their Images, &c.

WHEREFORE it is most true, as *Aristotle* often observeth, [h] "that the Knowledge of any "Scientifical Theorem is one and the self-same Thing with the Thing Known; [i] "that "which Knows, and that which is Known, are "really the same Thing. [k] The Knowledge "of any Metaphysical or Mathematical Truth "is the very Thing," [l] or Truth it self "Known," and not any Passion from it, or Image and Picture of it. And though the same Philosopher writes elsewhere, that [m] Sense is the same with Sensible Things, and Understanding the same with the Things understood; yet the Difference betwixt those two is

[f] Ὁ νοῦς τὰ νοητὰ γινόμενος οὐκ ἔστιν ἔστε γινόμενος.

[g] Θεωρήσει ἄρτι οὐκ ἔχων ἀπὸ, ἰδωλα ἐν αὐτῷ —— τὸ νοεῖν ἄρτιον οὐκ ἔχει. ἰδωλα δὲ τοῦ ἀπλοῦ, καὶ αὐτῷ λεῖον, τὸ ἀνεῖ ἔχει ἢ αὐτὸ ἀπλοῦς.

[h] Ὁ νοῦς ὁ κατ' ἐπιστήμην τὰ πράγματα νοῦν.

Τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστι τὸ νοῦν ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

[i] Ἐν ἐστιν ὁ ἐπιστήμων ἢ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστι.

[k] Τὸ ἐστι ἀεὶ ὁ κατ' ἐπιστήμην ἐστιν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ.

[l] Ἀλήθεια ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ τὸ, καὶ ἐπιστήμη τὸ νοεῖ.

very

very great, for the [n] *Senſible Things* Really exiſt without, and Senſe has only a Paſſive and Phantaſmatical Repreſentation of them; but the [o] *Intellectual Conceptions*, properly ſo called, the Primary Objects of Science and Intellection, that is, the [p] "ſeparate eternal "and immutable *Rationes* of Things," exiſt no where but in the Mind it ſelf, being its own Idea's: For the Soul *is*, as *Ariſtotle* ſpeaks, [q] *The Place of Forms and Idea's*, and they have no other Entity at all but only in being Known or Underſtood. And by and through theſe Inward Idea's of the Mind it ſelf, which are its Primary Objects, does it know and underſtand all External Individual Things, which are the ſecondary Objects of Knowledge only.

3. MOREOVER, that the Intellection and Knowing Perception of the Soul is not Relative and Phantaſtical as the Senſitive, is evident from hence, becauſe it is liable to Falſehood, which it could not be, if it had not a Power of Comprehending Abſolute Truth.

FOR External Senſe, for this very Reaſon, is not capable of Falſehood, becauſe as ſuch,

[n] Τὰ αἰσθητὰ.

[o] Τὰ νοητὰ.

[p] Τὰ χωριστὰ εἴδια καὶ ἀκίνητα. [q] Τόπος εἰδῶν.

it

it does not comprehend the abſolute Truth of any Thing; being only [r] *a Phantaſm* or Appearance, and all Appearances as ſuch are alike True.

So in like manner, if the Noetical Perceptions of the Soul were only Phantaſtical, and did not extend to the Comprehenſion of the Abſolute Truth of Things, then every Opinion would of Neceſſity be alike True, neither could there be any Abſolute Falſehood in any, becauſe [s] *Every Phancy is true*, that is, Every Phancy is a Phancy or an Appearance, and nothing more is required to it; for Abſolute Truth belongs not to the Nature of it. But it is evident to all that are not ſunk and degenerated below Men into brutiſh Sottiſhneſs, that there are Falſe Opinions: whence it follows undeniably, that the Noetical Knowing and Intellective Power extends to the Abſolute Truth of Things. So that whatever Theoretical Univerſal Propoſition in Geometry or Metaphyſicks is True to one Mind, the ſame is Abſolutely True in it ſelf, and therefore True to all Minds whatſoever throughout the whole World, that clearly underſtand it.

[r] Φαντασία.

[s] Πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστιν ἀληθὴς.

4. WHERE-

4. WHEREFORE, though the Immediate Objects of Knowledge, which are the Intelligible Eſſences of Things, and their Relations to One another or Verities, exiſt no where but in Minds; yet notwithſtanding they are not Figments of the Mind, becauſe then Every Opinion or Cogitation would be alike True, that is, a true Figment, having no other Truth but Relative to that Particular Mind whoſe Figment it is. But theſe Things have an Abſolute and Immutable Nature in themſelves, and their Mutual Reſpects to one another are alike immutable. And therefore thoſe Opinions and Cogitations of the Mind, which are not conformable to the Immutable Reality of thoſe Objective Idea's, have an Abſolute Falſehood in them. As for Example, the Nature of a Triangle is an Immutable Thing, and this is demonſtrable of it, as immutably and neceſſarily true, that it hath three Angles equal to two Right ones: neither can any Man's Opinion or Thinking make it otherwiſe: For it is a falſe Opinion, unleſs it be agreeable to the Immutable Nature of a Triangle. So likewiſe the Plain Regular Geometrical Solids, as ſuch, have an Immutable Nature or Eſſence: and it is demonſtrable of them, that there are five ſuch Bodies, and that there

there can be no more: And any Opinion to the Contrary will be an Abſolute Falſehood. Wherefore every Opinion or Thinking is not Knowledge, but only a Right Opinion: and therefore Knowledge is not Relative, πρὸς τὸ κεῖνον, as Senſe is. Truth is the moſt Unbending and Uncompliable, the moſt neceſſary, Firm, Immutable, and *Adamantine* Thing in the World.

4. MOREOVER, becauſe theſe Intelligible Eſſences of Things, as before was obſerved, are like Unities indiviſible; ſo that if the leaſt be added to them, or detracted from them, they are not the ſame, but ſomething elſe; whenever the ſame Things are rightly underſtood by any Minds, they muſt of Neceſſity have all the ſame Truths belonging to them every where. Nay, theſe Truths are not at all multiplied, as we obſerved before, by the Multiplicity of Minds that apprehend them; but are one and the ſame Individual Truths in thoſe ſeveral Minds: For as much as Wiſdom, Truth, and Knowledge, are but one and the ſame Eternal original Light ſhining in all Created Underſtandings.

TO conclude therefore; Whenever any Theoretical Propoſition is Rightly underſtood by

by any one Particular Mind whatsoever, and wheresoever it be, the Truth of it is no Private Thing, nor Relative to that Particular Mind only, but it is [t] *a Catholick and Universal Truth*, as the *Stoicks* speak, throughout the whole World; nay, it would not fail to be a Truth throughout Infinite Worlds, if there were so many, to all such Minds as should rightly understand it.

5. But probably it may be here demanded, how a Man shall Know when his Conceptions are Conformed to the Absolute and Immutable Natures or Essences of Things, and their Unchangeable Relations to one another? Since the Immediate Objects of Intellection Exist in the Mind it self, we must not go about to look for the *Criterion* of Truth without our selves, by Consulting Individual Sensibles, as the Exemplars of our Idea's, and measuring our Conceptions by them. And how is it possible to know by Measuring of Sensible Squares, that the Diameter of every Square is Incommensurable with the Sides? Nay, as was observed before, The Necessary Truth of no Geometrical Theorem can ever be examined, proved, or determined by Sen-

[t] Ἀληθὲς καθολικὸν.

sible

ſible Things Mechanically. And though the Eternal Divine Intellect be the Archetypal Rule of Truth, we cannot conſult that neither, to ſee whether our Conceptions be Commenſurate with it. I anſwer therefore, that the *Criterion* of true Knowledge is not to be looked for any where Abroad without our own Minds, neither in the Heighth above, nor in the Depth beneath, but only in our Knowledge and Conceptions themſelves. For the Entity of all Theoretical Truth is nothing elſe but Clear Intelligibility, and whatever is Clearly Conceived, is an Entity and a Truth; but that which is Falſe, Divine Power it ſelf cannot make it to be clearly and diſtinctly Underſtood, becauſe Falſehood is a Non-Entity, and a Clear Conception is an Entity: and Omnipotence it ſelf cannot make a Non-Entity to be an Entity.

WHEREFORE no Man ever was or can be deceived in taking that for an Epiſtemonical Truth which he clearly and diſtinctly apprehends, but only in Aſſenting to Things not clearly apprehended by him, which is the only true Original of all Errour.

6. BUT there is another Opinion that ſeems to have gained the Countenance of ſome

ſome very learned Philoſophers, which differs but a little from the *Protagorean* Doctrine; though for my Part I conceive it not to be an Opinion, but only a certain Scheme of Modeſty and Humility, which they thought decorous to take upon themſelves, that they might not ſeem to arrogate too much either to themſelves, or to their excellent Performances, by not ſo much as pretending to demonſtrate any Thing to be Abſolutely true, but only Hypothetically, or upon Suppoſition that our Faculties are rightly made.

For if we cannot otherwiſe poſſibly be certain of the Truth of any Thing, but only *ex hypotheſi*, that our Faculties are rightly made, of which none can have any certain Aſſurance but only he that made them, then all Created Minds whatſoever muſt of Neceſſity be condemned to an Eternal Scepſis. Neither ought they ever to aſſent to any Thing as certainly True, ſince all their Truth and Knowledge as ſuch, is but Relative to their Faculties Arbitrarily made, that may poſſibly be falſe, and their cleareſt conſtant Apprehenſions nothing but perpetual Deluſions.

WHEREFORE according to this Doctrine, we having no absolute Certainty of the first Principles of all our Knowledge, as that, *Quod cogitat, est. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficiunt æqualia. Omnis Numerus est vel Par vel Impar*, we can neither be sure of any Mathematical nor Metaphysical Truth, nor of the Existence of God, nor of our selves.

FOR whereas some would endeavour to prove the Truth of their Intellectual Faculties from hence, because there is a God, whose Nature also is such, as that he cannot deceive: It is plain that this is nothing but a Circle, and makes no Progress at all, forasmuch as all the Certainty which they have of the Existence of God, and of his Nature, depends wholly upon the Arbitrary Make of their Faculties; which, for ought they know, may be false. Nay, according to this Doctrine, no Man can Certainly Know that there is any Absolute Truth in the World at all; because it is nothing but his Faculties which makes him think there is, which possibly may be false. Wherefore upon this Supposition, all created Knowledge, as such, is a meer Phantastical Thing.

Now this is very ſtrange to aſſert, that God cannot make a Creature which ſhall be able certainly to know either the Exiſtence of God, or of himſelf; or whether there be any Abſolute Truth or no.

7. It is evident that this Opinion plainly ſuppoſes that Intellectual Faculties may be ſo made, as clearly and diſtinctly to underſtand that to be true which is abſolutely falſe, and impoſſible (for unleſs they did acknowledge that we do clearly underſtand ſome Things, they could not undertake ſo much as hypothetically to demonſtrate any thing) as for Example, that the Whole is not greater than one of its Parts, or that the three Angles of a Triangle are never equal to two Right Angles.

Now we have already demonſtrated, that a Falſehood can never be clearly conceived or apprehended to be true, becauſe a Falſehood is a meer Non-Entity; and whatſoever is clearly conceived or underſtood, is an Entity; but a Non-Entity can never become an Entity. Nay, the true Knowledge or Science which exiſts no where but in the Mind it ſelf, has no other Entity at all beſides Intelligibility; and therefore whatſoever is clearly intelligible, is abſolutely true.

Hence it comes to paſs, that both Philoſophers and Divines have without Scruple meaſured the Divine Omnipotence it ſelf, and the Poſſibility of Things, by their own clear Intellections concerning them; and ſo pronounce that God himſelf cannot make Contradictions to be true at the ſame time; whereas it were an high and unpardonable Preſumption thus to venture to meaſure the Divine Omnipotence, if there were not an abſolute Certainty of the Truth of clear Intellections, as being nothing elſe but the Immutable Wiſdom of God participated and imparted to us. And if it be abſolutely impoſſible even to Omnipotence, that Contradictories ſhould be true together, then Omnipotence it ſelf cannot make any ſuch Faculties as ſhall clearly Underſtand that which is falſe to be true, ſince the Eſſence of Falſehood conſiſts in nothing elſe but Non-Intelligibility.

But if they will ſay that it is not impoſſible that Contradictions ſhould be true, becauſe our Faculties, which make us think ſo, may be falſe and deceive us in every Thing, the neceſſary Conſequence from hence will be, that it is poſſible that there may be no Certain Knowledge at all, becauſe

becauſe if Contradictories may be true, then nothing can be certainly Affirmed or Denied of any thing.

8. WHEREFORE, be our Faculties what they will, and let them be ſuppoſed to be made how you will, yet notwithſtanding Whatſoever is clearly Underſtood and conceived, has an Objective Entity in it, and muſt of neceſſity be true. For a clear Conception cannot be nothing. And though Intellectual Faculties may be made Obſcure more or leſs, yet it is not poſſible that they ſhould ever be made Falſe, ſo as clearly to apprehend whatſoever is True to be Falſe, and what is Falſe to be True.

So that if there were a World of Men created either in the Moon or elſewhere, that ſhould affirm the Contradictories to all the Theorems in Geometry; Foraſmuch as we certainly Know that we clearly underſtand them to be true, and that Falſehood can never be clearly Underſtood, we ought not in the leaſt to queſtion from hence whether our Faculties or theirs were made true, or to ſuſpect that Truth and Knowledge were ſuch whiffling Things, as that they meerly depended upon an Arbitrary Make of Faculties; but Conclude without

any Controverſy, that this was but a *Bedlam*-World of mad frantick and diſtracted Souls, that had no clear Apprehenſions of any Thing, and either by meer Chance or Humour happened to aſſent to Every Thing that was falſe as true.

9. BUT yet if any one will ſtill pertinaciouſly urge, that it is nothing but our Faculties which inſtruct us thus, that every clear Conception is an Entity, and that the Entity of Truth is nothing but clear Intelligibility; that Contradictions cannot be true, or if they could, then there were no Poſſibility of any Certain Knowledge; that all this is from our Faculties, but that ſtill our Faculties themſelves may be falſe; nay, it is not reaſonable to think that the Intellectual Faculties of any Creatures ſhould be abſolutely Infallible in any Thing, becauſe this ſeems to be the Peculiar Privilege and ſole Prerogative of the Deity.

I ANSWER, That this is the Thing we contend for, that the Ultimate Reſolution of Theoretical Truth, and the only [a] *Criterion* of it, is in the Clearneſs of the Apprehenſions themſelves, and not in any

[a] Κριτήριον.

ſuppoſed

ſuppoſed blind, and unaccountable Make of Faculties. So that the Certainty of clear Apprehenſions is not to be derived from the Contingent Truth of Faculties, but the Goodneſs of Faculties is only to be tried by the Clearneſs and Diſtinctneſs of Apprehenſions. For be theſe Faculties what they will, Clear Intellectual Conceptions muſt of Neceſſity be Truths, becauſe they are real Entities. And to ſuppoſe that Faculties may be ſo made, as to beget Clear Apprehenſions of Things that are not, as if Knowledge were an Arbitrary Fictitious Thing, is much like that Opinion of ſome, That all the New Celeſtial Phænomena, as of the Jovial Planets, and the Mountains in the Moon, and the like, are no Real Things; but that the Clear Diaphanous Cryſtal of the Teleſcopes may be ſo artificially Cut, Ground and Poliſhed, as to make all thoſe, and any other Phænomena, Clearly to appear to Senſe, when there is no ſuch Thing: Nay, it is more abſurd and ridiculous to imagine, that that more than Cryſtalline Pellucid intellectual Faculty, by which we perceive the Truth of Things, can be Arbitrarily ſo made or poliſhed, as

to repreſent any Non-Entities whatſoever, as Clear and Real Objects of Intellection.

10. NAY, to make the Certainty of all Truth and Knowledge, Not to be determined by the Clearneſs of Apprehenſions themſelves, but a ſuppoſed unaccountable Truth and Rectitude of Faculties, and ſo by the Uncertainty thereof, quite to baffle all our Cleareſt Intellections, is quite to pervert the Nature of Knowledge, which is [h] " the Comprehenſion of that which Abſo- " lutely is; which is not terminated in the [i] Appearance only, as Senſe is, but in that [k] " which is," *and whoſe Evidence and Certainty is no Extrinſecal, Adventitious, and borrowed Thing, but Native and Intrinſecal to it ſelf.*

FOR if Knowledge have no Inward Κριτήριον of its own, but the Certainty of all Truth and Knowledge depend upon an Arbitrary Peculiar Make of Faculties, which is not a Thing knowable in it ſelf, neither can there be any Aſſurance of it given but what is Extrinſecal by Teſtimony and Revelation, (inartificial Arguments), there will be

[h] Κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντος.
[i] Τὸ φαινόμενον. [k] Τὸ ὄν.

no

no ſuch Thing as Knowledge, but all will be meer Credulity and Belief.

11. It is a Fond Imagination for any to ſuppoſe that it is derogatory to the Glory of God, to beſtow or import any ſuch Gift upon his Creatures as Knowledge is, which hath an Intrinſecal Evidence within it ſelf, or that Creatures ſhould have a Certainty of the firſt Principles, which all Men are conſcious that they do ſo clearly underſtand, that they cannot doubt of them, as that *Nihili nulla eſt affectio. Æqualia addita æqualibus efficient æqualia*; without which they can know nothing at all; though they be notwithſtanding Ignorant, doubting, and erring in many Things, and ſlowly proceed in their Ratiocinations from one Thing to another; whereas on the Contrary, it is plainly derogatory to it to ſuppoſe that God cannot make any Creature, that can poſſibly have any certain Knowledge of God's own Exiſtence, or any Thing more than a bare Credulity of the ſame.

12. Wherefore ſince it cannot be denied but every Clear Apprehenſion is an Entity, and the Eſſence of Truth is nothing but clear Intelligibility, thoſe Philoſophers

muſt lay the Streſs of their Cauſe here, that Intellectual Faculties may be ſo made, as that Men can never certainly tell when they have clear Apprehenſions, but may think they have them, when they have not.

AND it cannot be denied but that Men are oftentimes deceived, and think they clearly comprehend what they do not: but it does not follow from hence, becauſe Men ſometimes think that they clearly comprehend what they do not, that therefore they can never be certain that they do clearly comprehend any thing; which is juſt as if we ſhould argue, that becauſe in our Dreams we think we have clear Senſations, we cannot therefore be ever ſure, when we are awake, that we ſee Things that really are.

I SHALL conclude this Diſcourſe with that of *Origen* againſt *Celſus*. [1] *Science and Knowledge is the only firm Thing in the World*, without a Participation of which communicated to them from God, all Creatures would be meer Ludibria and Vanity.

[1] Μόνον τῶν ὄντων βέβαιον ἐπίστημα.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

1. WE have now abundantly confuted the *Protagorean* Philoſophy, which, that it might be ſure to deſtroy the Immutable Natures of Juſt and Unjuſt, would deſtroy all Science or Knowledge, and make it Relative and Phantaſtical. Having ſhewed that this Tenet is not only moſt abſurd and contradictious in it ſelf, but alſo manifeſtly repugnant to that very Atomical Phyſiology, on which *Protagoras* endeavoured to found it, and, than which nothing can more effectually confute and deſtroy it: and alſo largely demonſtrated, that though Senſe be indeed a mere Relative and Phantaſtical Perception, as *Protagoras* thus far rightly ſuppoſed; yet notwithſtanding there is a Superior Power of Intellection and Knowledge of a different Nature from Senſe, which is not terminated

minated [m] *in meer* Seeming and *Appearance* only, but [n] *in the Truth* and *Reality of Things*, and reaches to the Comprehenſion of that which Really and Abſolutely is, whoſe Objects are the Eternal and Immutable Eſſences and Natures of Things, and their Unchangeable Relations to one another.

2. To prevent all Miſtake, I ſhall again remember, what I have before intimated, that where it is affirmed that the Eſſences of all Things are Eternal and Immutable; which Doctrine the Theological Schools have conſtantly avouched, this is only to be underſtood of the Intelligible Eſſences and *Rationes* of Things, as they are the Objects of the Mind: And that there neither is nor can be any other Meaning of it, than this, that there is an Eternal Knowledge and Wiſdom, or an Eternal Mind or Intellect, which comprehends within it ſelf the Steady and Immutable *Rationes* of all Things and their Verities, from which all Particular Intellects are derived, and on which they do depend. But not that the Conſtitutive Eſſences of all Individual Created Things were Eternal and

[m] Ἐν τῷ φαινομένῳ. [n] Ἐν τῷ ὄντι.

Uncre-

Uncreated, as if God in Creating of the World, did nothing elſe, but as ſome ſarcaſtically expreſs it, *Sartoris inſtar Rerum Eſſentias veſtire Exiſtentia*, only cloathed the Eternal, Increated, and Antecedent Eſſences of Things with a New outſide Garment of Exiſtence, and not created the Whole of them: And as if the Conſtitutive Eſſences of Things could Exiſt apart ſeparately from the Things themſelves, which abſurd Conceit *Ariſtotle* frequently, and no leſs deſervedly chaſtiſes.

3. WHEREFORE the Reſult of all that we have hitherto ſaid is this, that the Intelligible Natures and Eſſences of Things are neither Arbitrary nor Phantaſtical, that is, neither Alterable by any Will whatſoever, nor changeable by Opinion; and therefore every Thing is Neceſſarily and Immutably to Science and Knowledge what it is, whether Abſolutely, or Relatively, to all Minds and Intellects in the World. So that if Moral Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt, ſignify any Reality, either Abſolute or Relative, in the Things ſo denominated, as they muſt have ſome certain Natures, which are the Actions or Souls of Men, they

they are neither Alterable by meer Will nor Opinion.

UPON which Ground that wise Philosopher *Plato*, in his *Minos*, determines that Νόμος, a Law, is not δόγμα πόλεως, any Arbitrary Decree of a City or supreme Governours; because there may be Unjust Decrees, which therefore are no Laws, but ° *the Invention of that which IS*, or what is Absolutely or Immutably Just, in its own Nature. Though it be very true also, that the Arbitrary Constitutions of those that have Lawful Authority of Commanding, when they are not materially Unjust, are Laws also in a secondary Sense, by vertue of that Natural and Immutable Justice or Law that requires Political Order to be Observed.

4. BUT I have not taken all this Pains only to Confute Scepticism or Phantasticism, or meerly to defend and corroborate our Argument for the Immutable Natures of Just and Unjust; but also for some other Weighty Purposes that are very much conducing to the Business that we have in hand. And first of all, that the Soul is

° Τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις.

not

not a meer *Raſa Tabula*, a Naked and Paſſive Thing, which has no innate Furniture or Activity of its own, nor any thing at all in it, but what was impreſſed upon it without; for if it were ſo, then there could not poſſibly be any ſuch Thing as Moral Good and Evil, Juſt and Unjuſt; Foraſmuch as theſe Differences do not ariſe meerly from the outward Objects, or from the Impreſſes which they make upon us by Senſe, there being no ſuch Thing in them; in which Senſe it is truly affirmed by the Author of the *Leviathan*, Page 24. *That there is no common Rule of Good and Evil to be taken from the Nature of the Objects themſelves*, that is, either conſidered abſolutely in themſelves, or Relatively to external Senſe only, but according to ſome other interior Analogy which Things have to a certain inward Determination in the Soul it ſelf, from whence the Foundation of all this Difference muſt needs ariſe, as I ſhall ſhew afterwards; Not that the Anticipations of Morality ſpring meerly from intellectual Forms and notional Idea's of the Mind, or from certain Rules or Propoſitions, arbitrarily printed upon the Soul as upon a Book, but from ſome other

other more inward, and vital Principle, in intellectual Beings, as ſuch, whereby they have a natural Determination in them to do ſome Things, and to avoid others, which could not be, if they were meer naked Paſſive Things. Wherefore ſince the Nature of Morality cannot be underſtood, without ſome Knowledge of the Nature of the Soul, I thought it ſeaſonable and requiſite here to take this Occaſion offered, and to prepare the Way to our following Diſcourſe, by ſhewing in general, that the Soul is not a meer Paſſive and Receptive Thing, which hath no innate active Principle of its own, Becauſe upon this Hypotheſis there could be no ſuch Thing as Morality.

5. AGAIN, I have the rather inſiſted upon this Argument alſo, becauſe that which makes Men ſo inclinable to think that Juſtice, Honeſty and Morality are but thin, airy and phantaſtical Things, that have little or no Entity or Reality in them beſides Senſuality, is a certain Opinion in Philoſophy which doth uſually accompany it, that Matter and Body are the firſt Original and Source of all Things; that there is no Incorporeal Subſtance ſuperiour to Matter,

Matter and independent upon it: And therefore that ſenſible Things are the only real and ſubſtantial Things in Nature; but Souls and Minds ſpringing ſecondarily out of Body, that Intellectuality and Morality which belong unto them, are but thin and evanid Shadows of ſenſible and corporeal Things, and not natural, but artificial and factitious Things that do as it were border upon the Confines of Non-Entity.

6. THIS is a Thing excellently well obſerved by *Plato*, and therefore I ſhall ſet down his Words at large concerning it. [p] "Theſe Men making this Diſtribution of

U "Things

[p] Λέγεσί πᾳ τινες ὡς πάντα ἐϛι τὰ πρᾴγματα τὰ μὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ τέχνῃ, τὰ δὲ ἀφ᾽ τύχης. Ἔοικε δὲ φασὶ, τὰ μὲ μέγιϛα αὐτῶν καὶ κάλλιϛα ἀπεργάζεϑαι φύσιν ϵ τύχην, τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα τέχνην· ἣν δὲ παρὰ φύσεως λαμβάνουσαν τὴν τῶν μεγάλων ϵ πρώτων γένεσιν ἔργων πλάττειν καὶ τεκταίνεϑαι πάντα τὰ σμικρότερα, ἃ δὴ τεχνικὰ πάντες προσαγορεύομεν. Ὥσϑ᾽ ἔτι σαφέϛερον ἐρῶ. Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα φύσει πάντα εἶναι ϵ τύχῃ φασὶ, τέχνῃ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων· καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἂν σώματα γῆς τε καὶ ἡλίϵ καὶ σελήνης ἄϛρων τε πέρι, ἀφ᾽ τούτων γεγονέναι παντελῶς ὄντων ἀψύχων. Τύχῃ δὲ φερόμενα τῇ τῆς δυνάμεως ἕκαϛα ἑκάϛοις, ᾗ ξυμπέπτωκεν ἁρμόττοντα οἰκείως πῶς ϑερμὰ ψυχροῖς, ἢ ξηρὰ ϖρὸς ὑγρὰ, ϵ μαλακὰ πρὸς ϖκληρα· καὶ πάντα ὁϖόσα τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κράϵει κατὰ τύχην ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεκεράϵϑη. Ταύτῃ ϵ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔτω γεγεννηκέναι τόν τε οὐρανὸν ὅλον ϵ πάντα ὁϖόϵα κατ᾽ οὐρανον· ϵ ζῶα ἂν καὶ φυτὰ ξύμπαντα ὡρῶν πασῶν ὑπ᾽ τούτων γενομένων· οὐ ἀφ᾽ νοῦν φασὶν, οὐδὲ ἀφ᾽ τινα ϑεὸν, οὐδὲ δια τέχνην, ἀλλὰ ὃ λέγομεν φύσει καὶ τύχῃ. Τέχνην δὲ ὕϛε-

ρον

" Things, that all Things that are, are ei-
" ther by Nature, or Art, or Chance, they
" imagine that the greateſt and moſt ex-
" cellent Things that are in the World,
" are to be attributed to Nature and Chance;
" which working upon thoſe greater Things
" which are made by Nature, does form and
" fabricate certain ſmaller Things afterward,
" which we commonly call artificial Things.
" To ſpeak more plainly, Fire, Water,
" Air, and Earth, they attribute wholly to
" Nature and Chance, but not to any Art
" or Wiſdom; in like manner thoſe Bodies
" of the Earth, the Sun, Moon and Stars,
" they will have to be made out of them
" fortuitouſly agitated; and ſo by Chance
" cauſing both divers Syſtems and
" Compages of Things: thus they would
" have the whole Heavens made, and all
" the Earth and Animals, and all the Sea-
" ſons of the Year, not by any Mind In-
" tellect, or God, not by any Art or Wiſ-

ρον ὲκ τύτων ὕσερον γενομένην ἀυτὴν θνητὴν ὲκ θνητῶν, ὕσερα γε-γενηκέναι παιδιάς τινὰς, ἀληθείας ὐ σφόδρα μετειχόυσας, ἀλλ' ἴδωλα ἄτλα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῶν· ὅια ἡ γραφὴ γενεᾷ Ϛ Μωσικὴ, Ϛ ὅσαι ταύταις ἰσὶ σωτήριοι τέχναι· ὅτω δὲ κ τὴν νομοθετικὴ πᾶσαν ὐ φύσει τέχνη δέ, ἧς ὐκ ἀληθεῖς· εἶναι τὰς θέσεις.

" dom,

" dom, but all by blind Nature and Chance. " But Art and Mind afterwards ſpringing " up out of theſe, to have begotten cer- " tain ludicrous Things, which have little " Truth and Reality in them, but are like " Images in a Glaſs, ſuch as Picture and " Muſick produces. Wherefore theſe Men " attribute all Ethicks, Politicks, Morality " and Laws, not to Nature, but to Art, " whoſe Productions are not real and ſub- " ſtantial."

7. Now this Philoſopher, that he may evince that Ethicks, Politicks and Morality are as real and ſubſtantial Things, and as truly natural as thoſe Things which belong to Matter, he endeavours to ſhew that Souls and Minds do not ſpring ſecondarily out of Matter and Body, but that they are real Things in Nature, ſuperior and antecedent to Body and Matter. His Words are theſe: [q] " Theſe " Men are all ignorant concerning the

[q] Ψυχὴν ὦ ἑταῖρε ἠγνοηκέναι κινδυνεύουσι μὲ ὀλίγοι ξύμπαντες, οἷόν τε ὂν τυγχάνει κ) δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει, τῶν τε ἄλλων αὐτῆς πέρι, & δὴ κ) γενέσεως ὡς σὺ πρώτοις ἐφι σωμάτων ἔμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη, & μεταβολῆς τε αὐτῶν κ) μετακοσμήσεως ἁπάσης ἄρχη παντὸς μᾶλλον.

" Nature of Mind and Soul, as in other " Regards, ſo eſpecially in reſpect of its " Original, as it is in order of Nature " before Matter and Body, and does not " reſult out of it; but does command it, " govern it, and rule it."

AND I have in like manner in this antecedent Diſcourſe, endeavoured to ſhew that Wiſdom, Knowledge, Mind and Intellect, are no thin Shadows or Images of corporeal and ſenſible Things, nor do reſult ſecondarily out of Matter and Body, and from the Activity and Impreſſions thereof; but have an independent and ſelf-ſubſiſtent Being, which in order of Nature, is before Body; all particular created Minds being but derivative Participations of one Infinite Eternal Mind, which is antecedent to all corporeal Things.

8. NOW from hence it naturally follows, that thoſe Things which belong to Mind and Intellect, ſuch as Morality, Ethicks, Politicks and Laws are, which *Plato* calls, [r] *The Offspring and Productions of Mind, are no leſs to be accounted natural Things, or real and ſubſtantial, than thoſe Things*

[r] Νοῦ γεννήματα οὐχ ἧττον φύσει εἶναι ἢ φύσεως.

which

which belong to ſtupid and ſenſeleſs Matter: For ſince Mind and Intellect are firſt in order of Nature before Matter and Body, thoſe Things which belong to the Mind muſt needs be in order of Nature before thoſe Things which belong to the Body. [s] " Wherefore Mind and Intel- " lect, Art and Law, Ethicks and Morality " are firſt in order of Nature, before Hard " and Soft, Light and Heavy, Long and " Broad, which belong to Body;" and therefore more real and ſubſtantial Things. For ſince Mind and Intellect are a higher, more real and ſubſtantial Thing than ſenſeleſs Body and Matter, and what hath far the more Vigour, Activity and Entity in it, Modifications of Mind and Intellect, ſuch as Juſtice and Morality, muſt of Neceſſity be more real and ſubſtantial Things, than the Modifications of meer ſenſeleſs Matter, ſuch as Hard and Soft, Thick and Thin, Hot and Cold, and the like are. And therefore that grave Philoſopher ex-

[s] Ἆρα ἐκ τῆς ἀνάγκης τὰ ψυχῆς συγγενῆ πρότερα ἂν εἴη γεγονότα τῶν σώματι προσηκόντων, ὅσης ταύτης πρεσβυτέρας ἡ σώματος, νοῦς καὶ τέχνη καὶ νόμος καὶ τρόπος καὶ ἤθη σκληρῶν καὶ μαλακῶν, βαρέων καὶ κούφων, μηκοῦς σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους πρότερα.

excellently well concludes, [t] that "the greatest and first Works and Actions are of Art or of Mind, which were before Body; but those Things which are said to be by Nature (in which they abuse the Word *Nature*, appropriating it only to senseless and inanimate Matter) are afterwards, being governed by Mind and Art."

9. WHEREFORE I thought our former Discourse seasonable to confute the Dulness and Grossness of those Philosophasters that make corporeal Things existing without the Soul, to be the only solid and substantial Things, and make their grossest external Senses the only Judges of Reality of Things, [u] "and so conclude nothing is or has "any Reality but what they can grasp in "their Hands, or have some gross or palpable Sense of."

WHEREAS notwithstanding it is most true that those corporeal Qualities, which they think to be such Real Things exist-

[t] Τὰ μιγάλα καὶ πρῶτα ἔργα καὶ πράξεις τέχνης ἂν γίγνοιτο ὄντα ἐν πρώτοις, τὰ δὲ φύσει καὶ φύσις (ἣν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπονομάζουσιν) αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὕστερα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ἂν ἐκ τέχνης ἦεν καὶ νοῦ.

[u] Ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ ἃ ἂν δύνανται ἅπτεις ταῖς χερσὶ λαβέσθαι.

ing

ing in Bodies without them, are for the moſt part fantaſtick and imaginary Things, and have no more Reality than the Colours of the Rainbow; and, as *Plotinus* expreſſeth it, [x] " have no Reality at all in the " Objects without us, but only a ſeeming " Kind of Entity in our own Fancies;" and therefore are not abſolutely any Thing in themſelves, but only relative to Animals. So that they do in a manner mock us, when we conceive of them as Things really exiſting without us, being nothing but our own Shadows, and the vital paſſive Energies of our own Souls.

THOUGH it was not the Intention of God or Nature to abuſe us herein, but a moſt wiſe Contrivance thus to beautify and adorn the viſible and material World, to add Luſtre or Imbelliſhment to it, that it might have Charms, Reliſhes and Allurements in it, to gratify our Appetites; Whereas otherwiſe really in it ſelf, the whole corporeal World in its naked Hue, is nothing elſe but a Heap of Duſt or Atoms, of ſeveral Figures and Magnitudes,

[x] Καὶ ἐκ ἐν τοῖς ὑπακτιμένοις, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν.

variouſly agitated up and down; ſo that theſe Things, which we look upon as ſuch real Things without us, are not properly the Modifications of Bodies themſelves, but ſeveral Modifications, Paſſions and Affections of our own Souls.

10. NEITHER are theſe paſſive and ſympathetical Energies of the Soul, when it acts confuſedly with the Body and the Pleaſures reſulting from them, ſuch real and ſubſtantial things as thoſe that ariſe from the pure noetical Energies of the Soul it ſelf Intellectually and Morally; for ſince the Mind and Intellect is in it ſelf a more real and ſubſtantial Thing, and fuller of Entity than Matter and Body, thoſe Things which are [y] *the pure Offspring of the Mind*, and ſprout from the Soul it ſelf, muſt needs be more real and ſubſtantial than thoſe Things which bloſſom from the Body, or from the Soul infeebled by it, and ſlumbering in it.

11. WHEREFORE that Philoſopher profeſſing and underſtanding to confute Atheiſts, and to ſhew, [z] *That all Atheiſts, though they*

[y] Νοῦ γεννήματα.

[z] Τοὺς λόγων ἀπτομένους ἀσεβῶν μηδὲν ἧττον τοῖς λόγοις ἀλλ' ἐξημαρτημένους χεῖσθαι.

pretend

pretend to Wit never so much, are but Bunglers at Reason, and sorry Philosophers, He, not without Cause, fetches his Discourse from hence, that [a] "They that thus infect Mens "Minds with Impiety and Atheism, make that "which is the first Cause of all Genera- "tion and Corruption, to be the last Thing "in the Universe, and that which is the "last to be the first: From hence proceeds "their Errour concerning the Being of "God;" that is, they make Mind and Soul to be the last Thing, and Body and Matter to be the first.

THIS therefore is the only Course and Method which this Philosopher proceeds in to confute the Atheists; to shew, [b] "That "Mind and Soul, in the Order of the "Universe, are before Body, and not poste- "rior to it; Mind and Soul being that "which rules in the Universe, and Body "that which is ruled and ordered by it." And there is no Phenomenon in the World but may be salved from this Hypothesis.

[a] Ὅτι ὁ πρῶτον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς αἴτιον ἁπάντων, τοῦτο δὲ πρῶτον ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἀπεφήναντο εἶναι γεγονὸς οἱ τὴν τῶν ἀσεβῶν ψυχὴν ἀπεργασάμενοι λόγοι, ὁ δὲ ὕστερον πρότερον, ὅθεν ἡμαρτήκασι περὶ θεῶν τὸ ὄντως εἶναι.

[b] Ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώματος, σῶμα δὲ δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον, ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν.

Now

Now this he demonſtrates, even from local Motion, becauſe Body and Matter has no ſelf-moving Power, and therefore it is moved and determined in its Motion by a higher Principle, a Soul or Mind; which Argument is further improved by the Author of that excellent philoſophical Treatiſe, *Book* II. *Chap.* 11.

12. Now, for the ſelf-ſame Cauſe, I have endeavoured to demonſtrate in the foregoing Diſcourſe, that Knowledge and Intellection cannot poſſibly ſpring from Senſe, nor the Radiation or Impreſſes of Matter and Body upon that which knows, but from an active Power of the Mind, as a Thing antecedent to Matter, and independent upon it, whereby it is enabled from within it ſelf to exert intelligible Ideas of all Things.

13. Lastly, I have inſiſted the rather ſo largely upon this Argument, for this further Reaſon alſo, becauſe it is not poſſible that there ſhould be any ſuch Thing as Morality, unleſs there be a God, that is, an Infinite Eternal Mind that is the firſt Original and Source of all Things, whoſe Nature is the firſt Rule and Exemplar of Morality; for otherwiſe it is not conceivable, whence any ſuch Thing ſhould

be

be derived to particular Intellectual Beings. Now there can be no such Thing as God, if stupid and senseless Matter be the first Original of all Things; and if all Being and Perfection that is found in the World, may spring up and arise out of the dark Womb of unthinking Matter; but if Knowledge and Understanding, if Soul, Mind and Wisdom may result and emerge out of it, then doubtless every thing that appears in the World may; and so Night, Matter, and *Chaos*, must needs be the first and only Original of all Things.

14. WHEREFORE *Plato*, as I have already intimated, taking Notice of the Opinion of divers Pretenders to Philosophy, [c] "That Fire, Water, Air and Earth, are "the first Beings of all, to which senseless and inanimate Things they appropriate the Title of Nature: But that "Soul did spring up afterward out of these "as a secondary Thing," and as a meer Shadow of them, he immediately adds concerning it, [d] "We have here found

[c] Πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι καὶ τὴν φύσιν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα αὐτά, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὕστερον.

[d] Οἷον πήγην τινα ἀνοήτου δόξης ἀνευρήκαμεν ἀνθρώπων ὁπόσον πώποτε τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἐφάψαντο ζητημάτων.

" and discovered the true Fountain of all " that atheistical Madness that possesses most " of those that deal in Physiology or " Questions of Natural Philosophy," *viz.* That they are all possessed with this Sottishness, that Matter and Body is the first Original of all Things; and therefore it is observed by the same Author, that the same Persons that held all Things were derived from Body, Blind Nature and Chance, did both deny the Existence of God, and which is consentaneous thereunto, asserted, that Justice and Morality have no Nature or Entity at all, saying, they were nothing but Passion from Corporeal Things, without the Sentient or the Renitence, or the Reaction made upon local Motion in a Body duly mixed and tempered: that is, if Soul and Mind, Knowledge and Wisdom may thus arise from the Contemplation of meer senseless Matter, and Radiation or Impression that is the meer local Motion of corporeal Objects without, then, as we said before, there cannot possibly be the least Shadow of Argument left to prove a Deity by; since not only the Souls of Men, but also all that Wisdom, Counsel and Contri-

Contrivance that apppears in the Frame of the whole viſible World, might firſt ariſe in like manner from the meer caſual Concourſe and Contemperation of the whole Matter; either in thoſe particular Bodies of the Sun and Stars, or elſe in the whole Syſtem and Compages of the material World it ſelf.

15. WHEREFORE we have not only ſhewed that all Intellection and Knowledge does not emerge or emane out of Senſe, but alſo that Senſe it ſelf is not a meer Paſſion or Reception of corporeal Impreſſes without, but that it is an active Energy and Vigour, though ſympathetical in the Sentient. And it is no more poſſible that this ſhould ariſe out of ſenſeleſs Matter and Atoms, by reaſon of any peculiar Contemperation or Contexture of them in reſpect of Figure, Site, and Motion, than that which all Atheiſts ſtoutly deny, that ſomething ſhould ariſe out of nothing.

AND here we can never ſufficiently applaud that antient atomical Philoſophy, ſo ſucceſsfully revived of late by *Carteſius*, in that it ſhews diſtinctly what Matter is, and what it can amount unto, namely, nothing

nothing elſe but what may be produced from meer Magnitude, Figure, Site, local Motion, and Reſt; from whence it is demonſtrably evident and mathematically certain, that no Cogitation can poſſibly ariſe out of the Power of Matter; whereas that other Philoſophy which brings in a dark unintelligible Matter that is nothing and every thing, out of whoſe Potentiality not only innumerable Qualities, but alſo ſubſtantial Forms and ſenſitive Souls, (and therefore why not rational alſo, ſince all Reaſon emerges out of Senſe) may be educed, muſt of neceſſity perpetually brood and hatch Atheiſm. Whereas we cannot but extremely admire that monſtrous Dotage and Sottiſhneſs of *Epicurus*, and ſome other ſpurious Pretenders to this Atomical Philoſophy, that notwithſtanding they acknowledge nothing elſe in Matter beſides Magnitude, Figure, Site, and Motion, yet would make not only the Power of Senſation, but alſo of Intellection and Ratiocination, and therefore all human Souls, to ariſe from the mere Contexture of corporeal Atoms, and utterly explode all incorporeal Subſtances; than which

which two Aſſertions nothing can be more contradictious. And this is far more abſurd, to make Reaſon and Intellection to ariſe from Magnitude, Figure and Motion, than to attribute thoſe unintelligible Qualities to Matter which they explode.

F I N I S.

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